PEOPLE OF MI V BRENT DAVID SEEVER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245615
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-013990
BRENT DAVID SEEVER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750. 227b. Defendant was sentenced to life in
prison for the first-degree felony murder conviction, and two years in prison for the felonyfirearm conviction. The sentence for defendant’s second-degree murder conviction was vacated.
We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for
first-degree felony murder premised upon first-degree home invasion. We disagree.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo and in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hunter,
466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002); People v Knowles, 256 Mich App 53, 58; 662 NW2d 824
(2003). Felony murder consists of the killing of a human being with the intent to kill, to do great
bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or
great bodily harm was the probable result while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting
in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in MCL 750.316(1)(b). People
v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 258; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). The underlying felony involved in this
case is home invasion in the first degree, a felony enumerated in MCL 750.316(1)(b). The
elements of first-degree home invasion applicable to this case are as follows:
A person who breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without
permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the
dwelling, commits a felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of home invasion in the
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first degree if at any time while the person is entering, present in, or exiting the
dwelling either of the following circumstances exists:
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon.
(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [MCL 750.110a(2); see
also People v Silver, 466 Mich 386, 390; 646 NW2d 150 (2002).]
The home invasion charge was based on defendant committing an assault. An assault is
defined as “‘either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in
reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.’” People v Grant, 211 Mich App
200, 202; 535 NW2d 581 (1995), quoting People v Johnson, 407 Mich 196, 210; 284 NW2d 718
(1979). A battery is defined ‘"the willful touching of the person of another by the aggressor or
by some substance put in motion by him; or, as it is sometimes expressed, a battery is the
consummation of the assault.’" People v Bryant, 80 Mich App 428, 433; 264 NW2d 13 (1978)
quoting Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396, 401; 295 NW 201, 203 (1940).
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for felony
murder based upon first-degree home invasion, as there was no evidence that defendant intended
to commit an assault when he entered his ex-girlfriend Cathy Harcourt’s house. But according to
the statute, defendant did not need to have the requisite intent to commit assault when entering
the house. The statute requires that (1) defendant entered the house without permission; (2)
defendant committed an assault while entering, being present in, or exiting the dwelling; and (3)
defendant was either armed with a dangerous weapon, or another person was lawfully present in
the dwelling.
Upon review de novo, we find, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, that there was sufficient evidence to prove all of the elements of first-degree felonymurder premised on first-degree home invasion. See Hunter, supra at 6. First, defendant
admitted that he entered the dwelling in question without permission. Second, defendant
testified that he walked into Harcourt’s bedroom at approximately 5:30 a.m., with a gun in his
waistband, and turned on the lights to wake Ali Almansoop, the victim in this case. Defendant
further testified that Almansoop became frightened, began to yell, jumped out of bed and ran
towards the front door. Defendant testified that, when Almansoop jumped out of bed, he drew
his gun and began to run after Almansoop. Harcourt testified that her children were in the house
at the time this incident occurred. This evidence, most of which was defendant’s own testimony,
satisfies the elements of first-degree home invasion. It is sufficient to show that defendant (1)
entered Harcourt’s house without permission; (2) while inside the dwelling, defendant drew a
gun on Almansoop, and therefore, willfully committed an unlawful act which placed Almansoop
in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate harmful or offensive touching; and (3)
defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon and Harcourt’s children and Almansoop were
lawfully present in the dwelling at the time of the incident. We find that, based on the above
discussed evidence, a reasonable jury could convict defendant of first-degree felony murder
premised upon first-degree home invasion. See id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s statement at trial,
as it was obtained after his arrest, which was not supported by probable cause. Defendant further
claims that his statement should have suppressed, as it was obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. We disagree with both contentions.
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We review for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress
evidence. People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 319; 614 NW2d 647 (2000). However, we
review de novo the trial court’s ultimate decision regarding a motion to suppress. Williams,
supra at 319. Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions require that an arrest, with or
without a warrant, be supported by probable cause. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
The law permits a police officer to arrest an individual without a warrant “if a felony has been
committed and the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual committed the
felony.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 631; 588 NW2d 480 (1998); see also MCL
764.15(1)(c). Probable cause will be found when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense had been or is
being committed. People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Police
officers may make a valid investigatory stop, even without probable cause, if they possess
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 24; 88 S Ct
1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). The Court has since expanded Terry stops to crimes that have
already occurred. United States v Hensley, 469 US 221, 229; 105 S Ct 675; 83 L Ed 2d 604
(1985).
