RAAD AYAR V FOODLAND DISTRIBUTORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RAAD AYAR,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
and
VINCENT, INC., JOLIET, INC., and R & D
WHOLESALE, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
FOODLAND DISTRIBUTORS and LIVONIA
HOLDING COMPANY, INC.,
No. 242603
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 93-328590-CK
Defendants,
and
KROGER COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Kroger Company (Kroger) appeals as of right and plaintiff Raad Ayar (Ayar)
cross-appeals from the trial court’s June 21, 2002, judgment, following a bench trial. Kroger
additionally challenges the trial court’s June 24, 2002, postjudgment order awarding plaintiffs
Ayar and Vincent, Inc. (Vincent) costs and mediation1 sanctions of $555,275, of which $381,752
1
MCR 2.403 was amended in 2000 to substitute the phrase “case evaluation” for “mediation.”
We use the term “mediation” in this opinion because the mediation proceeding in this case took
place in 1995. In general, this Court applies the version of MCR 2.403 in effect at the time of
(continued…)
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was allocated to Kroger, plus statutory interest. We vacate the June 21, 2002, judgment in part
and affirm the June 24, 2002, order awarding costs and mediation sanctions.
I. Facts and Proceedings
This case is before this Court for the second time. In a prior appeal, defendants Kroger,
Foodland Distributors (Foodland) and Livonia Holding Company, Inc. (Livonia Holding),
challenged the trial court’s April 27, 1998, and August 20, 1998, judgments, following a trial in
which a jury, by special verdict, found that Foodland committed intentional (silent) fraud by
failing to disclose material facts to plaintiffs Ayar and Vincent. The jury determined plaintiffs’
damages for the intentional fraud claim to be $9,270,686, and Kroger, Livonia Holding, and
Foodland were held jointly and severally liable on the intentional fraud claim. The jury also
found that Kroger breached a right-of-first-refusal (RFR) contract with Ayar and awarded
damages of $14,506,781, and Kroger was held individually liable for the RFR claim.
In the earlier appeal, this Court reversed the jury’s verdict finding Foodland liable to
Vincent for intentional fraud, because Foodland had a contractual right to a bench trial. This
Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. The trial court was
specifically instructed to determine on remand which portion of the jury’s award represented
damages for Ayar so as not to disturb that award on remand. This Court affirmed the judgment
in favor of Ayar with respect to his RFR claim against Kroger. See Ayar v Foodland
Distributors, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 21,
2000 (Docket No. 214293).
Prior to the jury trial, Kroger and Foodland placed a stipulation on the record, such that
they had an agency and “alter ego” relationship, agreeing that if one was liable, the other would
also be liable. The trial court provided the following explanation of the stipulation to the jury in
its instructions:
Further there is a stipulation between the parties which I informed you of
at the beginning of the trial. The stipulation was that Kroger is an agent of
Foodland and Foodlnd [sic] is an agent of Kroger. That is that statements of
Foodland and their employees may be binding on Kroger and Kroger’s statements
and emloyees [sic] maybe [sic] binding on Foodland. Statements of Kroger
employees maybe [sic] finding [sic] on Foodland.2
(…continued)
mediation. Haliw v Sterling Heights, 257 Mich App 689, 695; 669 NW2d 563 (2003).
2
The successor judge also indicated below, as does Kroger on appeal, that the jury was told as
part of the court’s preliminary instructions that “[t]he Court will instruct you there’s been an
acknowledgment or stipulation to the fact that Foodland Distributors and Kroger for all intents
and purposes in this case are partners, alter egos.” A review of the record reveals that this
statement was made by plaintiffs’ attorney in his opening statement, not as part of the court’s
preliminary instructions. The trial court instructed the jury that the attorneys’ opening statements
were not evidence.
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The April 27, 1998, judgment addressed only Kroger’s and Foodland’s liability. The trial
court relied on the pretrial stipulation, finding that Kroger was jointly and severally liable with
Foodland for the judgment amount for the intentional fraud claim. The judgment also provided
for Kroger and Foodland to pay statutory interest, as well as costs and attorney fees, if any, to be
assessed later. The trial court entered a second judgment on August 20, 1998, holding Livonia
Holding jointly and severally liable for the judgment amount with respect to the intentional fraud
claim based on another pretrial stipulation governing Livonia Holding’s liability as a partner of
Foodland.
