PEOPLE OF MI V DARRIN L BRASSWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 3, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
DARRIN L. BRASSWELL,
No. 246328
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-007221
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Kelly and R. S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316, assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f.
Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the first-degree murder conviction, forty to eighty
years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to murder conviction, ten years’ imprisonment,
enhanced as a third offender, for the felony-firearm conviction, and thirty to sixty months’
imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. In a supplemental brief filed in
propria persona, defendant asserts that appointed appellate counsel has rendered ineffective
assistance, among other claims. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by appealing to the sympathy of the jury, by attacking the defense and defense
counsel, by placing the power and prestige of the prosecutor’s office behind the case, and by
appealing to the jurors’ civic duty. We disagree.
To preserve the issue for appellate review, defendant must timely and specifically object
to the prosecutor’s improper conduct. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 644-645; 672
NW2d 860 (2003). Here, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements in the trial
court. Appellate review of an unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct is for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Reversal is only warranted when a plain error resulted in the
conviction of a truly innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceeding independent of the defendant’s innocence. If a curative
instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect, the appellate court will not find error
requiring reversal. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448-449; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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A prosecutor may not appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim. People v Watson,
245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001); People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 104; 351
NW2d 255 (1984). Here, the jurors were informed during voir dire that the victim’s mother was
waiting in the hallway, and that the prosecutor was going to have to report to her. This type of
questioning was repeated with a number of potential jurors. Defense counsel stated that it was a
case against defendant, and the question was if the jurors could be fair to defendant. The
prosecutor objected, stating the question was if the jurors could be fair to everyone. The court
responded by stating that each side could ask their own questions. In context, the prosecutor’s
reference to the victim’s mother was made to stress the need for the jurors to be thoroughly
honest in their responses to the questions presented in voir dire, particularly those addressed to
whether they could put their own experiences aside and be fair. We find no reversible error.
During closing argument, the prosecutor made references to the fact that the victim was a
devoted father of five girls and elicited testimony about toys, clothing and candy belonging to the
girls that was found in the victim’s car, and that defendant dumped the victim at the hospital like
“garbage.” The comments were only a brief part of the overall argument. Defense counsel did
not object, but addressed the comments in closing, noting that the victim was not on trial and that
the observations had nothing to do with the question whether defendant was guilty. The trial
court instructed the jury not to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice. Under these
circumstances, while the prosecutor’s comments were gratuitous and improper, defendant was
not prejudiced, and reversal is not required. Watson, supra, 245 Mich App 591-592.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly attacked the defense and defense
counsel. A prosecutor is not permitted to personally attack defense counsel, McLaughlin, supra,
258 Mich App 646, or the credibility of defense counsel, People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App
601, 607; 560 NW2d 354 (1996), or suggest that defense counsel is intentionally attempting to
mislead the jury, Watson, supra, 245 Mich App 592.
Some of the prosecutor’s arguments were legitimate comment on the case; e.g., the
prosecutor expressed that any shortcomings in his witnesses were defendant’s fault, stating “he
picked them” when he committed the crime. Other comments were clearly improper; e.g., in
rebuttal the prosecutor made several comments impugning defense counsel, and several
comments fairly characterized as improper “civic duty” arguments. Nevertheless, we conclude
that reversal is not required because any prejudice could have been cured by a timely objection,
Ackerman, supra, 448-449, and the comments were not so inflammatory as to cause the jury to
decide the case based on impermissible considerations, rather than the evidence presented.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor. We disagree. To establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show that counsel’s performance failed
to meet an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance so prejudiced
the defendant that it deprived him of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521
NW2d 797 (1994).
Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutor’s
comments. The Court will not second-guess matters of trial strategy. People v Gonzalez, 468
Mich 636, 644-645; 664 NW2d 159 (2003); People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429,
445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). It is probable that counsel determined, as a matter of trial strategy,
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that he should not object to the prosecutor’s statements because it could have been harmful in the
eyes of the jury by making the jury focus on the prosecutor’s arguments. Also, defense counsel
specifically stated, “I rarely object during closing,” which is where most of the comments
referred to by defendant as inappropriate occurred. Failure of a trial strategy does not necessitate
a conclusion that the strategy constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Stewart, 219
Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996). Defendant has not shown that had counsel objected to
the comments, and had the objections been sustained, it is reasonably probable that the result of
the proceedings would have been different. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d
884 (2001).
In a supplemental brief filed in propria persona, defendant asserts that his appellate
counsel has rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise issues that would compel reversal,
including failing to file a motion for new trial and evidentiary hearing in the trial court on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failing to seek correction of trial transcripts that
according to defendant omitted meritorious objections made by trial counsel. We disagree.
