PEOPLE OF MI V MELISSA ANN COX
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242364
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-179653-FH
MELISSA ANN COX,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J. and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial conviction for felonious assault, MCL
750.82(1). Defendant was sentenced to eighteen months’ probation and 183 days jail. She
received an enhanced sentence, pursuant to MCL 769.10, based on a previous felony conviction.
We affirm.
I. FACTS
Defendant’s conviction arose out of an altercation outside of a bar. Lashay Martin, the
victim, testified that prior to the assault she had met defendant one time at a friend’s house.
Martin knew Adam Esterin through her friends. Martin was aware that defendant and Esterin
had at one time been “together” and that they were not at that time. Martin stated that she and
Esterin “hung out” and described them as “friends.” She stated that she was at one time
romantically interested in Esterin, though they were never “boyfriend and girlfriend.” She
occasionally spent time alone with Esterin at his house.
On April 22, 2000, Martin was at Esterin’s house when defendant called fifteen to thirty
times. The calls lasted until approximately 10:00 p.m. Martin stated that during the calls,
defendant “threatened that she was going to come over and bash my head into the cement and
kill me,” and defendant also threatened Esterin. Martin did not actually speak with defendant on
this occasion, but knew of the threats because Martin “was sitting right next to Adam . . . [while
defendant] was going psycho and yelling out things to me and to Adam.” Esterin called the
police and reported the threats. After April 22, 2000, Martin did not see defendant again until
the assault.
On May 18, 2000, Martin and a group of friends went to a bar. Around 2:00 a.m., she
and her friends left the bar. As they were walking to their car they passed by Esterin’s car. At
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some point Martin, hearing someone yelling, turned around. Martin saw Esterin get out of the
car and defendant get out, “still yelling.” Martin said something to Esterin and then saw
defendant leaning down toward her own foot, as if to take her shoe off. Martin then felt
something strike the left side of her face. She did not know what struck her, but knew that
defendant had hit her. Martin grabbed her face and blacked out “for about a second” after being
struck.
Martin’s friends drove her to the emergency room. Martin was in a lot of pain and
received a shot for the pain at the hospital. Dr. Michael Dargay examined Martin in the
emergency room. After consulting the hospital record on the stand, he stated that Martin had
bruising and swelling around the boney orbit of one of her eyes, as well as a “small, very
superficial laceration to the face.” He stated that after an x-ray and “CT-scan” were performed
on Martin, it was determined she had four bone fractures in her face: “One involving the nose. . .
the inner portion [of the eye socket] close to the nose, the remedial wall of the eye socket and
then the . . . part of what we call the maxillary bone, involving the maxillary sinus.” Dargay
characterized Martin’s injuries as “serious,” and “consistent with a blunt force injury.” He said it
would not be unusual to see multiple fractures around the nose and eye from one blow.
Defendant testified on her own behalf that she was merely acting in self defense. She
testified that Martin approached her in a confrontational manner and that she hit her because she
was afraid. Defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, MCL 750.82. She now
appeals as of right.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could
consider whether defendant could have safely retreated when deciding whether she used
excessive force in defending herself. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews claims of instructional error de novo. People v Hall, 249 Mich App
262, 269; 643 NW2d 253 (2002). In doing so, it examines the jury instructions as a whole, and
instructions must not be extracted piecemeal to establish error. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Jury instructions must include all the elements of the charged
offense and must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence supports
them. People v Milton, 257 Mich App 467, 475; 668 NW2d 387 (2003). “Instructions that are
somewhat imperfect are acceptable, as long as they fairly present to the jury the issues to be tried
and sufficiently protect the rights of the defendant.” People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 526;
554 NW2d 362, 366 (1996), lv gtd 457 Mich 870 (1998), aff’d 460 Mich 55 (1999).
B. Analysis
The trial court’s instruction to the jury on self-defense consisted of the following
paraphrase of CJI2d 7.22 and CJI2d 7.16(1): “You should consider all the evidence and use the
following rules to decide whether Ms. Cox acted in lawful self-defense. [Summary of CJI2d
7.15(1) – (6).] . . . And finally, that there was no—no way open for the accused to retreat. If Ms.
Cox could have safely retreated, but did not do so, you can consider that fact along with all the
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other circumstances when you decide whether she went further in protecting herself than she
should have.” In its entirety, CJI2d 7.16(1) reads: “A person can use deadly force in selfdefense only where it is necessary to do so. If the defendant could have safely retreated but did
not do so, you may consider that fact in deciding whether the defendant honestly and reasonably
believed [he / she] needed to use deadly force in self-defense.”
Defendant claims that her action in self-defense, striking the victim once with a shoe, was
not the use of deadly force, and therefore, a jury instruction on the duty to retreat was not proper.
The validity of defendant’s claim of error depends on the characterization of the force she used
to defend herself. In Michigan case law, a person is deemed to use deadly force “where the
defendant's acts are such that the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence of said acts is
death.” People v Couch, 436 Mich 414, 428 n 3; 461 NW2d 683 (1990), citing People v Pace,
102 Mich App 522; 302 NW2d 216 (1980) (defining “deadly force” in the context of selfdefense). Whether death is a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of a defendant’s acts
depends on the facts of the case.
As pointed out above, this Court has stated that jury instructions “must not exclude
material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence supports them.” Milton, supra, 257 Mich
App 475 (citing People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000)). See also
People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 120 n 7; 649 NW2d 30 (2002) (“Where . . . a factual issue has
been presented for the jury's resolution concerning the circumstances under which the defendant
used deadly force—as is true in the case at bar—the jury should be instructed concerning all
relevant principles for which evidentiary support exists.”) Once the prosecution presented
evidence from which the jury could conclude that “death” was the “natural, probable, and
foreseeable consequence,” i.e., that defendant used “deadly force,” then whether defendant had a
duty to retreat became a material issue in the case. In People v Clark, 172 Mich App 407, 418;
432 NW2d 726 (1988), this Court held that “[t]he testimony regarding defendant’s striking of
[the victim] with a large iron pipe and the evidence presented concerning [the victim’s] injuries
reveal acts such that the natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of such acts is death.”
There is no description of the extent of the victim’s injuries in Clark. In the case at bar,
however, the victim described extensive and serious injuries resulting from the assault. The
doctor who treated the victim following the assault described the four bone fractures in the
victim’s face that resulted from the blow by defendant, and characterized the victim’s injuries as
“serious.” It appears from the trial judge’s ruling on the instruction at issue that he believed
sufficient evidence had been presented to allow the jury to conclude that defendant used deadly
force. The judge stated that “the object that was used could have been used in a deadly fashion.
If it hit a temple region, if it hit the neck or something, it could have been deadly.”
The trial court’s instructions fairly presented to the jury the issues to be tried, since they
gave the jury guidance regarding what to do if it found the defendant to have used deadly force.
The trial court’s action in fact presented a material issue – the duty to retreat before employing
deadly force in self-defense – that would have been omitted had the court presented the jury
instructions as defendant requested.
The prosecution presented evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
defendant used deadly force to defend herself. Consequently, the trial court did not err by
instructing the jury that it could consider whether defendant could have safely retreated but did
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not do so in deciding whether she honestly and reasonably believed she needed to use deadly
force.
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The trial court’s instructions fairly presented to the jury the issues to be tried and sufficiently
protected defendant’s rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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