With regard to the intentional fraud claim, the successor judge determined that the April
27, 1998, judgment did not include any damages for Ayar. Following a bench trial regarding
Vincent’s intentional fraud claim against Foodland, the successor judge found Foodland liable
for intentional fraud, but determined Vincent’s damages to be only $674,680.26, substantially
less than the jury’s verdict of $9,270,686 at the first trial. Kroger and Livonia Holding were
again held jointly and severally liable for this judgment amount. The successor judge, without
explanation, also found Kroger individually liable to Vincent (as well as Ayar) on the same
intentional fraud claim for an additional $6,200,149.74 in damages, which represents the balance
of the jury verdict less the joint and several damages award. The successor judge refused to
vacate the amount of Ayar’s and Vincent’s damages with regard to the RFR claim for which
Kroger was held individually liable under the April 27, 1998, judgment, but reduced the amount
of Foodland’s joint liability to the amount determined at the bench trial.
The June 21, 2002, judgment entered by the successor judge again provided for statutory
interest, as well as costs and attorney fees, if any, to be assessed later. The successor judge also
modified the statutory interest awarded in the April 27, 1998, judgment against Kroger with
respect to Ayar’s RFR claim to reflect a change in the interest rate established by MCL
600.6013, as amended by 2001 PA 175. On June 24, 2002, the successor judge ordered Kroger,
Foodland, and Livonia Holding to pay costs and mediation sanctions of $555,275, of which
amount $381,752 was allocated to Kroger, and $173,523 was allocated to Foodland and Livonia
Holding.
II. Intentional Fraud
On appeal, Kroger argues that the successor judge erred in holding it independently liable
for the amount of the jury verdict for the intentional fraud claim. Because this issue involves
questions of law, our review is de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School
Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
As a threshold matter, we reject plaintiffs’3 claim that the law of the case doctrine
precludes consideration of this issue. On remand, the successor judge was bound by this Court’s
earlier decision and was limited only insofar that he could not take action inconsistent with that
decision. Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259-260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000).
3
In this opinion, we refer to the appellees individually as Ayar and Vincent, or jointly as
“plaintiffs.” The remaining plaintiffs are not involved in this appeal.
-3-
Application of the law of the case doctrine to our review on appeal is discretionary, but the
general rule is that legal questions decided in an earlier appeal will not be decided differently if
the facts remain materially the same. Id.; Grace v Grace, 253 Mich App 357, 363; 655 NW2d
595 (2002).
A review of this Court’s earlier opinion, and its January 29, 2002, order denying
rehearing, fails to disclose that this Court, either implicitly or explicitly, actually decided any
issue concerning Kroger’s pretrial stipulation. Nor did this Court’s prior decision preclude
Kroger from arguing on remand that its liability was dependent on Foodland’s liability. Indeed,
in response to arguments raised by Foodland and Livonia Holding in support of their motion for
rehearing, this Court expressly recognized that Livonia Holding could argue that its liability was
dependent on Foodland’s liability. Although this Court earlier noted that Kroger had joined in
the motion, its failure to mention Kroger in connection with the later statement does not imply
any actual decision with regard to the issue of Kroger’s liability.
The essence of this Court’s holding in the earlier appeal was that only the parties to the
sublease, Vincent and Foodland, could invoke the jury waiver provision for claims relating to the
sublease and, in particular, the intentional fraud claim against Foodland for which the jury found
Foodland liable. The essence of the question raised by Kroger on remand was that the
stipulation regarding its relationship with Foodland only gave rise to derivative liability for the
damage award against Foodland. Because this issue was not decided in the earlier appeal, the
law of the case doctrine does not apply.
The successor judge likewise had the authority to address this issue and, pursuant to
MCR 2.604(A), could revise any prior orders to reflect a correct adjudication of the rights and
liabilities of the parties before entry of a final judgment on remand. Meagher v Wayne State
Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 718; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). But we conclude that the successor judge
erroneously relied on the parties’ pretrial stipulation to hold that Kroger remained liable for the
April 27, 1998, judgment.
An agreement regarding a proceeding in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is
not binding unless made in open court or in writing. MCR 2.507(H). Stipulations may differ in
character, with some being mere admissions of fact that relieve a party from the inconvenience
of making proof, while others, such as an agreement to settle a lawsuit, constitute a contract.
Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 378-379; 521 NW2d 847 (1994).
