IN RE BLAKE/WESSON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DEVON LEONARD BLAKE,
CALEB RYAN WESSON, and MIRANDA
DANIELLE WESSON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250674
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-051708-NA
LEONARD WESSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARY ANN BLAKE,
Respondent.
In the Matter of COREY ALAN BLAKE, DEVON
LEONARD BLAKE, NICOLE RACHELLE
BLAKE, CALEB RYAN WESSON, and
MIRANDA DANIELLE WESSON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250796
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-051708-NA
MARY ANN BLAKE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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ROBERT CHARLES DANIELS and LEONARD
WESSON,
Respondents.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Bandstra and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent, Leonard Wesson, appeals as of right from the
trial court order terminating his parental rights to his children pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), parental desertion for at least 91 days without seeking custody. Respondent,
Mary Ann Blake, appeals by delayed leave granted from the same order terminating her parental
rights to her children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), conditions of adjudication continue to
exist; (c)(ii), failure to rectify existing conditions considering children’s ages; (g), failure to
provide proper care and custody; and (j), child would be harmed if returned to parent’s home.
We affirm.
I. FACTS
Between 1993 and 1998, Leonard Wesson, respondent-father,1 and Mary Ann Blake,
respondent-mother, parents of the children involved in this appeal, lived together as a family. In
1998, respondent-father lost his job, and the couple eventually became estranged.2 At that point,
respondent-father discontinued all contact with and support of his children and later moved to
Arkansas. In July 2001, respondent-mother lost her housing, and she and her children were
forced to live on the street and in various housing shelters. In September 2001, the family
entered Turning Point Shelter. There, respondent-mother admitted her history of substance
abuse, including the use of heroin and crack cocaine. She also reported that, in January 2001,
she had relapsed from her seven-year sobriety and admitted to ingesting heroin the day before
entering the shelter. Upon entry, respondent-mother was suffering from heroin withdrawal and
wanted to secure methadone treatment. Meanwhile, Devon Blake, respondent-mother’s eleven
year old son, expressed suicidal and homicidal ideation after witnesses reported respondentmother encouraged the boy to kill himself, stating that she too wished she were dead. As a
result, Devon was promptly admitted to a Detroit-area psychiatric hospital.
Later that month, Child Protective Services referred the family to Families First for
assistance in an attempt to prevent removal of the children from their mother’s care. However,
Family First authorities advised that, considering respondent-mother’s psychological and
physical state and the children’s aggressive behavior, the Family First Program could not provide
the intensive services needed to secure the children’s safety.
1
Devon, Caleb and Miranda’s biological father.
2
The date is uncertain, sometime after 2000 but before September 2001.
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This decision caused the Family Independence Agency (FIA) to petition the court to take
temporary custody of the minor children. Regarding respondent-mother, the petition alleged
that, because she was suffering from heroin withdrawal,3 she could not meet her children’s
physical, emotional, and educational needs. Regarding respondent father, the petition alleged
that he failed to provide any support and showed no interest in raising his children. This history
of neglect, homelessness, and substance abuse led the court to authorize the petition, make the
children temporary wards of the court, and provide for foster care placement.
At the pretrial hearing, respondent-mother pleaded no contest to the allegations contained
in the petition. After accepting the plea, the children were adjudged protected and court wardship
continued. Further, because respondent-father failed to appear for the hearing, the court
extended temporary wardship in regard to his parental interest.
Between November 2001 and December 2002, the court held several dispositional
hearings and determined that FIA had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
for foster placement. However, at every hearing the court determined that returning the children
to respondent-mother’s care would be contrary to their best interest. Thus, the court ordered
foster care to continue and suspended all respondent-mother visits with the children and set the
matter for termination trial.
One month before the termination proceedings began, respondent-father reappeared with
an interest in resuming a family life. FIA entered into a parent-agency agreement with
respondent-father. Under the agreement, respondent-father was to secure housing and
employment and was required to participate in random drug screenings and attend parenting
classes. Further, the agreement required respondent-father to attend a psychological evaluation
and attend a domestic aggression program.
Despite respondent-father’s late arrival, the termination trial began April 24, 2003.
There, witnesses, including respondents, testified that, although portions of the respondent’s
parent-agency agreements had been met, the majority of the agreements’ provisions had not been
fulfilled by either parent.
