PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES ERIC JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245056
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 00-019335-FC
CHARLES ERIC JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury convictions for armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenced defendant to 360 to 600
months’ imprisonment for armed robbery, 60 to 120 months’ imprisonment for felon in
possession of a firearm, and a consecutive sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment for felony
firearm. We affirm.
Defendant argues that his constitutional right to self-representation was violated. An
individual has an implied right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and an explicit
right to self-representation under the Michigan Constitution. Faretta v California, 422 US 806,
818-819; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975); Const 1963, art 1, § 13. However, the right to
self-representation is not absolute. People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 366; 247 NW2d 857
(1976). An unequivocal request for self-representation is a prerequisite to the court’s obligation
to conduct a further inquiry into that request. Id. at 367-368. “The defendant must exhibit ‘an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment’ of the right to counsel, and the court should
‘ “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” ’ of that right.” People v Adkins (After
Remand), 452 Mich 702, 721; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458,
464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938).
In this case, defendant did not unequivocally express a desire to represent himself or to
abandon his right to counsel. Although defendant moved to proceed in propria persona, in a
subsequent letter to the trial judge, defendant asserted that the court was duty bound to appoint
new counsel for him and also that he had an absolute right to conduct his own defense. A
request for substitute counsel made at the same time as a request for self-representation is not an
unequivocal waiver. People v Ahumada, 222 Mich App 612, 615; 564 NW2d 188 (1997). Thus,
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defendant did not unequivocally assert his desire to represent himself or waive his right to
counsel, and defendant’s argument must fail.
Next, defendant claims his trial violated the 180-day rule. Under MCL 780.131,
outstanding warrants, indictments, informations, and complaints against individuals in the
custody of the Department of Corrections must be tried or disposed of within 180 days.
However, this rule only applies to persons in state prison or in the custody of the Department of
Corrections. MCL 780.131(1). The statute does not apply to persons confined in local county
jails for parole violations unless their parole is revoked. People v Von Everett, 156 Mich App
615, 618; 402 NW2d 773 (1986). Defendant was confined in the Saginaw County jail on a
parole violation and was not in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Therefore, the
180-day rule does not apply to defendant.
Likewise, defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Although
approximately twenty-four months elapsed between defendant’s arrest and his trial, a long delay
alone is not enough to conclude that defendant’s constitutional rights were violated. People v
Classen, 50 Mich App 122, 126; 212 NW2d 783 (1973). In this case, trial adjournments were
granted from April 24, 2001, to February 12, 2002—a period of more than nine months—
pursuant to requests by defendant and express waivers of his speedy trial rights. Further delay of
approximately 6½ months can be attributed to defendant’s motions for new counsel and a
different judge. The only delay genuinely attributable to the prosecutor or the court is a three
month delay that occurred on February 12, 2002, because of a trial that ran overtime. When the
prosecutor stands ready for trial, delaying motions by defendant do not bar trial. See People v
Hendershot, 357 Mich 300, 304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959). Therefore, defendant’s claim must fail.
Next, defendant claims he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by the admission
of identification evidence from a photographic lineup. Defendant claims the trial court erred in
denying his request for a physical lineup. Our Supreme Court has held that photographic
identifications should not be used “when a suspect is in custody or when he can be compelled by
the state to appear at a corporeal lineup.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 298 n 8; 505
NW2d 528 (1993). However, in this case, defendant’s attorney actually suggested and agreed to
a photographic lineup. A party may not stipulate a matter or waive objection and then argue on
appeal that the resultant action was error. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 111; 631 NW2d
67 (2001). Therefore, this claim also must fail.
Next, defendant claims he was denied due process and a fair trial because the witnesses’
identification of him at trial was tainted by the suggestive nature of the confrontation at the
preliminary examination. Although defendant moved in the trial court to suppress the pretrial
identifications, the argument made by defendant in the trial court was that the photographic
lineup was suggestive, not that the preliminary examination was suggestive. To preserve an
evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must assert the same grounds in the trial court that the
party raises on appeal. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc (On Remand), 259 Mich App 467,
475; 674 NW2d 736 (2003), citing MRE 103(a)(1); Samuel D Begola Services v Wild Bros, 210
Mich App 636, 642; 534 NW2d 217 (1995). Therefore, this issue is not preserved. People v
Mass, 464 Mich 615, 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001).
Additionally, we find no error in the trial court’s failure to grant defendant a continuance
to subpoena witnesses for his defense. Unlike the defendant in People v Williams, 386 Mich
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565, 571-572; 194 NW2d 337 (1972), on which defendant relies, defendant was negligent in
waiting until the eve of trial to inform his attorney of the names of six witnesses he wished to
call. There was no bona fide dispute between defendant and his attorney to justify a continuance,
as in Williams. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s discovery request was filed nearly two years
before, and trial was adjourned numerous times at defendant’s request.
Nor do we find error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case based on the
prosecutor’s alleged failure to timely comply with discovery. The videotape of the robbery was
made available to the defense on September 11, 2001, more than a year before trial. Any delay
in turning over the tape was harmless. Defendant also claims the prosecution failed to disclose a
lack of fingerprint evidence. However, under United States v Bagley, 473 US 667; 105 S Ct
3375; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985), evidence must be material for a party to allege error based on
nondisclosure. “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 682. Defendant has not made this showing.
Next, defendant demands reversal of his conviction because there were no African
Americans on his jury, despite the fact that they allegedly comprise 17.77 percent of Saginaw
County’s population.
Although the underrepresentation was regrettable, we find no
constitutional violation. “To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement, a defendant must show that . . . the underrepresentation was the result of systematic
exclusion of the [distinctive] group from the jury-selection process.” People v Smith, 463 Mich
199, 203; 615 NW2d 1 (2000), citing Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed
2d 579 (1979). Defendant’s naked assertion that such underrepresentation “often happens in
Saginaw” is not sufficient to prove systematic exclusion. Moreover, the juror selection process
used by Saginaw County in this case was upheld by our Supreme Court in Smith, supra at 209.
Next, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to
object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial. This claim has no merit. To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that but for defense counsel’s errors,
there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Defendant has not made
this showing. Given the overwhelming physical evidence against defendant, we are not
convinced that any failing on the part of defendant’s three attorneys affected the outcome of the
trial. And, consequently, having found no error on any of defendant’s claims, we also find no
cumulative error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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