IN RE JACOEBI BERNARD PARLOUR MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JACOEBI BERNARD PARLOUR,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249050
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-050578
HAROLD PARLOUR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
STACY IRELAND,
Respondent.
In the Matter of JUSTIN MARTEL IRELAND,
JAMES EARL IRELAND, and JACOEBI
BERNARD PARLOUR, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249093
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-050578
STACY IRELAND,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
HAROLD PARLOUR,
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Respondent.
Before: Zahra, P.J., Cavanagh and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 249050, respondent-father appeals as of right from an order terminating
his parental rights to his minor child, Jacoebi Bernard Parlour, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
(conditions leading to adjudication not rectified) and (g) (failure to provide proper care or
custody). In Docket No. 249093, respondent-mother appeals as of right the same order
terminating her parental rights to Jacoebi, as well as Justin Martel Ireland and James Earl Ireland
pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if
returned home). This Court consolidated these appeals. We affirm.
The children were brought into the court’s custody after respondent-mother angrily
threatened employees at a bus garage. The petition seeking temporary custody of the children
noted prior proceedings against respondent-mother, concerns that she might be suffering from
mental illness and substance abuse problems, and her unwillingness to participate in offered
services in the past. The children were taken into the court’s custody and both respondentmother and respondent-father entered into parent-agency agreements with petitioner. Although
the allegations in the original petition did not reference respondent-father, he entered into a
parent-agency agreement in order to regain custody of his son.
The two critical issues for respondent-mother were anger management and substance
abuse treatment. During the course of the proceedings, respondent-mother failed to address
either issue, despite repeated services offered to her. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding
sufficient evidence to support termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights under
§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and § 19b(3)(g). Because respondent-mother failed to manage her anger the trial
court properly found evidence of a likelihood of harm to the children if returned to her care
sufficient to justify termination under § 19b(3)(j).
Respondent-father maintains that the trial court erred in basing termination of his parental
rights on § 19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication not rectified). We agree. The
conditions resulting in the court’s custody over Jacoebi involved respondent-mother’s behavior,
not respondent-father. Respondent-father cannot be required to rectify the behavior of the
mother. In re C.R., 250 Mich App 185; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). However, this error was
harmless in light of the evidence supporting termination of respondent-father’s parental rights
under § 19b(3)(g). In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 117-118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
Termination is warranted under § 19b(3)(g) if the parent, without regard to intent, fails to
provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent
would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age. A respondent’s failure to substantially comply with the parent-agency agreement
would support termination of respondent’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(g). See In re A.H., 245
Mich App 77, 87-88; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). The court may terminate parental rights even if the
respondent complies with the parent-agency agreement in part, where the respondent’s partial
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compliance is insufficient to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication of the children. See
Matter of Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 27; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
Here, respondent-father’s parent-agency agreement required, among other things, that he
obtain and verify steady, lawful employment and abstain from use or possession of any illegal
drugs. The record clearly establishes respondent-father’s non-compliance in this regard.
Respondent-father failed to verify any employment. While he claimed to be employed from
September 2001 through September 2002, this purported employment was with five different
employers. Further, respondent-father admits that he lost his last job because he was
incarcerated for a drug related conviction. Respondent-father also failed to establish stable
housing that was suitable for a child. Respondent-father reported at least six different addresses
for the period between January 2002 and March 2003.
Respondent-father also displayed exceedingly poor decision-making skills, as evidenced
by his involvement in drug related criminal activity in violation of his lifetime probation, which
was imposed for a conviction relating to the delivery of cocaine. Further, the psychologist who
performed respondent-father’s evaluation expressed concern with respondent-father’s ability to
parent a young child.
Respondent-father also argues that, at a minimum, he should be granted an additional
ninety-day period to show that he can properly care for the child. However, the trial court had
already granted respondent-father ninety days to work towards reunification at the August 20,
2002, permanency planning hearing. Prior to the lapse of that ninety-day period, respondentfather had pleaded guilty to a drug use charge and had been sentenced to jail time. In light of
respondent-father’s conduct, the court could properly conclude that there was no reasonable
expectation that respondent-father would be able to provide proper care and custody of Jacoebi
within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did
not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent-father’s
parental rights to Jacoebi under § 19b(3)(g).
Once the petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights, unless the court
finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We
conclude the evidence did not show that termination of respondents’ parental rights was clearly
not in the best interests of the children at issue. That termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights was not contrary to the best interests of the children considering that the children
all had special needs and respondent-mother was unwilling to work with agencies, schools and
other professionals who were available to address those needs. Respondent-mother had also
failed to visit the children for almost a year prior to trial and had behaved inappropriately when
she did visit. Likewise, the evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that termination of
respondent-father’s parental rights was not contrary to the best interest of Jacoebi. Dr. Hobbs,
who had performed a psychological evaluation of respondent-father, concluded that respondentfather did not have any real understanding of what parenting required. Respondent-father’s
counselor indicated that respondent-father had limited or little insight regarding his lifestyle
choices and would rarely take responsibility for his action, tending instead to blame others.
Furthermore, respondent-father did not recognize or understand the child’s special needs. Even
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though the child was receiving occupational, speech, and physical therapy while in the court’s
custody, respondent-father testified that his son was a healthy child, without problems.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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