Stipulations of fact are binding on a court, but stipulations of law are not. Id. at 379. A
stipulation will be interpreted in reference to its subject matter, the surrounding circumstances,
and the whole record. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964).
In this case, the pretrial stipulation addressed both evidentiary and liability issues, but
essentially relieved plaintiffs of the burden of proving the relationship between Foodland and
Kroger. The parties stipulated that Foodland and Kroger had an agency and “alter ego”
relationship. From an evidentiary standpoint, the parties agreed that Foodland’s and Kroger’s
statements would be binding on each other, and from a liability standpoint, the parties agreed
that, if one was liable, the other would also be liable. The trial court explained the stipulation to
the jury in its instructions following the close of proofs as noted above. As summarized in the
trial court’s pretrial order, the stipulation provided that “any judgment entered against one shall
be collectible against either.”
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Here, we are only concerned with the stipulation’s intent with regard to liability issues
and, in particular, how to apply the stipulation to the verdict. We reject plaintiffs’ position that
the jury verdict against which the stipulation was first applied could itself be construed as a
finding that Kroger was liable for Foodland’s acts and representations. Although the jury was
called upon to use the evidence to decide an ultimate fact, that is, to apply legal standards to
determine if intentional fraud was committed, the jury, by its special verdict, found that only
Foodland committed intentional fraud. Sahr v Bierd, 354 Mich 353, 371; 92 NW2d 467 (1958).
The judge who presided over the jury trial, consistent with MCR 2.514(C), appropriately
applied the parties’ stipulation to find Kroger jointly and severally liable with Foodland for the
judgment entered against Foodland for the intentional fraud claim. But this finding arose from
the stipulated relationship between Kroger and Foodland. On remand, the successor judge found
Kroger individually liable on the intentional fraud claim for additional damages. The successor
judge on remand incorrectly applied the stipulation because the stipulated agency and “alter ego”
relationship established no basis for holding Kroger liable for Foodland’s intentional fraud
independent of Foodland.
The stipulated agency relationship did not provide a basis for holding Kroger
independently liable for Foodland’s intentional fraud because the law imposes vicarious liability,
that is, indirect responsibility, on the principal for its agent’s acts. Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Mgrs,
467 Mich 1, 11; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). The principal “is only liable because the law creates a
practical identity with his [agents], so that he is held to have done what they have done.” Cox,
supra at 11, quoting Smith v Webster, 23 Mich 298, 300 (1871).
Further, merely because, as a factual matter, a party could be viewed as an “alter ego” of
another party does not provide a basis for liability. Plaintiffs’ contention to the contrary lacks
citation to supporting authority. A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize its basis. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d
748 (2001). We note, however, that plaintiffs’ argument is flawed because, if Kroger and
Foodland were truly treated as alter egos in the manner suggested by plaintiffs, Foodland would
be equally liable on the RFR contract claim against Kroger. Here, only Kroger was found liable
for the RFR claim.
We nonetheless find the stipulated “alter ego” relationship relevant because an agent
generally is not authorized to be a principal’s “alter ego” for all purposes. Gore v Canada Life
Assurance Co, 119 Mich 136, 145; 77 NW 650 (1898). Hence, the “alter ego” stipulation
implies a broader application than the parties’ “agency” stipulation. But this does not resolve the
material question concerning what legal theory could be used to hold Kroger liable as an “alter
ego” of Foodland within the context of this case.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the only apparent legal theory for holding
Kroger liable as Foodland’s “alter ego” is its corporate relationship with Foodland. The essential
nature of this theory is set forth in plaintiffs’ amended complaint as follows:
Defendant, Foodland Distributors (“Foodland”), is a Michigan partnership
that conducts business in the City of Livonia, County of Wayne, State of
Michigan. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, Kroger and Livonia
Associates, are partners in Foodland, and Kroger is, in reality, the true partner of
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Foodland and has held itself out as a partner in Foodland through its alter ego
wholly owned subsidiary, JV Distributing, Inc., by Kroger’s conduct . . . .