Here, an evidentiary hearing was conducted to determine whether the police had probable
cause to arrest defendant and whether defendant’s statement was improperly taken after his
requests for counsel. The trial court found that probable cause existed at the time of defendant’s
arrest. The trial court’s decision was largely based on Lincoln Park Police Sergeant Anthony
Klaft’s testimony. Klaft testified that, at the time of defendant’s arrest, he had the following
information: (1) Almansoop was Harcourt’s friend, who had stayed the night at Harcourt’s
house that night; (2) defendant was Harcourt’s ex-boyfriend and had stopped by recently to
rekindle the relationship, however, Harcourt was not interested in rekindling the relationship; (3)
a neighbor saw a light-colored mini-van leaving the scene of the crime; (4) defendant owned a
light-colored mini-van; (5) several .45 caliber shell casings were found near Almansoop’s body;
and, (6) defendant owned several guns, including a .45 caliber handgun. Klaft further testified
that he went to defendant’s place of work to question him regarding the incident. Upon arrival,
Klaft introduced himself to defendant and stated that he wanted to talk to him regarding an
incident that occurred in Lincoln Park that morning. Klaft testified that defendant immediately
stiffened up, looked down, began trembling and placed his hands behind his back in the
handcuffing position. Klaft then arrested defendant and brought him back to the Lincoln Park
Police Department. The trial court found that the information that the police had before the
arrest, coupled with defendant’s actions upon Klaft’s initiation of conversation with him, was
sufficient probable cause to allow the police to arrest defendant.
We find that, upon arrival at defendant’s work, the police had reasonable suspicion,
grounded in specific and articulable facts, that defendant was armed and involved in
Almansoop’s murder, and therefore, had the right to question defendant to further investigate
that suspicion. Hensley, supra at 229. We further find that defendant’s behavior, upon
investigation, coupled with the information already known by the police, was enough to raise the
level from reasonable suspicion to probable cause, as it was sufficient to warrant a reasonable
person to believe that defendant committed the offense. See Champion, supra at 115.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the police possessed sufficient probable
cause to arrest defendant, and therefore, properly admitted defendant’s statement into evidence.
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Defendant also claimed that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement, as it
was taken after defendant’s repeated requests for counsel. The trial court found that defendant
initially invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, but subsequently initiated further contact
with the police, and therefore, denied his motion to suppress. During a custodial interrogation,
the police must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to
have counsel present until counsel has been made available, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. People v Kowalski, 230
Mich App 464, 478; 582 NW2d 613 (1998). For purposes of Miranda,1 interrogation refers to
express questioning or its “functional equivalent.” Kowalski, supra at 479, citing Rhode Island v
Innis, 446 US 291, 300- 301; 100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980).
Upon arrival to the police station, defendant was placed in a holding cell. After
approximately one hour, Klaft retrieved defendant and brought him to the detective bureau
conference room for an interview. At this time, Klaft read defendant his Miranda rights,
provided defendant with the form containing the rights, and asked defendant to initial the form
next to each right. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, but refused to initial the
form without an attorney. Klaft then terminated the interview and returned defendant to the
holding cell. Two hours later, at approximately 4:00 p.m., defendant asked Lincoln Park
Detention Officer Tara Kennedy for a pain reliever, but she did not have any to give him.
Defendant then requested to speak with Klaft. Klaft again retrieved defendant from the holding
cell and brought him to the detective bureau conference room. Defendant was again advised of
his Miranda rights, and this time, defendant initialed the form next to each right. Defendant
indicated to Klaft that he was now willing to speak about the incident and gave a statement
regarding the events that took place that morning. Defendant now claims that he merely
reinitiated the conversation with Klaft to ask for a pain reliever and not for the purpose of further
discussing the investigation.
There is no question in this case that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation,
thus, triggering the need to give Miranda warnings to defendant. Further, it is undisputed that
defendant requested an attorney during his initial interrogation, thus, invoking his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. It is further undisputed that defendant subsequently reinitiated
contact with Klaft, however, the reason for the reinitiation is in dispute. Defendant now claims
that he merely reinitiated contact with Klaft to request a pain reliever. At trial, however,
defendant testified that he sought to speak with Klaft regarding the incident in question. Klaft
testified at the evidentiary hearing that defendant reinitiated contact with him in order to discuss
the incident. Klaft further testified that, at the time of reinitiation, defendant indicated that he
was willing to speak and that he wanted to write out a statement. Based on the above testimony,
we find that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and on review de novo find that,
based on these factual findings, defendant reinitiated contact with Klaft, subsequent to invoking
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, for the purpose of discussing the incident in question and,
therefore, defendant’s assertion of his right to counsel no longer protected his statement.
Kowalski, supra at 471-472, 478. Because defendant’s statement was not obtained in violation
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 694 (1966).
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of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court did not err in admitting the statement at
trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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