IN RE CHARLES LASURE III MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARLES LASURE III, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 6, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248529
Mason Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000074-NA
CHARLES LASURE II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ANNETTE FONDAW,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Griffin and Jansen, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), (h), and (j).
We affirm.
On appeal, respondent-appellant argues that he was denied due process of law when the
trial court did not permit him to be physically present for the termination hearing. At the time of
the hearing, respondent-appellant was incarcerated in administrative segregation at Marquette
Prison. Although he did not physically attend the hearing, he did participate by telephone and
was represented by counsel, who was present at the hearing. In support of his position,
respondent-appellant primarily relies on our decision in In re Render, 145 Mich App 344; 377
NW2d 421 (1985). We find that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those in
Render. In the present case, respondent-appellant was able to actually participate in the hearing
telephonically and had the opportunity, with the assistance of counsel, to present evidence
favorable to himself at the hearing. Moreover, when Render was decided, the statute then in
effect required the parent to be present at the termination hearing. Render, supra at 349. The
current version of the statute does not require that the parent be present, but, instead, only
requires that the parent receive notice of the hearing. MCL 712A.19(2)(c).
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Our decision in In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44; 501 NW2d 231 (1993), is instructive in
the present case. In Vasquez, decided after the Legislature enacted the amended MCL
712A.19(2)(c), this Court rejected the notion “that an incarcerated parent is entitled as a matter
of absolute right to be present at the dispositional hearing,” and, instead, reasoned that “[i]n light
of present-day telecommunications, other means that fall short of securing the physical presence
of a parent are available to ensure that an incarcerated prisoner receives due process at a
dispositional hearing.” Vasquez, supra at 48-49.
In the present case, we cannot conclude that respondent-appellant’s physical absence
from the termination hearing amounted to a violation of his due process rights. Although
respondent-appellant was not physically present at the hearing, he was able to fully participate in
the hearing by telephone. Our conclusion is also supported by MCR 2.004, which specifically
contemplates that an incarcerated parent might participate in a termination hearing by telephone.
See MCR 2.004(C), (E)(5), and (F).
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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