DAWNIELLE RICHMOND V CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAWNIELLE RICHMOND, Individually and as
Next Friend of OLIVIA BRYANT, AMANDA
BROWN, RACHEL BRYANT, and THERESA
BRYANT, Minors,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 246833
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-219805-NI
CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES and
ARCHDIOCESE OF DETROIT,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KATHIE SPRATT, REGINA BOMAN, ANN
MURPHY, LISA MOLLOY, CRISTINA
PIEXOTO, and ABIGAIL MCINTYRE,
Defendants.
.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). This case involves claims that
Catholic Social Services (CSS), through its employees, acted improperly and unlawfully with
respect to services related to the placement and adoption planning of a minor child, where the
parental rights to the child and her three older siblings were terminated, and where Dawnielle
Richmond, sister of the biological mother, provided foster care to the three siblings and sought
the adoption of all four children. Foster parents, unrelated to the children, provided separate
foster care for the youngest child, who they wished to adopt, and, for a short period of time, they
also provided foster care for the three older siblings. Eventually, Richmond adopted all four
children after she challenged, in court, the adoption findings and decisions made by the Michigan
Children’s Institute in regard to the youngest child that were predicated on CSS’ input. We
affirm.
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Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred in finding defendants immune, and thus
the court erred in granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Glancy v
City of Roseville, 457 Mich 580, 583; 577 NW2d 897 (1998). MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests, in part,
whether claims are barred due to immunity granted by law. Id. The contents of the complaint
are accepted as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the moving party.
Pusakulich v City of Ironwood, 247 Mich App 80, 82; 635 NW2d 323 (2001). In analyzing a
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), the trial court must consider all
affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence if submitted or filed by the
parties. Id. When facts material to the immunity claim are not disputed, the issue becomes
whether the defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Gilliam v Hi-Temp Products,
Inc, 260 Mich App 98, 108-109; 677 NW2d 856 (2003).
Immunity extends to social workers in regard to activities involving the initiating and
monitoring of child placement proceedings and to placement recommendations in cases where
there is close oversight of the recommendations by the court. Martin v Children’s Aid Society,
215 Mich App 88, 95-99; 544 NW2d 651 (1996). Absolute immunity is necessary to assure that
the system can continue to function effectively. Id. at 96. The Martin panel stated that “we
find convincing the decisions granting absolute immunity to social workers” and that “absolute
immunity is necessary to assure that our important child protection system can continue to
function effectively[.]” Id. at 97. To permit social workers to become lighting rods for harassing
litigation would seriously hinder the effectiveness of Michigan’s child protection schemes. Id. at
96, quoting Coverdell v Dep’t of Social & Health Services, 834 F2d 758, 765 (CA 9, 1987). In
Spikes v Banks, 231 Mich App 341, 347; 586 NW2d 106 (1998), this Court ruled that “[w]e
agree with the circuit court and affirm its grant of summary disposition to Teen Ranch [child care
organization making foster care placements] based on its absolute immunity from tort liability
arising from its placement and supervision of plaintiff.”1
It is undisputed that this case involves the placement of children and adoption planning
activities by social workers stemming from child protection proceedings. Plaintiffs acknowledge
that CSS supervises foster care placements and recommends adoption placements, and the
gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint and grievances is that CSS undertook these functions in an
inappropriate and unlawful manner. Therefore, under Spikes and Martin, it would appear that
defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from liability.
Plaintiffs erroneously identify the immunity in question in this case as governmental
immunity. But this case does not involve governmental immunity. Martin specifically
distinguished its grant of absolute immunity to social workers from immunity granted to
governmental entities and employees under MCL 691.1407. Martin, supra at 95-96 n 5. The
immunity at issue here has nothing to do with CSS’ relationship to the government or
governmental immunity. Defendants and other social workers are immune because of their
1
Teen Ranch placed a fourteen-year-old female in a foster home, where she became impregnated
by a twenty-three-year-old occupant of the home.
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important role in child protective proceedings, not because of their relationship to the
government. Therefore, plaintiffs’ discussion of governmental immunity is misplaced and
unavailing.
