PEOPLE OF MI V MAURICE DOLAN HAMILTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246793
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-005698
MAURICE DOLAN HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Bandstra and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Maurice Dolan Hamilton appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 and one count of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct.2 Defendant was sentenced to forty-two months to ten years’ imprisonment for each
conviction to be served concurrently. We affirm.
I. Facts
The circumstances surrounding defendant’s convictions arose from his relationship with
eleven-year-old Ashante Snowden. When defendant met Ms. Snowden, she informed him that
she was seventeen years old. During several phone conversations following their first meeting,
Ms. Snowden again told defendant that she was seventeen and that she had lived with a previous
boyfriend. On the evening of April 4, 2002, Ms. Snowden accompanied defendant to his home.
Defendant asked Ms. Snowden for identification to prove her age at that time, but Ms. Snowden
indicated that she left her identification at home.
Ms. Snowden and defendant watched a movie and engaged in intercourse. Defendant
testified that the intercourse was Ms. Snowden’s idea and that she waited while he went to the
store to buy condoms. At some point, Ms. Snowden called a friend who informed the police of
her location. Ms. Snowden’s grandparents had already reported her missing. The police found
Ms. Snowden in defendant’s home and he was placed under arrest.
1
MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under thirteen years of age).
2
MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under thirteen years of age).
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II. Reasonable Mistake of Age
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to raise the defense of
reasonable mistake of age as he has a due process right to present a full defense. Defendant
argues that the underlying purpose of Michigan’s statutory rape laws—to protect minor
children—is invalidated by the circumstances of this case. Defendant also argues that this Court
should interpret the statutory rape laws to include a criminal intent element. We disagree. We
review questions of statutory interpretation3 and challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de
novo.4
Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a reasonable mistake of
age defense deprived him of his due process right to present a complete defense. However, it is
well established that mistake of age is not a defense in statutory rape cases under the Michigan
Constitution or Michigan law.5
Michigan’s policy behind the statutory rape laws is to protect minors. It is presumed that
minors are incapable of making decisions and appreciating the consequences of their choices
regarding sexual intercourse.6 Thus, the statutory rape laws presume that the sexual act took
place against the victim’s will if the conduct occurred while the victim was below the statutory
age of consent.7 The perceived maturity or experience of a victim under the statutory age of
consent does not negate the strict liability nature of this offense.8 Therefore, defendant is not
entitled to raise mistake of age as a defense.
We also disagree with defendant’s contention that we should construe the statutory rape
laws to include an element of criminal intent. Michigan law comports with the majority of states
that favor strict liability for statutory rape without proof of criminal intent as a matter of public
policy.9 Based on the plain language and current interpretation of Michigan’s statutory rape
statutes, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a mistake of
age defense.
3
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
4
People v White, 212 Mich App 298, 304-305; 536 NW2d 876 (1995).
5
People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 237, 240, 245; 351 NW2d 822 (1984), citing People v Gengels,
218 Mich 632; 188 NW 398 (1922), People v Doyle, 16 Mich App 242, 243; 167 NW2d 907
(1969).
6
In re Hildebrant, 216 Mich App 384, 386; 548 NW2d 715 (1996).
7
People v McGillen #2, 392 Mich 278, 284; 220 NW2d 689 (1974).
8
Doyle, supra, 16 Mich App 243.
9
Cash, supra, 419 Mich 240. See also 46 ALR5th 499.
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III. Sentencing
Defendant also asserts that the trial court improperly scored OV 11 at twenty-five points.
Defendant argues that the score was inaccurate because the trial court included defendant’s
second conviction involving penetration in scoring OV 11. He contends that each conviction
involving penetration should be scored on a separate Sentencing Information Report (SIR) and
should reflect an OV 11 score of zero points. We disagree. The sentencing court has discretion
in determining the number of points to be scored provided that there is evidence on the record
that adequately supports a particular score.10
MCL 777.41 provides for the scoring of OV 11 as follows:
(1) Offense variable 11 is criminal sexual penetration. Score offense variable 11
by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of
points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:
***
(b) One criminal sexual penetration occurred . . . . . . . . . .
25 points
***
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 11:
(a) Score all sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender arising out
of the sentencing offense.
(b) Multiple sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender extending
beyond the sentencing offense may be scored in offense variables 12 or 13.
(c) Do not score points for the 1 penetration that forms the basis of a firstor third-degree criminal sexual conduct offense.[11]
While points for the one, single penetration that forms the basis of a first- or third-degree
conviction should be excluded, points should be included for all other penetrations arising out of
the sentencing offense.12 We find that the trial court properly scored OV 11 by excluding points
for defendant’s one penetration offense that formed the basis of his conviction, and properly
included twenty-five points for defendant’s additional penetration, which did not form the basis
of his conviction.
10
People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
11
MCL 777.41.
12
People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 676-677; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
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Moreover, convictions with concurrent sentences are to be calculated based on the
sentencing guidelines for the offense having the highest crime class.13 The trial court properly
completed one SIR for defendant’s concurrent sentences based on defendant’s conviction of the
Class “A” crime of first-degree CSC. As the record evidence adequately supports defendant’s
score of twenty-five points for OV 11 and defendant’s sentence is within the minimum
sentencing guidelines range, we must affirm.14
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
13
MCL 771.14(2)(e)(iii). See also People v Hill, 221 Mich App 391, 396; 561 NW2d 862
(1997) (there is no need for separate scoring of concurrent sentences because such sentences are
served at the same time and the lesser offenses will be included in the sentencing of the highest
offense).
14
See MCL 769.34(10).
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