JEANETTE MUSE V LANSING HOUSING COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JEANETTE MUSE,
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 241807
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 01-093326-CZ
LANSING HOUSING COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the grant of summary disposition in defendant’s favor in this
wrongful discharge case. We affirm.
First, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she did not have a justcause employment contract with defendant because defendant’s handbook and work rules
created such legitimate expectation. See Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich 579,
598; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). We disagree. Rulings on motions for summary disposition are
reviewed de novo on appeal. UAW-GM Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation Corp, 228
Mich App 486, 490; 579 NW2d 411 (1998).
“At will” is the presumed employment relationship in Michigan. Lynas v Maxwell
Farms, 279 Mich 684, 687; 273 NW 315 (1937). Merely creating guidelines for a systematic
way of dealing with employees’ misconduct does not establish just-cause employment rather
than at-will employment. Biggs v Hilton Hotel Corp, 194 Mich App 239, 241-242; 486 NW2d
61 (1992). Where there is nothing in the rules that suggests an employee may only be discharged
for cause or that the rules are an exhaustive list upon which termination may be based, the rules
alone are insufficient to create a just-cause relationship. Id. Here, we find that there is nothing
in the work rules suggesting that plaintiff could only be discharged for cause.
First, plaintiff’s interpretation of defendant’s work rules as requiring a progression
moving from counseling through to discharge is unsupported by a reading of the rules. The
foreword to the rules states that violations of the work rules “may range from verbal counseling
through discharge” (emphasis added). Nowhere do the rules state that a disciplinary progression
is mandatory for every offense. In fact, many of the rules’ disciplinary guidelines recommend
that a first offense should result in discharge. Further, defendant’s policies do not contain
language expressly suggesting just-cause employment. Plaintiff, therefore, finds significance in
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a provision which states: “Employees are subject to discipline up to and including discharge for
violations of the Housing Commission rules and policies, unsatisfactory performance, and other
reasons providing just cause for discipline.” Although the words “just cause” are present here,
any possible effect that could be ascribed to these words is nullified by the handbook’s
contractual disclaimer in the foreword. See Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 166;
579 NW2d 906 (1998); Biggs, supra at 241.
Plaintiff also argues that the exchange she had with the executive director during her
interview created an express contract for just-cause employment. “The starting point in
analyzing oral statements for contractual implications is to determine the meaning that
reasonable persons might have attached to the language, given the circumstances presented.”
Rowe v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627, 640; 473 NW2d 268 (1991). The
statements must be clear and unequivocal, specific “with regard to duration of employment or
grounds for termination,” and show “indication of an actual negotiation or an intent to contract
for permanent or just-cause employment.” Lytle, supra at 172; Biggs, supra at 242.
With regard to job security, plaintiff alleges that she asked if it would be a problem that
she was leaving a union position to take a non-union position, and the executive director then
told her, “As long as you do your work, you won’t have no problem.” We find the executive
director’s response similar to the responses in Rowe, supra at 642, where the plaintiff was told
that as long as she sold, she would have a job, and Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich
107, 123; 507 NW2d 591 (1993), where the plaintiff was told that “unless something was really
wrong” he would be there for retirement and that as long as the employer had a truck, plaintiff
would be the driver. In both of those cases, the Court held that, considered in context, the
statements were insufficient to create a just-cause contract and no reasonable jury could find that
they were just-cause contracts. Rood, supra at 127; Rowe, supra at 645.
Here, we find that plaintiff’s comments merely reflect her concern over the possible
residual effects of her previous position as a union steward. There is no indication that she was
specifically negotiating for just-cause employment or making specific inquiries regarding
grounds for termination. See Lytle, supra. And likewise, the executive director’s response
cannot be reasonably deemed a clear and unequivocal statement of job security. See Biggs,
supra.
In sum, the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims was proper because no reasonable
jury could find that defendant’s policies or work rules, or the statements made to plaintiff during
her interview, created a just-cause employment relationship – plaintiff was terminable at will.
Because of our determination on this issue, we need not consider defendant’s alternative grounds
for affirmance.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her request to amend her
complaint when it determined that the request was too late. We disagree. This Court will not
reverse a trial court’s decision on a motion to amend absent an abuse of discretion that results in
injustice. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 393; 541 NW2d 566 (1995).
Although leave to amend a complaint is freely given when justice so requires, MCR
2.118(A)(2), it may also be denied for particularized reasons, including undue delay, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, or futility. Jenks v Brown, 219 Mich App 415, 420; 557 NW2d
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114 (1996). Delay alone is usually insufficient reason to deny amendment unless it also would
result in prejudice that would prevent the defendant from having a fair trial because of the
lateness. Knauff v Oscoda Co Drain Comm'r, 240 Mich App 485, 493; 618 NW2d 1 (2000);
Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass'n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 343-344; 568
NW2d 847 (1997).
Here, plaintiff did not move to amend her complaint to add a new theory of liability, a
violation of the Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act, until (1) over a year after her
first amended complaint was filed, (2) after the scheduling deadline negotiated for and stipulated
to by the parties, (3) after the close of discovery, (4) after the case evaluation hearing, (5)
approximately three months before the scheduled trial, and (6) after defendant filed its motion
for summary disposition. “A party is not entitled to wait until the discovery cutoff date has
passed and a motion for summary judgment has been filed on the basis of claims asserted in the
original complaint before introducing entirely different legal theories in an amended complaint.”
Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 661; 563 NW2d 647 (1997), quoting Priddy v Edelman, 883
F2d 438, 446-447 (CA 6, 1989). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s
motion to amend because defendant would have been prejudiced by plaintiff’s unduly delayed
amendment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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