Plaintiffs next argue that defendants proceeded in bad faith, or minimally there exists an
issue of fact as to whether they acted in bad faith, and thus defendants are not afforded protection
by any immunity status. In Martin, supra at 93, this Court noted the nature of the plaintiffs’
claims, stating that “[p]laintiffs made various allegations against defendants, including
negligence, breach of statutory and contractual duties, bad faith, and violation of their
constitutional rights.” (Emphasis added.) Because the Martin panel held that it was appropriate
for the entire action to be dismissed, it necessarily ruled that a claim of bad faith could not
survive the defense of absolute immunity.2 Plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on Snell v Tunnell, 920 F2d
673 (CA 10, 1990) is misplaced. In Snell, supra at 689, the federal appeals court held that social
worker activity which is not integral to the judicial process is not afforded absolute immunity.
The Tenth Circuit stated that “courts have looked to the particular task a defendant was
performing and its nexus to the judicial process rather than deciding that social workers or
guardians ad litem as a class are entitled to absolute immunity.” Id. at 687. The federal appeals
court concluded that social workers, who sought a pre-petition conditional protective custody
order in an investigation into neglect at an emergency shelter, and who were accused of
knowingly using and conveying false information, were entitled to only qualified immunity, like
police officers, from civil rights liability under 42 USC 1983. Id. at 691-692.
Here, as in Martin, plaintiffs did not pursue a § 1983 action. The Martin panel indicated
that “immunity may be unavailable for social workers in an action brought under 42 USC 1983.
However, plaintiffs do not allege a cause of action against the CAS [Children’s Aid Society]
defendants under that section.” Martin, supra at 95 n 4. Regardless whether Snell conflicts with
our opinion today or not, it is irrelevant because we are bound by Michigan law, i.e., Martin and
Spikes, not federal law. Additionally, in Martin, this Court did not rule that social workers have
absolute immunity with respect to all aspects of their employment. The Court stated:
Further, while Kurzawa [v Mueller, 732 F2d 1456 (CA 6, 1984),] has been
described as granting “blanket absolute immunity” to social workers, as the
dissent notes, our decision is not properly so described. It is limited to the facts
of this case, in which the close oversight of the social worker’s placement
recommendations by the probate court is especially noteworthy. [Martin, supra at
96 n 5.]
Plaintiffs seize this language, asserting that the case at bar does not fit within the
framework of Martin and is thus distinguishable. Plaintiffs contend that, because CSS is not a
governmental entity and not under the direct supervision of the court, absolute immunity is not
applicable. Plaintiffs further maintain that “CSS was engaged in the prohibited act of baby
brokering, far outside the jurisdiction” of the court.
2
We also note that the concepts of “good faith” and “bad faith’ typically arise in matters
regarding qualified immunity. See Guider v Smith, 431 Mich 559, 566; 431 NW2d 810 (1988).
-3-
In Martin, CAS was a private organization just as CSS here. CAS was contracted to
provide services for neglected and abused children, and it placed the minor child at issue in
Martin into a foster care home. The Martin plaintiffs sued CAS and four of its employees,
along with suing the Department of Social Services (now FIA) and some of its employees. The
underlying basis of the suit in Martin concerned the initiation and continuation of child
protection proceedings against the parents predicated on claims of physical abuse that were
vehemently denied by the plaintiff parents. Eventually, the minor child was removed from the
wardship and foster care placement and returned to the care of her parents. In support of its
decision, the Court stated:
[P]laintiffs have not been without a remedy regarding the allegedly
wrongful conduct of the CAS defendants. The probate court regularly reviewed
the placement recommendations of the CAS defendants at statutorily required
hearings. This provided judicial oversight sufficient to protect plaintiffs from
allegedly wrongful conduct against their interests by the CAS defendants.
Plaintiffs had the statutory right to request accelerated hearings to contest their
case service plan. The probate court had broad power to address concerns with
the case service plan if, after a hearing, they were found to be legitimate. To
allow plaintiffs additional protection in the form of a cause of action against the
CAS defendants for money damages would be too costly; it would “disserve the
broader public interest in having participants [in contested child protection cases]
. . . perform their respective functions without fear of having to defend their
actions in a civil lawsuit.” [Id. at 98-99 (citations omitted; alteration and
omission in original).]
