PEOPLE OF MI V HENRY DEQUAN MAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 243615
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-183038-FC
HENRY DEQUAN MAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole. We affirm.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that the prosecution failed to present sufficient
evidence to support his felony murder conviction. We disagree. In criminal cases, we review, de
novo, the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and conclude whether there
was sufficient evidence to justify a finder of fact in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999) (citing People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 513-516; 489 NW2d 748 (1992)); see also People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439,
457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
Defendant was charged with felony murder predicated upon first-degree child abuse in
the death of the two-year-old victim on December 22, 2001. To convict defendant of this charge
the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that defendant killed the
child, (2) “with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great
bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result,” (3) while
committing first-degree child abuse. People v Maynor, 256 Mich App 238, 243-244; 662 NW2d
468 (2003); see also MCL 750.316(1)(b). The elements of first-degree child abuse require proof
that defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) causes serious mental or serious physical harm
to a child. Maynor, supra at 240; see also MCL 750.136b(2). First-degree child abuse is a
specific-intent crime. Maynor, supra at 241. “Generally, a specific-intent crime requires
criminal intent beyond the act done, whereas a general-intent crime require only the intent to
perform the proscribed physical act.” Maynor, supra at 240 (citing People v Whitney, 228 Mich
App 230, 254; 578 NW2d 329 (1998)).
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An autopsy of the child revealed several contusions on his head and on his back, several
fractured ribs, and damage and hemorrhaging of the kidney, adrenal gland, and liver. Testimony
from the medical examiner and a prosecution medical expert in the field of child abuse and
pediatric medicine shows that the child died as the result of homicide from injuries constituting
child abuse. At issue is whether the evidence supported a finding by the jury that defendant was
guilty of committing the abuse and causing the death of the child beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant argues that the primary evidence linking him to the child’s death is the
testimony of Poupee Baines, the child’s mother, and that inconsistencies between Baines’
testimony and her prior police statements and between her testimony and the medical testimony
substantially undermined her credibility to the point that no reasonable jury could have found
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution counters by arguing that this Court
may not overturn a conviction on the basis of the credibility of a witness. Indeed, it is the case
that this Court generally may not interfere with a jury’s credibility determination. People v
Hughes, 217 Mich App 242, 248-249; 550 NW2d 871 (1996); People v Crump, 216 Mich App
210, 215-216; 549 NW2d 36 (1996) (citing Wolfe, supra); People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658,
600; 509 NW2d 885 (1993). Defendant argues that our Supreme Court has defined narrow
exceptions to this rule, where (1) “testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws,” (2)
“where testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities,” (3) “where a witness’s
testimony is material and so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable
juror,” or (4) “where the witness’ testimony has been seriously impeached and the case marked
by uncertainties and discrepancies.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-645; 576 NW2d 129
(1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court articulated these
exceptions in the context of reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a new trial
alleging that the verdict was against the great weight of evidence; accordingly, we do not agree
with defendant that Lemmon applies here. Regardless, we conclude that the medical evidence,
the testimony that defendant was alone with the victim for a significant period of time the day he
died, and that he spanked or “whipped” the victim for wetting his pants on the day of death as he
had before under the same or similar circumstances was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to
find that defendant had caused the victim’s fatal injuries. Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to
allow a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm
defendant’s conviction and sentence for felony murder.
Defendant’s next issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that
defendant had, one month prior to the victim’s death, grabbed the victim around his chest,
roughly placed him over his knee, pulled down his pants, and spanked him so hard that a
handprint was left on his buttocks. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an
abuse of discretion. People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). However, the
decision often involves a question of law, specifically, whether the admission of the evidence is
permitted by statute or court rule; we review questions of law de novo. Id. It is an abuse of
discretion to admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Id.
Evidence of scheme, plan, or system in doing an act may be properly admitted under
MRE 404(b). There are four requirements: that (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose
other than a character to conduct or propensity theory under MRE 404(b), (2) it is relevant under
MRE 402, and (3) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice
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pursuant to MRE 403, (4) the trial court consider a requested limiting instruction under MRE
105. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW3d 888 (2000) (citing People
v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994)). MRE
404(b) states, in relevant part:
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . . . motive, . . . intent,
. . .scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, . . . or absence of mistake or accident
when the same is material. [MRE 404(b)(1).]
Here, the prosecution sought to introduce the evidence that defendant had, one month
prior to the victim’s death, grabbed him by the chest, and spanked him so hard that he left marks
on the victim’s buttocks because the victim had wet himself, in order to prove defendant’s intent,
to prove defendant’s motive for hitting the victim, and to establish a common plan, scheme, or
system of abusing the victim when he wet himself. The trial court delayed the admission of the
prior acts evidence until such time as the identity of the disciplinarian was in dispute or for
purposes of impeachment. On defendant’s cross examination of the victim’s mother, counsel
asserted not only that the mother was the only one who disciplined the child, but that the mother
had in fact killed her child.
It was the theory of defense as elucidated during the cross-examination of the mother of
the child that served as a trigger for the prior acts evidence. The evidentiary door had been
opened. After stating the general prohibition against the use of propensity or conformity
evidence, our Supreme Court instructs in Sabin, supra at 56, “The second sentence of MRE
404(b)(1) then emphasizes that this prohibition does not preclude using the evidence for other
relevant purposes. MRE 404(b)(1) lists some of the permissible uses. The list is not, however,
exhaustive.” To rebut an advanced defense theory is a proper other purpose within the meaning
of MRE 404(b)(1). Once defendant asserted that he did not discipline the child, the issue of the
nature and extent of his involvement in disciplining the child was germane.
