PEOPLE OF MI V ERIK NATHANIEL MUEHLENBEIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244712
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-182924-FC
ERIK NATHANIEL MUEHLENBEIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hoekstra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by jury of kidnapping, MCL 750.349, and
two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 285 to 720 months’ imprisonment on each of the
three convictions. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that he was denied his constitutional rights to due
process and a fair trial by the introduction of irrelevant evidence concerning the beating of the
victim’s friend. We disagree. Because no objection to the admission of the evidence was made
at trial, defendant bears the burden of establishing plain error affecting his substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Generally, evidence tending to show that a defendant committed another criminal offense
is inadmissible on the issue of his innocence or guilt for the offense charged. People v
DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 413; 213 NW2d 97 (1973); People v Key, 121 Mich App 168, 179;
328 NW2d 609 (1982). An exception to the rule is where “acts, conduct and demeanor of a
person charged with a crime at the time of, or shortly before or after the offense is claimed to
have been committed, may be shown as a part of the res gestae.” People v Savage, 225 Mich 84,
86; 195 NW 669 (1923); cf. DerMartzex, supra at 414. Our Supreme Court has explained:
It is the nature of things that an event often does not occur singly and
independently, isolated from all others, but, instead, is connected with some
antecedent event from which the fact or event in question follows as an effect
from a cause. When such is the case and the antecedent event incidentally
involves the commission of another crime, the principle that the jury is entitled to
hear the "complete story" ordinarily supports the admission of such evidence.
-1-
[People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), quoting People v
Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273 NW2d 395 (1978).]
Here, evidence that defendant participated in the assault on the victim’s friend that
precipitated the victim’s kidnapping gave the jury an intelligible presentation regarding the full
context in which the events took place. Sholl, supra at 741. Therefore, the evidence was
relevant as part of the res gestae of the crime. MRE 401, 402. Consequently, defendant fails to
establish the existence of plain error.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
challenge the introduction of evidence regarding the victim’s friend’s injuries, failing to present
the defense of voluntary intoxication to the kidnapping charge, and failing to challenge the
scoring of offense variable (OV) 13. Because defendant’s request for a Ginther1 hearing was
denied, this Court’s review is limited to errors apparent on the record. See People v Stewart (On
Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996).
“To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the representation
so prejudiced defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636,
644; 664 NW2d 159 (2003). To prove ineffective assistance based on defense counsel’s failure
to object, a defendant is required to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions were the
result of sound trial strategy. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Here, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to
the evidence concerning the victim’s friend’s injuries. However, the defense strategy, as
demonstrated in the opening statement, was to show that defendant was sleeping in the car
during the events leading up to the conduct for which defendant was charged, including during
the kidnapping of the victim, and to shift the blame to the codefendant, Mohammed Hassan, who
“is a bad guy” and who had fled the country. Defendant’s counsel’s choice not to object to the
testimony regarding the beating of the victim’s friend could reasonably have been made in
furtherance of that trial strategy. We will not second-guess counsel’s strategic decision.
Gonzalez, supra at 644-645.
Defendant also maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer the
defense of voluntary intoxication to the kidnapping charge. Voluntary intoxication is no defense
to a general intent crime, People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 638; 331 NW2d 171 (1982), and
a showing of specific intent is not required for “forcible confinement or imprisonment of another
within this state,” People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 298; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). Therefore, this
issue has no merit.
Finally, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to object at sentencing to the scoring of OV 13, even though OV 11 was scored as well. The
prosecution concedes that it was error to score OV 13 when OV 11 was also scored, and we
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-2-
agree. See MCL 777.41-777.43. However, subtracting the 25 points assessed for OV 13 does
not change defendant’s offender classification or reduce the guideline range. Consequently,
defendant cannot establish that counsel’s error resulted in prejudice. Gonzalez, supra at 644;
People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 290; 508 NW2d 509 (1993).
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the kidnapping and CSC I
charges. Regarding the kidnapping charge, defendant again relies on the contention that the
kidnapping charge in this case requires proof of specific intent and that the evidence of his state
of intoxication likely would have resulted in an acquittal if the jury had been instructed on the
defense of voluntary intoxication. But, as already noted, forcible kidnapping is not a specific
intent crime, Jaffray, supra, and therefore voluntary intoxication is no defense. Accordingly,
there was no error.
Regarding the CSC I convictions, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient
because “there was substantial evidence in support of his defense of consent.” As argued by
defendant, his claim is not really a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather,
defendant argues that his defense of consent should have prevailed and likely would have
succeeded but for the admission of the evidence regarding the beating of the victim’s friend, and
if the jury had been instructed that voluntary intoxication was a defense to the charge of
kidnapping. Previously in this opinion, we have rejected defendant’s challenges to the admission
of the evidence of the beating of the victim’s friend and to the propriety of a voluntary
intoxication instruction. Thus, neither of those factors implicates whether the evidence was
sufficient. Defendant’s argument regarding whether the defense of consent should have
prevailed implicates the assessment of credibility. Defendant does not maintain that the
prosecution failed to introduce credible evidence in support of its theory that the sexual
penetrations performed by defendant on the victim were nonconsensual.2 Defendant only
maintains that his evidence of consent should have prevailed. Thus, the trial set up a classic
credibility dispute for the jury to resolve. We will not second-guess the decision of the jury.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992);
People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999) (Questions of credibility are for
the trier of fact to resolve and this Court will not resolve them anew on appeal.).
Defendant’s final claims address the sentence imposed for his convictions.3 Defendant
argues that scoring prior record variable (PRV) 7 (multiple convictions) and OV 11 (multiple
penetrations) “result[s] in excessive points awarded and could not possibly reflect the intent of
the [L]egislature.” However, defendant provides no meaningful analysis and does not support
this claim by citation to relevant authority. Consequently, this claim is abandoned. People v
Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998) (“An appellant may not merely
2
“In sufficiency of the evidence claims, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Fennell, 260
Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004).
3
We already have noted that the improper scoring of OV 13 does not require resentencing. See
supra.
-3-
announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting
authority.”).
Defendant also asserts that his sentence “reflects the sentencing judge’s desire to punish
defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial.” In support of this claim
defendant points to the lesser sentence imposed on one of the codefendants who pleaded guilty
and to the prosecutor’s arguments at sentencing for the sentence that was ultimately imposed by
the trial court. However, defendant’s sentence was within the appropriate guideline sentence
range. Sentences within the guideline range must be affirmed unless error is found in the scoring
of the guidelines or inaccurate information is relied upon to determine defendant’s sentence.
MCL 769.34(10). Here, defendant has not established error in the scoring that would affect his
guideline range and we are not persuaded that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate
information. In particular, the record does not reflect that the trial court used the sentence to
impose a penalty on defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial, nor do we believe that a
sentence that is within guidelines, and therefore is presumptively proportionate, see MCL
769.34(10); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 261; 666 NW2d 231 (2003) (a sentence within the
sentencing guidelines range is not subject to review for proportionality), can constitute one that
is a punishment for exercising the right to a trial by jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