Had plaintiffs alleged (and proved) that Kroger was actually a partner of Foodland, an alleged
Michigan partnership, then arguably Kroger would have liability for the judgment against
Foodland under partnership law. See MCL 449.15(a) (partners jointly and severally liable for
everything chargeable to a partnership under MCL 449.13 and MCL 449.14); Commonwealth
Capital Investment Corp v McElmurry, 102 Mich App 536, 541; 302 NW2d 222 (1980). But
plaintiffs’ allegation, that a corporate entity separated Kroger and Foodland, made their “alter
ego” relationship relevant for purposes of determining whether a court of equity should pierce
the corporate veil in order to hold Kroger liable for Foodland’s intentional fraud. See generally
Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services v Shah, 236 Mich App 381, 393; 600 NW2d 406 (1999)
(piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine).
Had the corporate veil been pierced, Kroger would stand in Foodland’s shoes. Law
Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 43-44; 436 NW2d 70 (1989); see
also Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 650-651; 364 NW2d 670 (1984)
(although separate corporate entities are generally respected in Michigan, the corporate veil may
be pierced for equitable reasons). “The various doctrines for disregarding the corporate entity
are only remedial, for they only expand the potential sources of recovery.” Kern v Gleason, 840
SW2d 730, 736 (Tex App, 1992). “A plaintiff asserting such a theory does not allege direct
damage as a result of the challenged conduct. Rather, these are equitable doctrines allowing a
party to recover derivatively for the debts of a controlled corporation.” United States v Clawson
Medical Rehabilitation & Pain Care Center, PC, 722 F Supp 1468, 1471 (ED Mich, 1989).
Hence, viewing the parties’ pretrial stipulation regarding an agency and “alter ego”
relationship in the context of the whole record, its subject matter, and the surrounding
circumstances, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation to give to the stipulation is
that it intended to make Kroger’s liability for the intentional tort claim dependent on Foodland’s
liability. Because Kroger’s liability was derivative of Foodland’s liability, Kroger stood in the
shoes of Foodland for purposes of any rights or defenses that Foodland might have. Kroger did
not forfeit its rights by stipulating to having its relationship with Foodland used for purposes of
establishing that it had the same liability as Foodland. “[T]he language of a stipulation will not
be construed so as to give the effect of a waiver of a right not plainly intended to be
relinquished.” In re Freiburger, 153 Mich App 251, 262; 395 NW2d 300 (1986).
There being no evidence that Kroger demanded that a jury decide its liability for
Foodland’s intentional fraud, regardless of what Foodland might claim, we conclude that the
successor judge erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to vacate the April 27, 1998, judgment
against Kroger for the intentional fraud. Kroger was entitled to have the stipulation applied to
the bench trial verdict rendered by the successor judge on remand from this Court. Because
¶ 2(C) of the June 21, 2002, judgment contains the affected part of the damage award against
Kroger, which was derived from the April 27, 1998, judgment, we vacate ¶ 2(C) of the June 21,
2002, judgment. The scope of Kroger’s liability should have been limited to the provision in ¶
2(A), which provides for joint and several liability with Foodland and Livonia Holding (as a
partner of Foodland) for the damage award of $674,680.26.
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In light of our decision to vacate ¶ 2(C) of the June 21, 2002, judgment, it is unnecessary
to address Kroger’s remaining arguments, including, in particular, Kroger’s claim that it was
denied procedural due process.
III. Mediation Sanctions
Next, Kroger argues that plaintiffs were not entitled to mediation sanctions because they
failed to timely request sanctions within twenty-eight days of the April 27, 1998, judgment,
contrary to MCR 2.403(O)(8). Our review of a trial court’s grant of mediation sanctions is de
novo. Brown v Gainey Transp Services, Inc, 256 Mich App 380, 383-384; 663 NW2d 519
(2003). Having concluded that the successor judge erred by not vacating the April 27, 1998,
judgment against Kroger with regard to the intentional fraud claim, we find no basis for Kroger’s
claim that plaintiffs were required to file their request for sanctions within twenty-eight days of
the April 27, 1998 judgment.
A final judgment is unnecessary to invoke the twenty-eight-day time period prescribed in
MCR 2.403(O)(8). Rather, “[f]or purposes of the court rule, the judgment is the judgment
adjudicating the rights and liabilities of particular parties, regardless of whether that judgment is
the final judgment from which the parties may appeal” (emphasis in original). Braun v York
Properties, Inc, 230 Mich App 138, 150; 583 NW2d 503 (1998). In this case, Kroger’s rights
and liabilities with regard to the intentional tort claim were adjudicated in ¶ 2(A) of the June 21,
2002, judgment. As such, the June 21, 2002, judgment is the controlling judgment for purposes
of filing a request for mediation sanctions. See generally Haliw v Sterling Heights, 257 Mich
App 689, 697-698; 669 NW2d 563 (2003); Hyde v Univ of Michigan Regents, 226 Mich App
511, 526; 575 NW2d 36 (1997); Keiser v Allstate Ins Co, 195 Mich App 369, 374-375; 491
NW2d 581 (1992). Accordingly, we reject Kroger’s argument that plaintiffs’ request for
mediation sanctions was untimely filed.
