OSCAR C MITCHELL JR V JOHN DOE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OSCAR C. MITCHELL, JR,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 245560
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 01-05538-NI
JOHN DOE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage P.J., O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order of dismissal for failure to timely serve
defendant. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion for
substituted service of process on Citizens Insurance Company of America (Citizens) with respect
to defendant. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
On October 1, 1999, plaintiff attended a party where he consumed six or seven double
shots of Cognac over the course of the evening. Plaintiff left the party alone and drove off in his
pickup truck.
Approximately two blocks from the party, plaintiff’s truck collided against a tree. There
were no witnesses to the accident, but witnesses did see two persons running from the truck after
the accident. The police arrived and found plaintiff unconscious in the passenger’s seat of the
truck. Based on the injuries to plaintiff and the damage to the inside of the truck, the responding
officers determined that plaintiff was not driving the vehicle when it collided with the tree. Also,
plaintiff stated that he had about $100 in cash when he left the party, but did not have it after the
accident. The unusual aspect of this case is that plaintiff has no recollection of events after
leaving the party in his truck until the police awakened him after the accident.
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Plaintiff could not locate defendant. Relying on two common law evidentiary
presumptions,1 plaintiff filed a third-party negligence complaint against “John Doe.” Plaintiff
then requested the trial court issue substitute service for defendant on Citizens, the liability
insurer of plaintiff’s motor vehicle. In support of the motion, plaintiff alleged that Citizens
insured defendant as a driver of plaintiff’s vehicle against third-party liability under plaintiff’s
policy. Citizens’ attorneys entered a limited appearance to contest plaintiff’s motion for
substituted service. The trial court denied each of plaintiff’s requests for substituted service.
The court clerk subsequently dismissed the case for lack of service on defendant. MCR
2.102(E)(2).
II. Standard of Review
MCR 2.105(I) provides trial courts with discretion to issue substituted service. An abuse
of discretion is found only in extreme cases in which the result is so palpably and grossly
violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the
exercise of passion or bias. Dep’t of Transportation v Randolph, 461 Mich 757, 768; 610 NW2d
893 (2000). Also, this Court reviews de novo the proper interpretation of the Michigan Court
Rules. Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467 Mich 337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff argues the trial court improperly denied his motion for substituted service based
on the unlikelihood that “John Doe” would ever be specifically named as a party. MCR
2.105(I)(1) provides for substituted service, and states:
On a showing that service of process cannot reasonably be made as
provided by this rule, the court may by order permit service of process to be made
in any other manner reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
Plaintiff points to provisions of the Michigan Court Rules that impliedly permit service of
process on unknown individuals. Specifically, MCR 2.105(I)(2), provides that, “[i]f the name or
present address of the defendant is unknown, the moving party must set forth facts showing
diligent inquiry to ascertain it.” Also, MCR 2.106(C)(2), regarding service of process by posting
or publication, provides that, “[i]f the names of some or all defendants are unknown, the order
must describe the relationship of the unknown defendants to the matter to be litigated in the best
1
Specifically, a person is presumed to have operated a motor vehicle with owner’s implied or
express permission or consent. See Caradonna v Arpino, 177 Mich App 486, 489; 442 NW2d
702 (1989). Also, that a person who flees an accident scene without identifying themselves is
presumed at fault. See Johnson v Secretary of State, 406 Mich 420, 440-441; 280 NW2d 9
(1979).
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way possible, as, for example, unknown claimants, unknown owners, or unknown heirs,
devisees, or assignees of a named person.”2
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for
substitutive service. We agree with plaintiff that the court rules contemplate instances of
substituted service on defendants whose names are unknown. However, service in all cases must
be “reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice.” MCR 2.105(I)(1).
Plaintiff relies on Krueger v Williams, 410 Mich 144; 300 NW2d 310 (1981), in which
our Supreme Court agreed that “service of process on a motorist, insured at the time of the
accident but missing at the time of the suit, may be made by service on the defendant’s liability
insurance carrier and notice to the defendant’s last known address.” Id. at 163, citing Dobkin v
Chapman, 236 NE2d 451 (NY 1968). This instant case does not implicate the basis for Krueger
service of process. First, there is no evidence of an agency relationship between defendant and
Citizens. Citizens does not know defendant’s identity, let alone defendant’s last known address.
Second, it is uncertain whether Citizens is defendant’s liability insurance carrier. Only by
operation of law does a potential relationship between Citizens and defendant exist. Moreover,
this relationship is irrelevant to Citizens’ ability to give defendant actual notice. Finally, because
it is unknown whether Citizen would actually be required to insure defendant, Citizens’ interest
in finding defendant is unascertainable.
2
The court rules do not expressly provide for the use “John Doe” complaints, nor does case law
expressly approve of this practice. Whether MCR 2.105(I)(2) and MCR 2.106(C)(2) permit
unknown defendants be named in personal injury cases is questionable. The language employed
in MCR 2.106(C)(2), appears to reflect language in MCR 2.206(D), entitled “Unknown Parties;
Procedure” which states:
(1) Persons who are or may be interested in the subject matter of an action,
but whose names cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, may be made parties
by being described as:
(a) unknown claimants;
(b) unknown owners; or
(c) unknown heirs, devisees, or assignees of a deceased person who may
have been interested in the subject matter of the action.
The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” indicates that the expression of these
legal designations may operate to exclude the use of general non-legal descriptions, such
as “John Doe.” Further, the language of MCR 2.105(I)(2) and MCR 2.106(C)(2) is not
inconsistent with this interpretation because, as plaintiff notes, they indicate that the court
rules contemplate merely unknown defendants.
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Here, there is no basis to conclude that substituted service to Citizens is “reasonably
calculated to give the defendant actual notice.” To the extent that the trial court indicated that
MCR 2.113 requires that defendant be named as a party, the trial court merely expressed the
reality that, “. . . for all practical purposes all defendants specifically unnamed are not yet parties
to a suit.” Thomas v Process Equipment Corp, 154 Mich App 78, 84 l 3798 NW2d 224 (1986),
citing Meda v City of Howell, 110 Mich App 179, 185-186; 312 NW2d 202 (1981); Fazzalare v
Desa Industries, Inc, 135 Mich App 1, 6, 351 NW2d 886 (1984). Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for substituted service on Citizens with
respect to defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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