IN RE BACON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of EMILY BACON, CHARITY
BACON, and MATTHEW BACON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248836
Emmet Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-004528-NA
JAMES BACON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
NOREEN BACON,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Griffin and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to her minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (i). We affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 5.974(I), now 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial
court determines that petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, then the trial court must terminate the respondentappellant’s parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We
review for clear error the trial court’s decision with regard to the child’s best interests. Id. at
356-357.
In the instant case, respondent-appellant does not contest the trial court’s findings on the
statutory grounds for termination. On the contrary, respondent-appellant argues that testimony
presented at trial indicated that terminating his parental rights and disallowing any further
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contact with his children after termination was clearly not in the children’s best interests and that
the trial court clearly erred in finding otherwise. We do not agree.
MCL 712A.19b(5) provides:
If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights,
the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts
for reunification of the child with the parent not be made, unless the court finds
that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best
interests.
As our Supreme Court decreed in In re Trejo, supra, “subsection 19b(5) preserves to the
court the opportunity to find that termination is ‘clearly not in the child’s best interests’ despite
the establishment of one or more grounds for termination.” Trejo, supra at 352-353. According
to the court in Trejo, “[s]ubsection 19b(5) attempts to strike the difficult balance between the
policy favoring the preservation of the family unit and that of protecting the child’s right and
need for security and permanency.” Trejo, supra at 354.
In the case at bar, the court specifically considered respondent-appellant’s twenty-year
history with social services and determined that, after exhausting every resource available,
parental rehabilitation and family reunification were not even in the realm of possibility.
Thereafter, the trial court considered that at best, testimony adduced at trial suggested that
continued contact with the children post termination would “probably” not harm the children and
“may” be of some limited value. Consequently, the trial court determined that the testimony
presented did not clearly indicate that termination was antithetical to the children’s best interests,
terminated respondent-appellant’s parental rights accordingly, but nevertheless allowed visits to
continue on a monthly basis contingent upon subsequent adoption.
A review of the record unequivocally establishes that, notwithstanding over twenty years
of intervention and services, respondent-appellant’s parenting skills did not improve one iota.
Moreover, the record is replete with testimony regarding respondent-appellant’s lack of interest,
interaction, and involvement with his children. Indeed, psychologist Timothy Strauss clearly
testified that respondent-appellant was “detached” from his children and that continued contact
would likely disrupt the children’s development.
Similarly, testimony adduced at trial established that while continued contact may not
harm the children, respondent-appellant failed to present evidence to definitively establish that
further contact would advance their interests. On the contrary, testimony revealed that continued
contact with respondent-appellant would probably delay the children’s progress
developmentally. To be sure, expert testimony put forth at trial indicated that respondentappellant’s general passivity made it exceptionally difficult for him to impose appropriate
emotional and behavioral boundaries upon his children to control their conduct. Further on that
point, Strauss testified that respondent-appellant would likely withdraw from the children in the
event of any conflict arising among them and leave the situation entirely unresolved. To ensure
that these children “catch up” emotionally, intellectually, and socially, Strauss clearly testified
that the children need “assertive, supportive, proactive” parents. Given respondent-appellant’s
globally passive nature, Strauss opined that he could not meet the children’s needs in this critical
regard.
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A review of the entire record reveals that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating
respondent-appellant’s parental rights. Indeed, all of the witnesses testifying at trial
unequivocally agreed that terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights would serve the
children’s best interests. Consequently, the trial court also did not clearly err by denying
continued contact with respondent-appellant post adoption. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
decision in every regard.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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