Although Kroger additionally argues that plaintiffs untimely taxed costs under MCR
2.625(F)(2), we decline to address this issue because Kroger has not identified any costs awarded
by the successor judge that were outside the scope of allowable mediation sanctions. A party
may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject a position. Great
Lakes Div of National Steel Corp v Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 424; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). In
passing, we find Kroger’s reliance on MCR 2.625(F)(2) misplaced because the clerk did not tax
costs. Cf. J C Bldg Corp II v Parkhurst Homes, Inc, 217 Mich App 421, 428-429; 552 NW2d
466 (1996). Rather, the record indicates that the successor judge determined costs at a joint
proceeding held after the bench trial.
Finally, we decline to address Kroger’s claim regarding expert witness fees because
Kroger has not identified the factual basis for its argument that plaintiffs were awarded costs for
expert witness fees. Great Lakes Div of National Steel Corp, supra at 424. In this regard, we
note that expert witness fees may be included as mediation sanctions because they are taxable
costs under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(a). Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich App 179, 203; 667 NW2d 887
(2003). Kroger has not established any basis for relief stemming from the award of expert
witness fees.
IV. Statutory Interest
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In his cross-appeal, Ayar argues that the successor judge erroneously modified the
statutory interest award for the RFR claim based on a change in the interest rate established by
the 2001 amendment of MCL 600.6013.4 We consider this issue de novo as a question of law.
Cardinal Mooney High School, supra at 80; Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand), 469
Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003).
Initially, we conclude that the successor judge was authorized to consider this issue on
remand following the prior appeal because the case had not yet reached a point of finality. MCR
2.604(A); Meagher, supra at 718; see also Mayor of Detroit v Arms Technology, Inc, 258 Mich
App 48, 65-66; 669 NW2d 845 (2003). Further, the law of the case doctrine does not apply
because neither this Court previously, nor our Supreme Court when denying Kroger’s
application for leave to appeal, actually decided the merits of this issue. Grievance
Administrator, supra at 259-260; Grace, supra at 363.
Further, we conclude that Ayar’s constitutional claims must be examined in the context
of a subsequent amendment of MCL 600.6013, pursuant to 2002 PA 77, effective March 21,
2002, rather than the 2001 amendment, because the 2002 amendment applies retroactively to
plaintiffs’ complaint setting forth the RFR claim, and because, as of July 1, 2002, that complaint
had not yet resulted in a final, nonappealable judgment. See Morales, supra at 490-491; Shuler v
Michigan Physicians Mutual Liability Co, 260 Mich App 492, 523-524; ___ NW2d ____ (2004).
Hence, the relevant statutory provision provides as follows:
For a complaint filed on or after January 1, 1987, but before July 1, 2002,
if the civil action has not resulted in a final, nonappealable judgment as of July 1,
2002, and if a judgment is or has been rendered on a written instrument that does
not evidence indebtedness with a specified interest rate, interest is calculated as
provided in subsection (8). [MCL 600.6013(6).]
Examined in this context, Ayar has not established any basis for disturbing the successor judge’s
decision to apply the modified interest rate. A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party
opposing it bears the burden of overcoming that presumption and proving the statute
unconstitutional. Owosso v Pouillon, 254 Mich App 210, 213; 657 NW2d 538 (2002).
Ayar has not established that he had a vested right to have interest on his RFR claim
determined by the interest rate prescribed in MCL 600.6013 before it was amended. In general,
“vested rights are not created by a statute that is later revoked or modified by the Legislature if
‘[t]he Legislature did not covenant not to amend the legislation.’” In re Certified Question (Fun
‘N Sun RV, Inc v Michigan), 447 Mich 765, 778; 527 NW2d 468 (1994), quoting Franks v White
Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 654; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). MCL 600.6013 is a remedial
statute that serves to compensate the prevailing party for litigation expenses and the delay in
receiving money damages, as well as to encourage early settlements. Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v
Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 510; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). “It is firmly established that there
4
See 2001 PA 175, effective March 22, 2002.