Particularly, regarding respondent-mother’s agreement, testimony and evidence showed
that she did complete a psychological exam as required and continuously participated in her
substance abuse treatment program, never testing positive for heroin. Further, it was shown that
respondent-mother did participate in parenting classes required by the parent-agency agreement,
but testimony suggested that respondent-mother failed to utilize the skills taught in her parenting
classes and repeatedly acted inappropriately toward her children. Testimony further showed that
respondent-mother (1) failed to submit to secondary drug testing as required by the agreement;4
3
Because of her substance abuse, Children’s Protective Services had already removed the
children from respondent-mother’s custody, placing them in foster care from 1992 through 1994.
4
Although respondent-mother did continuously submit to and pass drug testing during her
methadone treatment, she was also order to submit to other testing to ensure she was not using
other drugs or alcohol. This she failed to continuously do (participating in nine of twenty-seven
tests), despite FIA efforts to arrange for the alternate testing.
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(2) failed to attend individual counseling sessions to address psychiatric issues, including posttraumatic stress disorder and depression,5 as ordered; (3) failed to secure a sustained or suitable
source of income,6 as ordered; (4) failed to find suitable housing, as ordered;7 and (5) failed to
address her physical health issues, as ordered.8
Regarding respondent-father, he admitted he had not secured housing or a reliable source
of income as required by his parent-agency agreement. Regarding the random drug screenings
and parenting classes, respondent-father did go to the classes and did submit to four random drug
screens per month. But, of the twelve drug screen, eleven showed that respondent-father either
diluted or otherwise tampered with the sample, and one showed that respondent-father had used
codeine and morphine. Based on these failures, FIA concluded that respondent-father had
breached the parent-agency agreement.
Based on these failures, the court concluded that the conditions that resulted in the initial
adjudication persisted and that these conditions would not be rectified within a reasonable
amount of time considering the children’s respective ages for purposes of MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Consequently, the trial court terminated respondents’ parental rights and
committed the children to the FIA for adoptive planning, supervision, and placement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court
determines that petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, then the trial court must terminate respondent’s
parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review for clear
error the trial court’s decision with regard to the child’s best interests. Id. at 356-357.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
A. Respondent Wesson
5
Respondent-mother did attend all counseling sessions during her methadone treatment;
however, as FIA explained, the individual counseling was ordered to address respondentmother’s other psychiatric issues, those unrelated to her substance abuse.
6
Respondent-mother worked for a total of three weeks during this period. Further, FIA tried to
help respondent-mother sign up for social-security benefits, which would likely have been
granted and would have sufficed this parent-agency agreement provision; yet respondent-mother
showed little interest and failed to follow through on the opportunity.
7
Respondent-mother made no efforts to find housing, rather staying at friends’ homes or in
shelter during this period, despite FIA efforts to the contrary.
8
Respondent-mother suffered from hepatitis-C, which caused her legs to severely swell and
immobilized her. Despite her access FIA-sponsored health care, respondent-mother only visited
a doctor on one occasion during this period. One visit was not sufficient to fully address her
health problems.
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After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the trial court did not clearly err
in finding statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondent Wesson’s own testimony established that in 2000 or 2001 he moved out of the
residence that he shared with respondent Blake and their children after their relationship
deteriorated. According to respondent, he became “angry” with Blake and unequivocally
testified that he did not have any further contact with his children after he moved out. Wesson
testified that he lived in Arkansas from June 2002 until January 2003 and, during this time, failed
to contact or otherwise provide support for his children. Thus, respondent Wesson deserted his
children for more than 91 days without seeking custody for purposes of MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii)
and termination of his parental rights under this subsection was not clearly erroneous. Moreover,
at the time of trial, respondent-appellant Wesson was not employed and did not have his own
independent residence.
B. Respondent Blake
Regarding respondent Blake, evidence showed that her substance abuse and inability to
obtain and maintain a stable residence for her children resulted in the children becoming
temporary wards of the court on September 22, 2001. When the children entered protective
custody, respondent Blake had relapsed from her short-lived sobriety; she was experiencing
withdrawal symptoms and therefore requesting methadone treatment. Further, she was
homeless. At the time of trial, respondent Blake still did not have independent housing
accommodations and still relied on various friends for a place to reside. Respondent Blake
testified that if the court returned her children, she would have to enter a shelter until she secured
income and housing.
Additionally, at the time of trial, respondent Blake was receiving a full dose of
methadone and had not yet begun the detoxification process. Thus, the grounds for suspension
of parental rights remained 182 days after the original dispositional order was entered and there
was no reasonable expectation that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time
given the children’s ages.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
As a final point, we find that the evidence produced demonstrated that termination of
respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra
at 356-357. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating their parental rights to their
minor children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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