PEOPLE OF MI V ALVEN D SHARP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244058
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008884-01
NATHAN D. JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244059
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008884-02
ALVEN D. SHARP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a joint jury trial, defendants were each convicted of armed robbery, MCL
750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.
Defendant Johnson was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of ten to thirty years for the armed
robbery conviction and 2-1/2 to 5 years for the felon in possession conviction, to be served
consecutive to a term of five years for the felony-firearm conviction and consecutive to a term of
two to twenty years for the home invasion conviction.1 Defendant Sharp was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of six to twenty years for the armed robbery and home invasion
convictions and two to five years for the felon in possession conviction, to be served consecutive
1
It appears that defendant Johnson’s judgment of sentence contains an internal inconsistency.
We therefore remand for a correction as discussed in Part X of this opinion.
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to a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Both defendants appeal as of right. Their
appeals have been consolidated for consideration by this Court. We affirm; however, we remand
for administrative correction of the judgment of sentence.
I
This case arises from a home invasion that occurred on July 18, 2001, at approximately
1:30 a.m. Jason Schaifer was awakened when someone turned on his bedroom light. Two men
came into the bedroom. One man hit Schaifer on the head with a handgun. The men asked for
money, jewelry, and a leather coat. When Schaifer did not produce the items, he was hit
repeatedly in the head with the gun. The men took Schaifer’s wallet and watch. Before leaving,
the men restrained Schaifer with duct tape and attempted to cover his eyes, but the tape would
not stick because of the blood. Schaifer had never seen the men before, but as the men left, they
said they would be back and knew about his girlfriend Yolanda.
Defendants were arrested shortly after the home invasion. The police stopped their car
on the basis of a radio broadcast describing the car involved in the home invasion. Schaifer’s
wallet, watch, and jacket were found in the car. Police also found two guns and a partial roll of
duct tape in the car.
Defendants denied any involvement in the home invasion and gave contradictory stories
concerning their whereabouts that evening. Johnson testified that he knew Schaifer, he had
previously been to Schaifer’s home to buy marijuana, and was with him earlier in the evening
shooting dice outside some apartments. Sharp was there also. Schaifer got into an argument
over a drug deal and pulled a gun. Later, he left with Sharp to go to the store and they were
stopped by the police.
Sharp denied knowing Schaifer. Sharp testified that he had been with Johnson the
evening before the home invasion, but fell asleep in the back seat of the car while he and
Johnson were driving around with a woman they had picked up. When he awakened, he heard
the trunk of the car shut and then saw Johnson looking for something under the front seat. Sharp
decided to drive, and shortly after that they were stopped by the police.
II
Johnson argues that a new trial is required because trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request an alibi instruction. We disagree.
Because Johnson did not raise this issue in an appropriate motion in the trial court
pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), our review is limited to
errors apparent on the record, People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649
(1997).
A trial court is required to give an alibi instruction upon request if a defendant provides
his own alibi testimony, even if uncorroborated. People v McGinnis, 402 Mich 343, 345-347;
262 NW2d 669 (1978). Where a court properly instructs on the elements of the offense and the
burden of proof, however, the absence of an alibi instruction does not have a reasonable
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probability of affecting the outcome of the trial. People v Sabin (After Second Remand), 242
Mich App 656, 660; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Here, Johnson does not challenge the instructions
concerning the burden of proof or the elements of the charged offenses. Accordingly, under the
circumstances, Johnson has not demonstrated the requisite level of prejudice to prevail on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694
(2000).
Johnson also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and hire an
expert to examine the bags of drugs that were found in Sharp’s car. He claims that evidence of
Schaifer’s fingerprints on the bags would have corroborated defendant’s version of the events
and that counsel should have introduced this expert testimony.
Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call witnesses are presumed
to be matters of trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant has failed to overcome this presumption. There is no indication in the record, nor has
Johnson demonstrated by offer of proof, that an expert witness, had one been called, could have
provided favorable testimony in this regard. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669
NW2d 818 (2003). Because defendant has not established the factual predicate for his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he “has not established a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s alleged error the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 455456.