Here, while a foster parent’s or potential adopting parent’s interests are at issue instead of
a parent who is subject to having his or her parental rights terminated, there remained judicial
oversight of the process. Although not entirely clear from the opinion, it appears that the
complaint against CAS in Martin regarded placement of the child in foster care and continuing
efforts to keep the child in protective care and away from the natural parents because of
suspected abuse.3 Decisions, recommendations, and activities regarding the placement of
children in a particular foster care home and adoption planning are distinguishable from those
regarding removal and separation of children from an abusive home environment.4 Yet those
3
The context of the Martin decision is reflected in the following passage:
These precedents [from federal appellate courts] recognize the important
role that social workers play in court proceedings to determine when to remove a
child from the home and how long to maintain the child in foster care. They also
recognize that, to do that difficult job effectively, social workers must be allowed
to act without fear of intimidating or harassing lawsuits by dissatisfied or angry
parents. [Martin, supra at 96 (citation omitted).]
4
In their respective appellate briefs, the parties give conflicting accounts on whether CSS was
involved in the initial placement of the youngest child and in the temporary placement of the
older siblings in the other foster home (not Richmond’s home), as opposed to only being
(continued…)
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recommendations, decisions, and activities are also vital to the overall well-being of a child, and
we believe equally deserving of absolute immunity protection. We reach this conclusion
because, consistent with Martin, foster care placement and adoption are overseen by the family
court and mechanisms exist to challenge actions and recommendations by social workers. See
generally, Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq.; MCR 3.800 et seq. (Adoption);
Chapter XIIA of the Probate Code of 1939 – Juveniles and Juvenile Division, MCL 712A.1 et
seq.; MCR 3.901 et seq. (Proceedings Involving Juveniles). This is best evidenced by the simple
fact that Richmond was able to petition a court, challenge adoption recommendations, point out
the alleged improprieties of CSS, and request and obtain adoption of the youngest child. In a
hearing, the family court judge harshly rebuked and criticized the actions of the FIA and CSS.
Moreover, Spikes makes abundantly clear that “placement” actions by social workers are subject
to absolute immunity. We conclude that defendants are absolutely immune from liability under
the circumstances of the case.
The trial court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCL 2.116(C)(7) only on
plaintiffs’ tort claims. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court incorrectly granted summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) on their implied contract and third-party beneficiary
claims. But defendants contend on appeal that their immunity was total and should have
resulted in the dismissal of all the claims in this case. Under the reasoning in Martin, the goal
expressed by this Court was to grant immunity to social workers so they could make their
important decisions without fear of reprisal in the form of civil suits. Furthermore, as noted
above, Martin involved claims such as breach of statutory and contractual duties, but none
survived absolute immunity, and the contractual claims likewise fail here.
We do note, however, that summary disposition was also appropriate on the contractual
claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because the contracts alleged by plaintiffs merely amounted to
an obligation to follow the law. “A pledge to undertake a preexisting statutory duty is not
supported by adequate consideration.” General Aviation, Inc v Capital Region Airport Authority
(On Remand), 224 Mich App 710, 715; 569 NW2d 883 (1997). In this case, the trial court
correctly ruled that defendants’ preexisting duty to follow the law could not constitute
consideration for the contract plaintiffs attempt to imply. Plaintiffs failed to state a claim on
which the trial court could grant relief, and summary disposition was appropriate under MCL
2.116(C)(8). We also find that the contractual claims appear to have been an attempt to
circumvent an immunity defense, and the essence of the plaintiffs’ claims sound in tort. As our
Supreme Court stated in Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 135; 597 NW2d 817 (1999), a
plaintiff “cannot avoid the protection of . . . immunity by artful pleading; the gravamen of
plaintiff’s action is determined by considering the entire claim.”
(…continued)
involved in the adoption planning, or whether this was the work solely of the FIA. For purposes
of this appeal, any conflict is not pertinent.
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Finally, plaintiffs contend that summary disposition was inappropriate because genuine
issues of material fact remain. We disagree. As we concluded, supra, the trial court correctly
granted summary disposition pursuant to MCL 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). This is true regardless of
the existence of any disputed facts because they are immaterial. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims are
without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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