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is no vested right in any particular procedure or remedy.” Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 703;
520 NW2d 135 (1994).
Because Ayar has not established a vested right to have interest calculated under a prior
version of MCL 600.6013, we uphold the successor judge’s decision rejecting Ayar’s claim that
an unconstitutional “taking” occurred. The Legislature may retroactively amend a statute that
does not take away or impair any existing vested rights. See People v Jackson, 465 Mich 390,
401; 633 NW2d 825 (2001); Aztec Air Service, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 253 Mich App 227, 234;
654 NW2d 925 (2002).
We also uphold the successor judge’s rejection of Ayar’s claim that MCL 600.6013, as
amended, unconstitutionally impairs contract rights, because Ayar has failed to show that he had
any contract rights impaired by the statute as amended. Ayar’s hypothetical factual scenario
regarding other potential litigants who might enter into settlement agreements is insufficient to
invoke judicial review, because Ayar has not established that he has standing to vindicate the
constitutional rights of other litigants. Fieger v Comm’r of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 471; 437
NW2d 271 (1988); People v Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 16; 312 NW2d 657 (1981).
Next, similar to the successor judge, we have treated Ayar’s claim that the amended
statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive as a challenge to its facial validity based on
equal protection guarantees. We conclude, however, that even if we were to find that Ayar had
standing to challenge the facial validity of the amended statute, Ayar failed to present any
argument that would persuade us that MCL 600.6013, as amended in 2002, is constitutionally
infirm on its face.
The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a state from distinguishing persons, but
rather prohibits arbitrary or invidious classifications. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259; 615
NW2d 218 (2000). The type of judicial review applied to a viable equal protection challenge
depends on the nature of the classification. Id. Here, because Ayar does not address the
particular level of judicial review that applies to his facial challenge to the statute, this issue is
not properly before us. This Court need not address an issue that is given only cursory treatment
on appeal. Eldred, supra at 150.
In any event, a party challenging the facial validity of a statute must establish that there is
no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Council of Organizations &
Others for Educ About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568; 566 NW2d 208 (1997).
The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is not sufficient. Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs v Wayne Co Airport Authority, 253
Mich App 144, 160; 658 NW2d 804 (2002). The 2002 amendment of MCL 600.6013(6) reflects
the Legislature’s determination that all litigants who filed complaints between January 1, 1987,
and July 1, 2002, are subject to the condition that the action on the written instrument not result
in a final, nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002. For purposes of determining the
applicable interest rate, the litigants are distinguished based on whether the written instrument
contains a specified interest rate. Applying the rational basis level of review to the classification
scheme in the statute, we conclude that Ayar’s arguments on appeal present no basis for finding
the statute constitutionally infirm.
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Finally, analyzing MCL 600.6013 in the context of the 2002 amendment, we find no
basis for disturbing the successor judge’s determination that MCL 600.6013, as applied to Ayar,
does not violate equal protection guarantees. When faced with a claim that a statute, as applied,
is constitutionally infirm, a court must analyze the statute as applied to the particular case.
Crego, supra at 269.
Here, Ayar’s challenge to the amended statute is directed largely at the Legislature’s use
of the date on which a case results in a final, nonappealable judgment. MCL 600.6013(6). But
selection of this date was rational because the Legislature’s ability to retroactively apply a new
law is limited and the 2002 amendment affects complaints filed both before and after its effective
date. See Mayor of Detroit, supra at 65-66. Because Ayar’s RFR claim was set forth in a
complaint filed before July 1, 2002, that did not result in a final, nonappealable judgment as of
July 1, 2002, the judgment interest rate was subject to the 2002 amendment of MCL
600.6013(6).
The circumstances under which a given action does not result in a final, nonappealable
judgment as of July 1, 2002, may differ from case to case, but rational-basis review does not test
whether the classification scheme was made with “mathematical nicety” or whether some
inequity results. Crego, supra at 260. Hence, examining the 2002 amendment in light of the
remedial purpose of MCL 600.6013, we reject Ayar’s claim that his equal protection rights were
violated. Lastly, we are not persuaded that the challenged legislation is arbitrary and wholly
unrelated in a rational way to its objective. Crego, supra at 259.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219(A),
neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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