PEOPLE OF MI V TERRILL LAWRENCE JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246160
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-008079-01
TERRILL LAWRENCE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment for the firstdegree premeditated murder conviction and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. We affirm.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is defendant’s claim that the introduction of testimony
regarding his codefendant’s guilty plea denied him a fair trial. Defendant failed to preserve this
issue with an appropriate objection below; thus, this Court may grant relief only for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Reversal is warranted only when the error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Defendant contends he was denied a fair trial through elicitation of testimony by the
prosecutor informing the jury of his codefendant’s guilty plea as an accessory after the fact in
disposing of the weapon used in this crime. Defendant argues information pertaining to his
codefendant’s plea was used as substantive evidence to prove defendant’s guilt. The general rule
is that the conviction of another person involved in a criminal incident is not admissible at
defendant’s separate trial. People v Barber, 255 Mich App 288, 297; 659 NW2d 674 (2003).
Had the codefendant’s plea been used as substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt, reversal
would be required. People v Eldridge, 17 Mich App 306, 316-317; 169 NW2d 497 (1969).
However, that is not the situation presented under the facts of this case. Defendant admits to the
shooting. Reference to codefendant’s guilty plea was consistent with defendant’s trial testimony.
The testimony pertaining to codefendant’s plea regarding disposal of the weapon went not
towards defendant’s guilt, which was already acknowledged, but rather, served to dispute
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defendant’s contention regarding the accuracy of his recorded statement to police. Viewed from
the perspective that defendant is alleging that this issue is one of prosecutorial misconduct, the
same conclusion is inevitable. “Appellate review of allegedly improper conduct by the
prosecutor is precluded where the defendant fails to timely and specifically object; this Court
will only review the defendant’s claim for plain error.” People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713,
720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Defendant confessed to the shooting. As such defendant has failed
to demonstrate that admission of this testimony resulted in any prejudice to defendant given his
confession to the crime.
Defendant’s second issue on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting defendant’s written confession, as it was not a voluntary and knowing waiver of his
rights. When reviewing a trial court’s determination of the voluntariness of a confession, an
appellate court engages in de novo review of the entire record, but will not disturb a trial court’s
factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless that ruling
is found to be clearly erroneous. See People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d 152
(2000).
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in determining his confession was voluntary based
on the alleged “threat” of an unnamed officer that defendant would be charged with first-degree
premeditated murder if he failed to make a statement. “In general, statements of an accused
made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the accused voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 417;
608 NW2d 502 (2000), citing Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d
694 (1966). The Michigan Supreme Court has delineated a nonexhaustive list of factors that a
trial could should consider when determining whether a statement is voluntary. People v
Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). The standard set by the Supreme Court
includes, in relevant part:
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial
interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry
into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain
whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights
to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. [Fare v Michael C, 442 US
707, 724-725; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979), quoted with approval by
Daoud, supra, 462 Mich 652.]
When reviewing the totality of the circumstances, defendant denies any abuse, mistreatment, or
misunderstanding of his rights. Defendant does not assert he did not comprehend his rights. He
only contends that the “threat” of being charged with first-degree premeditated murder
intimidated him into making a statement and that the attitude of the police, during his
interrogation, caused him to omit relevant facts. To determine what constitutes an effective
waiver of Miranda rights, the government must prove from the totality of the circumstances that
(1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s Miranda rights was voluntary, and (2) that the
defendant had a full understanding of the right being waived and the consequences of waiving
that right. Daoud, supra, 462 Mich 633. Thus, determining whether a waiver of Miranda is
voluntary is dependent upon the absence of police coercion. Daoud, supra, 462 Mich 635.
Promises of leniency, without more, do not invalidate a Miranda waiver. People v Margoes, 141
Mich App 220, 223; 366 NW2d 254 (1985).
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Defendant acknowledged that the officer recording the statement that was admitted into
evidence did not threaten or coerce him into making a statement. Testimony of the officers
involved disputes defendant’s claims that he either requested an attorney or that he had been
threatened or coerced into making a statement through a promise of leniency in the charges. As
such, the issue is one of credibility. In resolving such issues, this Court defers to the trial court,
“which had a superior opportunity to evaluate these matters.” People v Sexton (After Remand),
461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). Thus, giving deference to the trial court’s findings,
there is no basis for reversing the determination of voluntariness, as it cannot be said that the
factual findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous.
Defendant’s third issue on appeal is the claim that he was denied a fair trial due to
revelation to the jury that defendant was incarcerated pending trial in this matter. Defendant
failed to preserve this issue with an appropriate objection below; thus, this Court may grant relief
only for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Reversal is warranted only when the
error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Carines, supra, 460 Mich 763764.
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that revealed
defendant’s incarceration for the crimes charged and being tried. Defendants’ own witnesses
revealed that defendant was in jail. Defendant’s location in jail was volunteered and, arguably,
not anticipated by the prosecutor. Questioning of the witnesses was an attempt by the prosecutor
to weaken their credibility and demonstrate their opportunity for collusion with defendant to
provide support for defendant’s claim of self-defense. No further references were made
throughout the proceedings pertaining to defendant’s incarceration while awaiting trial in this
matter. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, an unresponsive answer from a lay witness is not
grounds for reversal of a conviction. People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d
358 (1990). In order to warrant reversal, “ ‘it is necessary to show some prejudice or pattern of
eliciting inadmissible testimony.’ ” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 588; 629 NW2d 411
(2001), quoting People v White, 53 Mich App 51, 58; 218 NW2d 403 (1974). The brief mention
of defendant’s incarceration did not prejudice defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial. People v
Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36-37; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Defendant admitted his guilt. The
only true issue at trial was whether defendant’s actions were justified pursuant to his theory of
self-defense. As such, a brief reference to defendant’s incarceration for a crime he admitted to
committing did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.
Defendant’s statement of the issue suggests the trial court improperly informed the jury
that defendant was incarcerated. A thorough review of the transcripts in this matter reveals no
comment by the court concerning defendant’s incarceration for this or any other crime. If
defendant is implying the court should have sua sponte instructed the jury to disregard the
witness’ comments regarding defendant’s incarceration, despite the failure of defendant’s trial
counsel to object to either the line of questioning or the witness’ responses, he fails to site any
supporting authority. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment
[of an issue] with little or no citation to supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App
627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). The court’s failure to provide a curative instruction to the
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jury is not a ground for setting aside the jury’s verdict when the defendant did not request the
instruction. Griffin, supra, 235 Mich App 37.
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that the court erred in admitting a morgue photograph
of the victim. The decision to admit photographs is within the trial court’s discretion. People v
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), modified 450 Mich 1212; 539 NW2d 504
(1995). “The proper inquiry is always whether the probative value of the photographs is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.” Id. The photograph was admitted to attack the
credibility of a defense witness that alleged the occupant of the backseat of the vehicle,
consistently identified as the victim, had “wild” hair and appeared “rough.” The photograph
merely served to contradict this testimony as it demonstrated the clean, neat and styled
appearance of the victim’s hair. As such, sufficient justification exists for the court’s ruling of
admissibility regarding the photograph. Gore v Rains & Block, 189 Mich App 729, 737; 473
NW2d 813 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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