PEOPLE OF MI V DALE D HARPER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 230717
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-012336
DALE D. HARPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: White, P.J., and Kelly and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us for the second time, on remand from the Supreme Court. In our
initial opinion,1 we found that trial counsel’s failure to file a proper notice of an alibi defense
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We reversed defendant’s convictions of seconddegree murder and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, and remanded for a new trial.
People v Harper, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 230717,
issued 6/5/03). The prosecution appealed. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, its December 11, 2003 order stating that “[d]efendant has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s failure to perfect an alibi defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” The Supreme Court’s order of remand instructs
that we consider issues raised by defendant that were not reached in our initial opinion.2 We
affirm.
I
Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective in raising questions about a polygraph
examination that defendant had failed, and for failing to join in objecting to references to drug
dealing made by counsel for co-defendant, Keith Tate.3 We disagree.
1
The original panel was comprised of Judges White, Kelly and Gribbs. Judge Gribbs having
since retired, Judge Cooper is substituted in his stead.
2
By order dated March 30, 2004, the Supreme Court denied a motion for reconsideration.
3
Tate’s case was originally submitted with the instant case. This Court reversed Tate’s
conviction and remanded for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. People v
(continued…)
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Trial counsel cannot be faulted for questioning the polygraph examiner regarding the
polygraph given defendant’s insistence that he passed the examination. The prosecution
produced the polygraph examiner, who testified in rebuttal for the limited purpose of rebutting
defendant’s claim that he had passed the polygraph examination. The examiner testified that he
did not prepare a formal report, and that his conclusions were based on his interpretation of the
marks made by the polygraph machine. There was no mark on the polygraph designating truth
or falsity; it was subject to the examiner’s interpretation and comparison with other answers.
Defendant’s contention that his trial counsel could have looked at the examiner’s report to
determine whether he passed or failed is thus without merit. Trial counsel was given the
opportunity to view the exam results, but he could not have been expected to interpret the data.
Regarding the failure to object to the bad acts evidence, defendant cannot show the required
prejudice. Co-defendant’s counsel objected to the evidence and thus the issue was presented to
the court. See People v Bradford, 69 Mich App 583, 586; 245 NW2d 137 (1976). Further, as
discussed infra, the admission of the evidence does not warrant reversal. Defendant was thus not
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to join in the objection.
We conclude that defendant has not shown that his trial counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; defendant has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d
674 (1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), nor has he shown that the
resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App
702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
II
Defendant contends that the trial court mistakenly believed it had no discretion to allow
alibi witnesses since the proper notice had not been filed. He argues that the court could have
ordered a continuance. Under the circumstance that the Supreme Court has determined that
“defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s failure to
perfect an alibi defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” i.e., that the trial
court would most likely have convicted defendant even if the alibi defense had been presented,
further review of this issue is precluded.
III
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor violated People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994), when he questioned witnesses about
defendant’s drug activities. The prosecution did not provide advance notice under MRE
(…continued)
Tate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, (Docket No. 231230, issued
6/5/03). On reconsideration, the panel clarified that a new trial must be granted if the newly
discovered evidence is presented and is consistent with representations made on appeal, and that
barring this, the trial court could grant or deny a new trial based on the record made at the
hearing. People v Tate, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 231230, issued
9/22/03).
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404(b)(2), and the issue was raised below by objection of co-counsel. See Bradford, supra at
586. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court did not err in admitting the testimony because
defendant injected the issue of drug activities during cross-examination of the survivor, Robert
Madden. Defendant apparently was pursuing a theory that Collins and Madden were shot by
others in retaliation for a shooting at another drug house. The prosecutor’s follow-up questions
came after defendant had injected the issue. The failure to provide notice is thus excused, and
the evidence was relevant to show that the alleged motive of third parties was equally applicable
to defendant.
IV
Defendant also contends that the prosecution impermissibly brought out that threats had
been made against a prosecution witness, without tying the evidence to defendant. Because such
evidence is viewed as being very prejudicial, it is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, but
only if there is evidence that the threat “was made at the instigation of the defendant, or with his
consent or approval, or at least with the knowledge or expectation that it had been or would be
made.” People v Salsbury, 134 Mich 537, 569-570; 96 NW 936 (1903); see also People v Sholl,
453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
Robert Madden, who was with the victim, Toriano Collins, at the time of the drive-by
shooting, and was the only eyewitness to testify at trial, testified that he had heard through
unnamed “girls” on the street that his life would be in danger if he testified. Madden also
testified that his son was beaten in prison by unnamed persons, and that he still had concerns for
his safety. When defendant objected, the prosecution argued that the evidence was being offered
to show Madden’s mental state when he told co-defendant’s attorney in a taped conversation that
the co-defendant was not involved. On cross-examination, Madden admitted that he did not
know from whom the threats originated. Madden testified at trial that he at no time saw the
driver of the car involved in the drive-by shooting.
Although Madden’s testimony that he did not know who made the threats rendered the
evidence inadmissible to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and nevertheless allowed for
an inference that it might have been defendant who made the threats, we conclude that defendant
has not shown that it is more probable than not that the outcome of the trial was affected, People
v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). This was a bench trial and we
presume that the court considered the testimony for the limited purpose offered - - to explain
Madden’s behavior.
V
Defendant argues that the prosecution’s introduction into evidence of an assault rifle,
bullets, and a bag of marijuana, without a proper foundation to tie the evidence to the killing, was
reversible error and denied defendant due process. The record does not support defendant’s
argument. The items themselves were not offered or admitted as exhibits. In any event, because
defendant did not object below, our review is for plain error that affected substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A police evidence technician testified that a gun was found inside the doorway of the
house where the shooting occurred. Unspent bullets were found in the back yard, and a small
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bag of marijuana retrieved from the front porch. The items were not offered or admitted as
exhibits. Defendant argues that there was no proof that any of these items were connected to him
in any way, but does not explain how reference to items which the prosecution did not connect to
him could constitute plain error that affected his substantial rights.
We conclude that defendant’s claim fails. The unobjected to testimony regarding these
items was more likely to have inured to defendant’s benefit—in that it leant itself to the inference
that the house where Madden and Collins were on the evening of the shooting was a drug house,
that the drive-by shooting was part of drug-trade retaliation, and that the accuracy of Madden’s
testimony was in question, he being the sole eyewitness to testify at trial, and marijuana having
been found in proximity to where he was standing on the porch at the time of the shooting.
Defendant has not shown plain error that affected his substantial rights. Carines, supra.
VI
Defendant’s final challenge is that his conviction of second-degree murder was
inconsistent with his acquittal of the felony-firearm charge. Defendant maintains that when the
court found that he did not possess a firearm, it was compelled to find that he did not aid in
utilizing the firearm for the shooting. We disagree.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, and assault with intent to commit
great bodily harm under an aiding and abetting theory. The court found that defendant intended
to assist in the killing when he drove to the complainants’ location, turned off the car’s lights,
and stopped the car. After co-defendant Tate shot at Collins and Madden, defendant turned the
car lights back on and drove away. The trial judge, sitting as the fact-finder in this bench trial,
explained the acquittal of felony-firearm as follows:
This Court finds that the defendant Harper did not have possession of the gun and
did not intentionally assist or encourage defendant Keith Tate to possess the gun,
or to get it, or to keep it. Therefore, this Court finds the defendant Dale Harper
not guilty of felony firearm.
Defendant’s claim fails. Nothing in the trial court’s statement regarding defendant’s
relationship to the gun precludes finding that he nevertheless aided and abetted the murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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