IN RE SEABOLT/HALE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TAYLOR ANN SEABOLT,
CHRYSTAL LYNN HALE, LANDON
EMMANUEL HALE, and KAITELYNNE ELISE
HALE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252846
Branch Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-002583-NA
JONATHON HALE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRANDALYN WERTZ HALE and JOLIANNE
CONLEY,
Respondents.
In the Matter of TAYLOR ANN SEABOLT,
CHRYSTAL LYNN HALE, LANDON
EMMANUEL HALE, and KAITELYNNE ELISE
HALE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252864
Branch Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-002583-NA
BRANDALYN WERTZ HALE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JONATHON HALE,
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Respondent.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and O’Connell and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Jonathan Hale and Brandalyn Wertz Hale
appeal as of right from the trial court order terminating respondent father’s parental rights to the
minor Hale children: Landon, Kaitelynne, and Chrystal, and respondent mother’s parental rights
to the minor children Taylor Seabolt and Chrystal Hale, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) and (j). We
affirm.
This case came to the attention of the Family Independence Agency when Kaitelynne,
then nearly three, was brought to the emergency room by her mother, Jolianne Conley, and was
found to be dehydrated with extremely high, life-threatening blood sodium levels. Landon, age
four, was brought to the emergency room in similar condition by police several hours later.
According to the testimony of a pediatric intensivist who cared for Landon and Kaitelynne while
they were hospitalized, their condition could only have resulted from the intentional withholding
of water. The fact that they were not more debilitated implied that their sodium levels rose over
a protracted period of five to seven days. Several other medical witnesses, including one
presented by respondent mother, indicated that the condition could result from water deprivation
or salt poisoning.1 Both children had been in the custody of respondent mother and father for the
preceding week. Respondent mother’s child from a previous relationship, Taylor, and her child
with respondent father, Chrystal, both of whom were also in respondent mother and father’s
custody, were examined and found to have normal sodium levels.
The trial court did not err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. MCR 3.977(J);
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); MCL 712A.19b(3). Respondent
father’s parental rights were properly terminated on the ground that he had the opportunity to
prevent physical injury or abuse to his children or, with regard to Chrystal, the siblings of his
child, but failed to do so. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). When a state trooper and a social worker
initially interviewed respondent father, he stated that he realized some things were going on and
that respondent mother treated her own children much better than Landon and Kaitelynne. He
stated that the first thing the children asked for when he came home from work was a drink of
water and that he had seen respondent mother hitting Landon with a belt just before the police
had arrived. The night the children were hospitalized, respondent father stated in a conversation
with Jodie Green, the maternal grandmother of Landon and Kaitelynne, that he knew respondent
mother was doing things to the children, putting things in their food and drinks, and that people
1
Dr. Robertson, who testified for respondent mother, opined that diarrhea was the most likely
cause of the children’s extreme dehydration and elevated sodium. However, that theory was not
supported by other evidence.
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had tried to tell him about her but “I guess it took this for me to wake up.” The trial court found
the witnesses who testified to these admissions to be credible, and the court’s judgment is
entitled to deference. In re Miller, supra at 337. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court’s conclusion that respondent father failed to prevent injury or the abuse of his children
when he had the opportunity to do so.
The trial court also did not clearly err in finding that respondent father would not protect
the children in the future. Respondent father and mother married some six weeks after the events
in question and during the pendency of these proceedings. At the termination trial, respondent
father denied his earlier admissions and testified that he had no suspicions concerning respondent
mother and no information that she had done anything to cause Landon and Kaitelynne’s
condition. Given respondent father’s denial of any abuse or injury, the trial court was justified in
concluding that he remained unable to protect his children from future abuse or injury. Based on
the same reasoning, we conclude that the trial court was clearly justified in terminating
respondent father’s parental rights to Kaitelynne and Landon under MCL 712A.19b(b)(iii)
(nonparent caused injury or abuse to child or sibling).2
Respondent mother’s parental rights were properly terminated on the grounds that she
caused injury or abuse to the siblings of her children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i).3 The medical
evidence, much of which we have already noted, convincingly established that Kaitelynne and
Landon’s condition could only have resulted from water deprivation or salt poisoning. The
children were primarily in the care of respondent mother the week before they were hospitalized,
with respondent father returning home in the early evening. Respondent mother’s theory that the
children’s extreme condition was caused by diarrhea is not supported by the evidence. The
medical witnesses were in agreement that diarrhea would have to be severe to cause the
2
However, this section cannot support the termination of respondent father’s parental rights with
respect to Chrystal because respondent mother is her parent. MCL 712A.13a(g).
