PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES LEE MAYS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242141
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-176840-FC
JAMES LEE MAYS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J. and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction of unarmed robbery, MCL
750.530. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to thirty months to
fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Douglas Culbreath was working as a cashier at a Kroger store on January 20, 2001.
Culbreath observed Harold Usher (whom he identified at trial) come out of the manager’s office
and scream. When Culbreath approached Usher, Usher held up a twelve-inch kitchen knife over
Culbreath’s head and instructed him to get out of the way. Culbreath observed Usher point a
knife at another cashier and grab money from her cash register. Culbreath observed Usher walk
out of the grocery store.
Culbreath followed Usher out of the grocery store. Usher began to run toward a red
Pontiac in the parking lot. Culbreath wrote down the license plate number. Culbreath observed
someone in the driver seat of the Pontiac. Culbreath was standing approximately ten feet away
from the Pontiac. At trial, Culbreath identified defendant as the driver.
Police Officer Dan Edwards was the arriving officer to the grocery store on the day in
question. Edwards’ investigation determined that the red Pontiac was registered to Usher, who
lived in Southfield. Edwards contacted the Southfield police, who located the Pontiac in
Southfield Down Trailer Park. Edwards drove to the trailer park where he observed the car
parked directly across from a trailer where defendant resided.
Edwards asked defendant if he knew Usher, and defendant indicated that he did.
Defendant initially told Edwards that Usher had taken the car somewhere without him during the
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time when the robbery occurred. When Edwards informed defendant that the police had an
eyewitness who saw the driver of the getaway car, defendant became upset and admitted that he
was driving the getaway car. Defendant told Edwards that he did not know there was going to be
a robbery at the grocery store, until Usher came running out of the store,
After closing arguments by the attorneys, the trial court gave its ruling. The trial court, in
its findings, noted that according to “[d]efendant’s testimony,” he may have known or suspected
that there was going to be a misdemeanor, either retail fraud and/or larceny from a building,
committed in the grocery store. The trial court analyzed the evidence and found that some
evidence pointed towards defendant’s culpability: (1) he was the driver and, (2) he parked in a
secluded location. However, the trial court also noted evidence that pointed towards defendant’s
innocence: (1) he did not speed out of the parking lot, (2) he parked far from the entrance of the
grocery store, and (3) no evidence was presented that defendant was aware that a weapon was
going to be involved before Usher went into the grocery store. Ultimately, the trial court
concluded that because there was evidence that defendant knew beforehand or suspected that
Usher was going into the grocery store to commit a crime, the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of unarmed robbery because the crime was within the
scope of the common enterprise. Defendant now appeals as of right.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In defendant’s sole issue on appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence by viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether a rational trier of fact could find that
each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich
720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). “The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court
is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the . . .
verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
B. Analysis
To convict a defendant of unarmed robbery, the prosecution has to establish the following
elements: (1) a felonious taking of property from another, (2) by force, violence, assault, or
putting in fear, and (3) being unarmed. People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532, 536; 648 NW2d 164
(2002). To convict defendant as an aider and abettor, the prosecutor had to show “(1) the crime
charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts
or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended
the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the
time he gave aid and encouragement.” MCL 767.39; People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 758; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). “Aiding and abetting” describes all forms of assistance made available to the
perpetrator of a crime and includes all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the
commission of a crime. Id., 757. “The quantum of aid or advice is immaterial as long as it had
the effect of inducing the crime.” People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 352; 492 NW2d 810
(1992). “An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and
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circumstances.” Id. “Factors that may be considered include a close association between the
defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the
crime, and evidence of flight after the crime.” Carines, supra, 460 Mich 757.
Defendant first argues that because unarmed robbery is a specific intent crime, the
prosecution had to establish that he either possessed the specific intent to take property from a
person by force, violence assault or putting in fear. We disagree. This Court has held that a jury
can infer an aider and abettor’s knowledge of the principal’s intent when the principal was
carrying a gun during a burglary. See People v Harris, 110 Mich App 636, 643; 313 NW2d 354
(1981); People v Poplar, 20 Mich App 132, 139-140; 173 NW2d 732 (1969).
Further, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
evidence was sufficient to establish an inference that defendant had knowledge that his codefendant, Harold Usher, had the intent to commit a robbery. Defendant acknowledged that he
observed Usher exit the grocery store with a knife and cash in his hand. At no time when
defendant gave his statement to the police, did he express surprise or shock at seeing the knife.
Indeed, we note that when defendant asked what happened after the crime had occurred, Usher
stated, “Man, I only got $50 or $60.” Additionally, defendant’s intent can be inferred by
evidence of his close association with Usher and evidence that he attempted to elude law
enforcement by driving the “getaway vehicle” on side streets after the commission of the crime.
Consequently, in light of defendant’s conduct, we are not persuaded by his assertion that
he could only be convicted as an accessory after the fact. “The crime of accessory after the fact
is a common-law felony punishable under the catch-all provision of MCL 750.505 . . . .” People
v Cunningham, 201 Mich App 720, 722; 506 NW2d 624 (1993). “An ‘accessory after the fact,’
at common law . . . is ‘one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon
in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment.’” People v Lucas, 402 Mich 302,
304; 262 NW2d 662 (1978), quoting Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), p 667. We conclude that
because defendant assisted with the crime before its commission, he acted as more than an
accessory after the fact, and he was properly convicted as an aider and abettor.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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