A criminal defendant’s rights to appeal and to counsel on appeal include the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 396; 105 S Ct 830, 836; 83 L Ed 2d
821 (1985); People v Pauli, 138 Mich App 530, 534; 361 NW2d 359 (1984). To establish
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness and the deficiency prejudiced the
defendant. Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470; 120 S Ct 1029; 145 L Ed 2d 985, 994 (2000);
People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 640-641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994).
We address defendant’s last point first. Defendant asserts that missing from the trial
transcript is trial counsel’s objection to the prosecution’s failure to call an endorsed res gestae
witness, Hack Welch. Defendant contends that Welch was an essential res gestae witness who
transported the victim to the hospital after defendant called Welch on the phone, and that Welch
was the last person to speak to the victim. Defendant contends that had Welch been called to
testify, defendant may have been convicted of manslaughter rather than murder.
Even though defendant is correct that Welch was an endorsed witness, defendant’s claim
fails because both defense counsel and defendant requested that the jury not be instructed on
lesser offenses to murder, thus foreclosing the possibility of a manslaughter conviction. Thus,
any error in failing to produce this witness, and any omission in the trial transcript of counsel’s
objection thereto could not have affected the trial’s outcome.
Relatedly, defendant maintains that appellate counsel filed his appellate brief without
attempting to contact trial counsel (presumably, regarding objecting to the prosecution’s failure
to produce Welch), and without attempting to get the trial transcript corrected. We disagree.
Appellate counsel did attempt to secure the court reporter’s tapes for defendant, based on
defendant’s assertion that the transcript omitted defense objections made to the non-production
of Welch. Correspondence defendant attached to his supplemental in propria persona brief
indicates that his appellate counsel acknowledged defendant’s concern in this regard, requested
the court reporter’s tapes, was told the tapes are not routinely produced and that a motion would
have to be filed, and so advised defendant. Appellate counsel’s letter to defendant dated April 9,
2004, stated in pertinent part:
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We talked about your desire to have the court recordings made available for
inspection because you believe that there are errors or omissions in the transcripts.
This office made contact with the court reporter and he indicated that the tapes are
not “typical” tapes that can be turned over to me. However, he did indicate that a
motion to inspect the tapes can be made in the trial court if you so desire. At this
time, I am not sure that we can meet the hurdle set forth in People v Abdullah [sic
Abdella], 200 Mich App 473 (1993).[1] But if you feel strongly about it, please
draft an appropriate argument and I will forward same to the Court for
consideration.
Thus, defendant’s claim that appellate counsel did not attempt to correct the transcript is
unsupported by the record. Appellate counsel set the process in motion by contacting the court
reporter and requesting the tapes, but was told they were not available, and was advised that a
motion to inspect the tapes could be filed. Again, any error was harmless, however, because
even assuming trial counsel did object to Welch’s non-production at trial, and assuming that
Welch had been produced, defendant’s and trial counsel’s request that the jury not be instructed
on lesser offenses to murder, as discussed above, foreclosed the possibility of a manslaughter
conviction.
Defendant’s claim that appellate counsel failed to file a motion for new trial is also
without merit. A motion for new trial must be filed within 42 days of the entry of Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence. MCR 6.431(A)(1). If the claim of appeal has already been filed,
however, a defendant may file a motion for new trial in the trial court within 56 days after the
commencement of the time for filing appellant’s brief. MCR 6.431(A)(2) and 7.208(B)(1). In
this case, however, the 56-day period had elapsed, thus counsel had to get this Court’s
permission to go back to the trial court; which is accomplished by filing a motion to remand in
the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(i). Defendant’s appellate counsel in this case did file
a motion to remand in this Court. A panel of this Court denied the motion by order entered on
1/29/04. Defendant’s claim thus fails.
We conclude that the issues defendant raised in his brief filed in propria persona do not
entitle him to relief.
1
This Court in Abdella, supra, stated that “[w]here a defendant is able to make a colorable
showing that inaccuracies in transcription have adversely affected the ability to secure
postconviction relief, and such matters have seasonably been brought to the trial court’s
attention, the defendant is entitled to a remedy.” 200 Mich App at 476. Further, this Court held:
In light of the competing interests involved, today we hold that in order to
overcome the presumption of accuracy and be entitled to relief, a petitioner must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) seasonably seek relief; (2) assert with
specificity the alleged inaccuracy; (3) provide some independent corroboration of
the asserted inaccuracy; (4) describe how the claimed inaccuracy in transcription
has adversely affected the ability to secure postconviction relief pursuant to
subchapters 7.200 and 7.300 of the court rules. [Abdella, supra at 476.]
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Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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