PEOPLE OF MI V DWAYNE UNDREA JONES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243481
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 02-047024-FC
DWAYNE UNDREA JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J. and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to rob while armed,
MCL 750.89, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to 18 to
40 years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, and to a concurrent term of 8 to 30 years’
imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, plus two years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
evidence the hearsay statement of a police detective that police records indicated defendant’s
address was 2509 Lahey. We conclude that, assuming error in admitting the evidence, the error
was harmless under People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), because the
weight of the untainted evidence is such that it is not likely that a different outcome would have
resulted without the error. The harmless error rule, codified in MCL 769.26, provides:
No judgment or verdict shall be . . . reversed . . . in any criminal case, on
the ground of . . . the improper admission . . . of evidence, . . . unless in the
opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Here, defendant has failed to establish that it is “more probable than not that a different
outcome would have resulted without the error.” Lukity, supra at 495. The admission of alleged
hearsay evidence establishing that defendant’s address was 2509 Lahey was of little value
because the prosecutor had already presented unchallenged evidence that a police officer went to
-1-
2509 Lahey after the crime, found defendant to be present in the house at that address, and spoke
to defendant about the crime. Moreover, the prosecutor presented the testimony of defendant’s
accomplice, Lee Matthews, who testified to defendant’s participation in the robbery and testified
that he saw defendant shoot one of the victims in the leg. We also question the damaging effect
of the evidence admitted at trial where the only evidence found at 2509 Lahey were two .25
caliber bullets in one of the bedrooms, and Matthews testified that defendant used a .380
automatic gun. Because defendant has not established that it is more probable than not that the
jury would have reached a different verdict if the alleged hearsay evidence that connected
defendant with the 2509 Lahey address had been excluded, we conclude that the error was
harmless.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s improper questioning of an alibi witness
regarding her drug use deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Reviewing this unpreserved claim
of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights, People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720;
613 NW2d 370 (2000), we find no error.
At trial, defendant’s mother testified that defendant was at her sister’s home during the
time that the crimes were committed. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked her
whether she had used cocaine during the time that the offenses were committed. Although
defendant contends that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by questioning an alibi witness
about her drug use, the questioning was proper. Because the credibility of this alibi witness
depended on her ability to perceive and recall events that occurred the night of the offense, the
prosecutor’s inquiry regarding whether the alibi witness used cocaine around the time of the
offense was relevant and proper. MRE 401-403; People v Duff, 165 Mich App 530, 537; 419
NW2d 600 (1987).1 The prosecutor was merely attempting to establish whether the alibi
witness was under the influence of drugs that could have affected her perception of the events at
the time. Further, because the prosecutor primarily directed his questions regarding drug use to
the time that the offenses occurred, he did not act in bad faith. A finding of misconduct may not
be based upon a prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit evidence. People v Noble, 238 Mich
App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999), citing People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 328; 299
NW2d 346 (1980). We therefore conclude that defendant has failed to establish any error, let
alone plain error that affected his substantial rights. Pursuant to the language in Carines, supra
1
In Duff, supra at 537, this Court stated:
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned whether Jackson
[defense witness] had “smoked any weed” that night and had Jackson show the
jury his marijuana belt buckle. While these unobjected-to questions and answers
may have been irregular, they did not imply that defendant used drugs, but rather
cast doubt on Jackson’s ability to perceive and recall and did not rise to the level
whereby defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
-2-
at 763, we cannot find that, assuming plain forfeited error, the “error resulted in the conviction of
an actually innocent defendant or . . . ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” (Citation
omitted; alteration in original).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.