III
Both defendants challenge the trial court’s instructions concerning the intent requirement
for aiding and abetting. Because defendants did not object to the court’s aiding and abetting
instructions at trial, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 761; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Accordingly, we review this instructional issue for plain error
in accordance with Carines, supra at 763-764.
The record discloses that the trial court’s instructions were derived from the standard jury
instructions on aiding and abetting. CJI2d 8.1(3)(c) and CJI2d 8.4. These instructions are
consistent with Carines, supra at 757-760, wherein the Court recognized that a defendant’s
knowledge of the principal’s intent is sufficient to establish the intent element of aiding and
abetting. The recognition in Carines is consistent with earlier case law in this state. People v
King, 210 Mich App 425, 430-431; 534 NW2d 534 (1995). Defendants have not shown plain
error.
IV
Johnson also claims that the admission of Schaifer’s in-court identification during trial
was “plain error” because it was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive identification that
occurred at the preliminary examination.
An identification procedure can be so suggestive and conducive to irreparable
misidentification that it denies an accused due process of law. People v Williams, 244 Mich App
533, 542; 624 NW2d 575 (2001), citing Stovall v Denno, 388 US 293, 301-302; 87 S Ct 1967; 18
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L Ed 2d 1199 (1967). “The defendant must show that in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to have led to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591
NW2d 692 (1998). The relevant factors for evaluating the totality of the circumstances include:
the opportunity for the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of a prior description, the witness’ level
of certainty at the pretrial identification procedure, and the length of time between
the crime and the confrontation. [Id. at 304-305.]
If a trial court finds that a pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive, then evidence
concerning that identification is inadmissible at trial, and the witness’ in-court identification is
allowed only if the prosecution “shows by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court
identification will be based on a sufficiently independent basis to purge the taint of the illegal
identification.” Id., citing People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303, 318; 505 NW2d 528 (1993);
see also People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 115-124; 577 NW2d 92 (1998).
In this case, Johnson asserts that the identification at the preliminary examination was
impermissibly suggestive, but he fails to support this assertion under the relevant factors.
Defendant states only that the identification was highly suggestive because defendant was
presented as one of the accused at the defense table. Merely because an identification procedure
was suggestive does not mean that it is constitutionally defective. Colon, supra at 304.
Although a confrontation at a preliminary examination “does not necessarily mean that it cannot
be considered unduly suggestive,” id., citing People v Leverette, 112 Mich App 142, 154; 315
NW2d 876 (1982), this Court has repeatedly indicated that not all confrontations at a preliminary
examination are impermissibly suggestive. People v Hampton, 138 Mich App 235, 238; 361
NW2d 3 (1984); People v Flinnon, 78 Mich App 380, 389-390; 260 NW2d 106 (1977); People v
Johnson, 58 Mich App 347, 353; 227 NW2d 337 (1975).
Defendant has failed to establish plain error with regard to the preliminary examination
identification and therefore has failed to show plain error with regard to the subsequent
courtroom identification at trial. People v Laidlaw, 169 Mich App 84, 92-93; 425 NW2d 738
(1988). Even assuming that defendant could show plain error, we would conclude that he is not
entitled to appellate relief. Defendant has failed to show that he was unduly prejudiced by any
error or that reversal of his conviction is warranted. Carines, supra at 763. Other evidence
clearly linked defendant to the crimes. He was stopped in the vicinity of the home invasion,
shortly after it occurred, in a car matching the description provided to the police by Schaifer.
Schaifer’s watch, wallet, and jacket were found in the car. Although defendant’s version of
events accounted for some of this evidence, his version contradicted Sharp’s version of events
and was essentially unsupported by other evidence. Defendant has failed to show that any error
was outcome determinative, resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant, or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id.
For the same reasons, Johnson’s corresponding claim of ineffective assistance fails.
Johnson has not established a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s failure to seek
suppression of the identification at trial, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Toma, supra at 302-303.