3
We note that there was argument in the trial court about whether statutory subsection (b) could
be relied upon for the termination of respondent mother’s parental rights to Taylor, because she
is not the biological sibling or half sibling of Landon or Kaitelynne. She did become their
stepsibling by virtue of the respondents’ marriage. It is not clear from the record whether the
trial court relied on statutory subsection (b) to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights to
Taylor.
We conclude that Landon and Kaitelynne may be considered “siblings” of Taylor. The
children are in fact stepsiblings who would jointly be under the care of respondent mother on at
least a part time basis but for the instant proceedings. Under this factual scenario, there exists no
rational basis for treating Chrystal differently from Taylor merely because Chrystal shares
genetic material with Landon and Kaitelynne while Taylor does not. In any event the definition
of sibling is not determinative of the outcome of this appeal since we also find the that the trial
court properly terminated respondent mother’s parental rights under statutory subsection (j).
Termination need be based on only one statutory subsection. In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 247;
599 NW2d 772 (1999).
-3-
extremely elevated sodium levels found in the children. Respondent mother herself testified that
on the day she began to believe Kaitelynne and Landon were ill, she was aware of no diarrhea
for Landon and only one loose stool for Kaitelynne. Significantly, respondent father, who was in
the home every evening during the week, had no knowledge of either of the children having
diarrhea. Based on this evidence, the trial court was amply justified in its specific finding that
the condition of the children was not caused by diarrhea. Further, respondent mother’s theory
that the giving of pedialyte to the children was a cause or a contributing cause of their elevated
sodium also lacks credibility. The medical evidence consistently indicated that pedialyte would
not cause the sodium levels found. Moreover, respondent mother stated to the police on the day
the children were hospitalized that she was giving pedialyte to all the children, but testified at
trial that she was giving it only to Kaitelynne and Landon because Taylor and Chrystal would not
drink it. We conclude that the trial court was justified in rejecting the contention that the
children’s life-threatening condition was caused by the consumption of pedialyte.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding a reasonable likelihood that respondent
mother’s children will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in her care.
The evidence gave rise to a strong inference that respondent mother salt poisoned or withheld
water from Kaitelynne and Landon. Those medical witnesses who offered an opinion on the
matter were in agreement that the children’s condition came about over a period of several days
to a week. The fact that Taylor and Chrystal were in normal and healthy condition while Landon
and Kaitelynne were severely dehydrated with extremely elevated sodium levels strongly
suggests different treatment of the two sets of children and, therefore, intentional action. Even
though respondent mother’s own children were unscathed in this instance, we are in agreement
with the trial court that a person who committed abuse that could have ended the lives of two
young children clearly cannot be entrusted with the care of any child. Various cases recognize
that “‘[h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other
children.’” In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 84; 627 NW2d 33 (2001), quoting In re LaFlure, 48
Mich App 377, 392; 210 NW2d 482 (1973). Certainly the emotional well being of a child who is
witness to other children in her mother’s care being deprived of water nearly to the point of death
is severely at risk. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in
finding a reasonable likelihood that respondent mother’s children would suffer injury or abuse if
placed in her home.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of both respondents under MCL
712A.19b(3)(j), and we affirm on that basis as well. The evidence showing that the children are
likely to suffer abuse or injury if returned to their respective parents also establishes under
statutory subsection (j) that, because of respondents’ conduct or capacity, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to their care.
The record as a whole does not indicate that termination is clearly contrary to the best
interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5). Landon and Kaitelynne are in the care of their
mother, who has been their primary caretaker for the majority of their lives. Chrystal, now two,
was committed to the Michigan Children’s Institute for adoption. On a record indicating
respondent father lacks either ability or inclination to protect his children, termination cannot be
said to be contrary to their best interests. Taylor, the child of respondent mother only, is now in
the care of her father. The evidence indicated that Taylor and Chrystal are well bonded with
respondent mother. However, on the entire record, including strong evidence that respondent
-4-
mother intentionally abused Kaitelynne and Landon, it does not appear that termination was
clearly contrary to the best interests of Taylor and Chrystal.
Finally, respondent mother contends on appeal that the trial court improperly considered
evidence beyond the plea taken at the adjudication of this matter to terminate her parental rights
at the initial dispositional hearing. However, MCR 3.977(E)(3), effective at the time of the
instant proceedings, allows for termination at the initial dispositional hearing based on legally
admissible evidence introduced at the trial, plea proceedings, or the dispositional hearing.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in relying upon legally admissible evidence admitted at the
dispositional hearing to terminate respondents’ parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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