ROBERT EARL WINDHAM V OTIS SABBATH
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT EARL WINDHAM,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
TARA REED,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 244665
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-029188-NI
OTIS SABBATH,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury awarded plaintiff Robert Windham damages of $80,000 for injuries he sustained
in an automobile accident when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Otis
Sabbath. Judgment was entered on the verdict and defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict. Defendant maintains that the evidence failed to show that plaintiff suffered a serious
impairment of body function under MCL 500.3135. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed de novo. Sniecinski
v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). We must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve any conflict
in the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, to determine whether a question of fact existed.
-1-
Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998); Thomas v
McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643-644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
The no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., generally abolished tort liability in connection
with the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3),
however, tort liability remains for noneconomic loss if the injured person suffered a “serious
impairment of body function.” MCL 500.3135(1). “Serious impairment of body function” is
defined in the no-fault act as “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body
function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL
500.3135(7). Pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(a), the trial court must make factual findings before
determining whether the plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function or whether the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App
223, 232; 611 NW2d 333 (2000).
In this case, although we agree with defendant that the trial court did not make all the
requisite findings, it is apparent that the denial of defendant’s motion was proper because there
was a question of fact whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function.
Regarding the requirement of an objectively manifested impairment, for an impairment to
be objectively manifested, there must be a medically identifiable injury or condition that has a
physical basis. Jackson v Nelson, 252 Mich App 643, 653; 654 NW2d 604 (2002). At trial,
plaintiff presented evidence that Dr. Teklehaimonot diagnosed, and an MRI confirmed, a “C7
radiculopathy,” or “a pinched nerve at that level.” In addition, there was evidence that plaintiff
was diagnosed with cervical neuralgia in February or March 2002. Further, an MRI revealed
that plaintiff suffered from a disc protrusion. The trial court thus properly found that plaintiff
satisfied the “objectively manifested impairment” requirement.
As for the requirement that the impairment be of an important body function, an
important body function “is a function of the body that affects the person’s general ability to live
a normal life.” Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 340; 612 NW2d 838 (2000).
Defendant concedes, and this Court has held, that the back and neck involve important body
functions.1 See e.g., Chumley v Chrysler Corp, 156 Mich App 474, 480; 401 NW2d 879 (1986)
(back); Harris v Lemicex, 152 Mich App 149, 153; 393 NW2d 559 (1986) (movement of one’s
back is important body function).
Regarding the requirement that the [serious] impairment affect a person’s general ability
to lead his or her normal life, in Kreiner v Fischer, 468 Mich 885; 661 NW2d 234 (2003), the
Court stated, “[a]lthough a serious effect [on one’s general ability to lead his life] is not required,
any effect does not suffice either. Instead, the effect must be on one’s general ability to lead his
normal life.”
1
Defendant’s appellate brief contends that plaintiff did not establish an objectively manifested
impairment, but adds that should this Court conclude that a question of fact existed whether there
was an objectively manifested impairment, he concedes that back and neck are important body
functions.
-2-
[I]n determining whether the impairment of the important body function is
‘serious,’ the court should consider the following nonexhaustive list of factors:
extent of the injury, treatment required, duration of disability, and extent of
residual impairment and prognosis for eventual recovery. [Kern, supra at 341.]
The extent of the injury is determined by comparing one’s lifestyle before and after the injury.
May v Sommerfield (After Remand), 240 Mich App 504, 506; 617 NW2d 920 (2000). An injury
does not need to be permanent to be considered serious. Kern, supra at 341.
The evidence in this case discloses that a question of fact existed with regard to whether
plaintiff’s impairment affected his general ability to lead his normal life. Plaintiff testified that
he experiences chronic neck and back pain, and the problems are aggravated when he either sits
or stands for long periods. He further testified that he experiences problems with both of his
shoulders, and a toe on his left leg is always numb. He is also uncomfortable sleeping due to his
back pain. He takes medication daily to alleviate his pain, which is sometimes “unbearable,”
requiring hospitalization. Additionally, plaintiff testified that his injuries affected his work
because, before the accident, “I loaded the steel in the machine. I just had a regular job. And I
didn’t have a boring job sitting there pushing buttons. I was in the action.” Plaintiff was now
restricted to light duty at work. Regarding the effect of his injuries on his personal life, plaintiff
testified:
My lifestyle has changed. I used to be, you know, the type of fellow that
was out in the street. I like to pitch horseshoes; I liked horseback riding. I liked
to play a little basketball with the kids on the block. I used to go bicycle riding,
but all that now I’m unable to do. I liked to go hunting. I can’t do the walking.
Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there was sufficient evidence that plaintiff’s
impairment affected his general ability to lead his normal life.
Defendant further contends that even if there was a question of fact concerning a “serious
impairment of body function,” plaintiff’s impairment was caused by a second automobile
accident in which plaintiff was involved. Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, however, there was
sufficient evidence linking plaintiff’s impairments to the injuries sustained in the accident with
defendant. Dr. Teklehaimonot testified at deposition that plaintiff’s injuries most likely were
caused by the accident involving defendant on March 14, 1999, and plaintiff testified that he
suffered no new injuries in the second accident, but that pain that he suffered from the accident
with defendant returned.
II
Next, defendant argues that plaintiff’s counsel violated MCL 500.3030 and MRE 411 by
making repeated references to Allstate Insurance Company (and other insurance companies)
during the testimony of Dr. Kneiser, and also during his closing argument. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. Chmielewski
v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998).
-3-
Dr. Kneiser testified about her independent medical examination of plaintiff. On crossexamination, plaintiff’s counsel, over defendant’s objection, questioned Dr. Kneiser about
whether she performed examinations at the request of automobile insurance companies and
defense attorneys. Plaintiff’s counsel also questioned Dr. Kneiser about the fact that she faxed
her report to defense counsel and “Allstate.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the questioning was
relevant to Dr. Kneiser’s credibility and for the purpose of showing bias, a purpose expressly
permitted by MRE 411. Furthermore, the court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury,
advising it that the question of insurance had no bearing on any issue in the case and that it must
refrain from any inference, speculation, or discussion about insurance. To the extent counsel’s
questions or comments implicated MCL 500.3030, the court’s instruction was sufficient to cure
any perceived prejudice.
III
We also reject defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s counsel’s remarks during closing
argument denied him a fair trial. Kubisz v Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 236 Mich App 629, 638;
601 NW2d 160 (1999). The record does not reveal a deliberate course of conduct aimed at
preventing a fair and impartial trial. Indeed, defendant never objected to the remarks that he now
claims were improper. Any prejudice that did result was sufficiently cured by the trial court's
instructions that the attorneys' statements are not evidence and that the jury should disregard
anything said by an attorney which is not supported by the evidence. Tobin v Providence Hosp,
244 Mich App 626, 641; 624 NW2d 548 (2001); Hunt v CHAD Enterprises, Inc, 183 Mich App
59, 65; 454 NW2d 188 (1990).
IV
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Jeffrey Sagala to testify as
a rebuttal witness.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding rebuttal testimony for a clear abuse
of discretion. Taylor v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 205 Mich App 644, 655; 517
NW2d 864 (1994); Winiemko v Valenti, 203 Mich App 411, 418; 513 NW2d 181 (1994).
Rebuttal evidence is evidence which explains, contradicts, or otherwise refutes an opponent's
evidence. Its purpose is to undercut the opponent's case and not to merely confirm that of the
proponent. Sullivan Industries, Inc v Double Seal Glass Co, 192 Mich App 333, 348; 480 NW2d
623 (1991). Generally, rebuttal evidence must relate to a substantive rather than a collateral
matter, and contradictory evidence is admissible only when it directly tends to disprove a
witness' exact testimony. City of Westland v Okopski, 208 Mich App 66, 72; 527 NW2d 780
(1994). A trial court may admit evidence offered in rebuttal even if it incidentally tends to show
a matter as to which evidence is not usually admissible. Nolte v Port Huron Area School Dist Bd
of Ed, 152 Mich App 637, 645; 394 NW2d 54 (1986).
It is apparent from defendant’s summary of Dr. Sagala’s testimony and the transcript of
Dr. Sagala’s deposition, that the testimony was properly received to rebut Dr. Kneiser’s opinion,
after reviewing plaintiff’s medical tests and chiropractic treatment, that there was no clinical
evidence that plaintiff was suffering from the effects of a herniated disc in his cervical spine.
-4-
V
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed plaintiff’s counsel to
ask defendant, on cross-examination, about the make, model and ownership of the car that he
was driving when he struck plaintiff’s vehicle. Persichini v William Beaumont Hosp, 238 Mich
App 626, 632; 607 NW2d 100 (1999). The evidence was relevant, albeit minimally, because the
size of the vehicle was probative of the extent of the impact and amount of force that plaintiff
was subject to during the collision. MRE 401; Dep’t of Transportation v VanElslander, 460
Mich 127, 129; 594 NW2d 841 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.