Prior abuse of sufficient similarity is admissible to support that the defendant employed a
common plan in committing the charged offense, that the death was non-accidental, and that the
child’s death was a homicide. People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 252-253; 650 NW2d 659 (2002).
This Court has also ruled that evidence of similar past conduct was admissible to show a
common scheme on the part of a defendant to assault his girlfriend’s children. People v Maygar,
250 Mich App 408, 417; 648 NW2d 215 (2002).
Here, evidence that defendant had previously beaten or spanked the victim for wetting
himself would be probative in establishing not only that he disciplined the child, but a common
plan, system, or methodology in spanking or beating the victim as punishment for wetting
himself. Further, the similarities of the behavior of the defendant and the methods he employed
between the charged acts, the uncharged acts, and the pattern of injury that resulted are probative
of the fact that the child’s death was neither non-accidental nor unintended. We conclude that
the evidence is for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b).
“‘“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
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it would be without the evidence.’” Hawkins, supra at 449 (quoting MRE 401, emphasis added
by this Court in Hawkins). Here, the evidence does have a tendency to make it more probable
that defendant committed the instant crime, and is thus, relevant.
“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative
evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich
App 434, 442; 669 NW2d 818 (2003) (quoting People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 306; 642
NW2d 417 (2001) (quoting People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998))).
As this Court noted, all relevant evidence “is somewhat prejudicial to a defendant. . . .” Maygar,
supra at 416. Here, the trial court did consider the prejudicial effect of the evidence, and
accordingly restricted the use of the evidence for impeachment purposes, or where defendant put
the victim’s discipline at issue. Furthermore, the trial court’s instructions to the jury specifically
prohibited the jury from inferring bad character on the part of defendant. The fact that the trial
court issues a limiting instruction “that cautions the jury not to infer that a defendant had a bad
character and acted in accordance with that character” contributes to a finding that evidence was
not unfairly prejudicial. Id. Juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, and
“instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 278279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that there was no unfair
prejudicial effect that substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the evidence, and did not commit
an abuse of discretion in doing so.
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that the trial court committed a plain error requiring
reversal in admitting evidence that defendant attempted to arrange a deal to purchase marijuana,
and that defendant and his cousin were using a scale to weigh marijuana. Further, that defense
counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
This issue has not been preserved for appeal. To preserve an issue for appeal, the party
appealing must make a timely objection at trial. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d
144 (2000). Defendant concedes on appeal that no objection was made at trial. This Court may,
nonetheless, review the trial court’s admission of the evidence for a plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). This doctrine comprises three requirements: “1) error must have occurred, 2) the error
was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights . . . [which]
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court
proceedings.” Carines, supra at 763 (citing United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 731-734; 113 S
Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993)). This Court must reverse “only when the plain, forfeited error
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error ‘“seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” independent of the
defendant’s innocence.’” Carines, supra at 763 (quoting Olano, supra at 736-737).
In order to review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad act
for plain error, it is first necessary to determine whether the decision was error at all. Carines,
supra at 763. “‘“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Hawkins, supra at 449 (quoting MRE 401,
emphasis added by this Court in Hawkins). Defendant was not charged with possessing or
distributing marijuana. The possession of marijuana or distribution of marijuana is not an
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element to the crime of felony murder predicated on first-degree child abuse. Defendant’s
alleged attempts to purchase marijuana, and his alleged weighing of marijuana outside his house,
do not make it any more (or less) likely that he committed the instant crime. Any evidence that
is not relevant is inadmissible. MRE 402.
While the marijuana evidence should not have been admitted into evidence as irrelevant,
we conclude that in light of the significant amount of evidence tending to show defendant’s guilt,
this plain error did not result in prejudice to defendant, nor did it result in the conviction of an
innocent defendant, nor did it seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. As a
result, the admission of the marijuana evidence by the trial court is plain error, but not one
requiring reversal.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel’s failure to object on this ground at trial
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are reviewed de novo. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 410-411; 639 NW2d
291 (2001). Where defendant did not move for a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing below, the issue
is waived if the record does not support defendant’s assertions. Sabin (On Remand), supra at
659.
A defendant that claims he has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel must establish (1) the performance of his counsel was below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) a
reasonable probability exists that, in the absence of counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v
LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 213; 528 NW2d 721 (1995); People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). A defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that the assistance of his counsel was sound trial strategy, and he
must show that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). [Sabin
(On Remand), supra at 659.]
Here, as defendant concedes in his brief, defense counsel, at trial, failed to object to
defendant’s introduction of the evidence, choosing instead to impeach Baines’ testimony as it
related to the alleged marijuana dealings. We find that this choice suggests that defense counsel
understood the damaging effects of the testimony, and that she preferred to attack it head on
rather than object to it. It is not unreasonable to infer that defense counsel hoped to use the
testimony to defendant’s advantage by attempting to catch Baines in a lie. In any event, we find
that defendant has not made a showing sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption” that
counsel’s decision was “sound trial strategy,” and as such, we conclude that defendant was not
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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