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V
Next, Johnson asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because of two instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Because Johnson did not object to the prosecutor’s conduct at trial,
we review this unpreserved issue for plain error in accordance with Carines, supra. Ackerman,
supra at 448-449. Johnson first claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Schaifer’s
credibility by noting that his preliminary examination testimony was given under oath. We
disagree. The prosecutor’s comments did not amount to improper vouching because they did not
suggest that the prosecutor had “some special knowledge or facts indicating the witness’
truthfulness.” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276-277; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Johnson also argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to state that Johnson’s alibi
witnesses refused to testify in support of his defense because no evidence was admitted on that
point. Again, we disagree. The record discloses that the facts concerning the witnesses’ failure
to testify in support of Johnson’s defense were admitted through Johnson’s own testimony.
Therefore, the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper. We likewise reject Johnson’s contention
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these remarks. Because the remarks
were not improper, any objection would have been futile. Counsel is not required to make a
futile objection. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
VI
Johnson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial
motion for severance. We disagree.
Severance of trials is governed by MCR 6.121 and MCL 768.5. People v Hana, 447
Mich 325, 331; 524 NW2d 682 (1994), amended 447 Mich 1203 (1994). “Severance is
mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant demonstrates that his substantial rights
will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the potential
prejudice.” Hana, supra at 331. A trial court’s determination whether to sever is discretionary
and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 346.
Here, the only motion for severance that appears in the lower court record was filed by
Sharp. To the extent Johnson may have joined in that motion, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying it because the affidavit submitted in support of the motion was conclusory
and neither defendant presented an adequate offer of proof establishing that his substantial rights
would be prejudiced and that severance was the necessary means to rectify the prejudice. The
failure to make that showing precludes reversal “absent any significant indication on appeal that
the requisite prejudice in fact occurred at trial.” Id. at 347.
On appeal, Johnson claims that he was prejudiced by Sharp’s testimony, because it
contradicted his own account of the events and implicated him in the charged crimes. However,
the Court in Hana agreed with the United States Supreme Court’s view that mere testimony of a
codefendant is insufficient to establish the requisite prejudice:
“[I]t is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely
because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials. . . . While
‘[a]n important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only relevant and
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competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence,’ . . . a fair trial
does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence. A
defendant normally would not be entitled to exclude the testimony of a former
codefendant if the district court did sever their trials, and we see no reason why
relevant and competent testimony would be prejudicial merely because the
witness is also a codefendant.” [Hana, supra at 350, quoting Zafiro v United
States, 506 US 534, 540; 113 S Ct 933; 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993).]
Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to relief on this basis.
VII
Johnson also argues that the cumulative effect of each of the alleged errors previously
discussed warrants relief. We review this issue to determine whether the cumulative effect of
multiple errors denied Johnson a fair trial. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387; 624 NW2d
227 (2001). However, “only actual errors are aggregated to determine their cumulative effect.”
Bahoda, supra at 292 n 64. We have found no actual error with regard to most of the claims
asserted, and therefore defendant was not denied a fair trial because of their cumulative effect.
VIII
Johnson lastly challenges the constitutionality of his determinate five-year sentence
imposed for his second felony-firearm conviction. He argues that the Michigan Constitution
authorizes the Legislature to prescribe only indeterminate sentences and, therefore, the
Legislature lacked the authority to prescribe a determinate five-year sentence. We disagree.
This Court considered and rejected this argument in People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 660664; 601 NW2d 409 (1999). Although the decision in Cooper specifically addressed only the
two-year determinate sentence for a first-time felony-firearm conviction, the holding applies with
equal force to Johnson’s five-year sentence for a second conviction. Therefore, we find no merit
to this issue.
IX
Defendant Sharp argues that Schaifer’s “imprecise” testimony identifying Sharp as the
perpetrator was insufficient to support Sharp’s convictions. We disagree. The weight and
credibility of the complainant’s identification testimony was a matter for the jury to decide.
People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 676; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). This Court will not interfere
with the factfinder’s role in evaluating the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
X
It appears that defendant Johnson’s judgment of sentence contains an internal
inconsistency. The start dates of his respective sentences are inconsistent with the court’s order
of consecutive sentences for his felony-firearm and home invasion convictions and that his
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felony-firearm sentence be served before the other sentences. We therefore remand for an
administrative correction of the judgment of sentence to resolve any inconsistency.
Affirmed. Remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence in accordance with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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