PEOPLE OF MI V DWAYNE WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242865
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-005310
DWAYNE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that events occurring
before the immediate shooting incident could not be considered in determining whether adequate
provocation existed for purposes of voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that there is no basis
for reversal. We review this claim of instructional error de novo. People v Lowery, 258 Mich
App 167, 173; ___ NW2d ___ (2003). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole in determining
whether the trial court made an error requiring reversal. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 127;
605 NW2d 28 (1999). Jury instructions do not have to be perfect; however, they must fairly
present the issues for trial and sufficiently protect a defendant’s rights. People v Canales, 243
Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000).
The principal support for defendant’s manslaughter theory was based on events occurring
before the immediate shooting incident. Apart from defendant’s testimony, there was substantial
evidence presented at trial indicating that the victim had engaged in a pattern of threatening and
intimidating behavior directed at both defendant and defendant’s girlfriend, Traci Newell.
Newell testified about several past incidents in which the victim said he was going to kill
defendant and broke into the apartment shared by defendant and Newell. Many of the incidents
were reported to the police and were corroborated by the testimony of different police officers
who investigated the incidents. Defendant’s union steward also testified that defendant had
informed her before the killing that he was afraid for his life because of the victim’s harassing
and threatening conduct.
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Voluntary manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder. People v
Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 540-541; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). The single additional element that
differentiates second-degree murder from manslaughter is “malice,” which “is negated by the
presence of provocation and heat of passion.” Id. at 540. Voluntary manslaughter, as opposed
to murder, exists if (1) the defendant killed in the heat of passion, (2) the passion was caused by
adequate provocation, and (3) there cannot have been a lapse of time during which a reasonable
person could control his or her passions. People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 388; 471 NW2d 346
(1991).
Defendant’s challenge arises out of a sua sponte comment made by the trial court during
defense counsel’s closing argument and the court’s instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
During closing argument, defense counsel, discussing voluntary manslaughter and heat of
passion – adequate provocation, stated that “it’s perfectly acceptable under the law to consider
the entire history of this story because you’re the judge as to what time frame - - .” The trial
court interjected, stating that “actually the provocation must be at the time . . . [i]t doesn’t go to
what happened before.” During instructions on voluntary manslaughter and heat of passion –
adequate provocation, the court stated: “Again, ladies and gentlemen, this provocation must be at
the time the defendant acted.” More thorough discussions by the trial court and the parties on the
topic were conducted outside the presence of the jury.
We believe that the trial court was attempting to communicate that the killing had to have
occurred while defendant was in the heat of passion or in a state of emotional excitement, which
would be a correct statement of the law. Pouncey, supra at 388. Arguably, the trial court may
have been under the mistaken belief that circumstances occurring before the killing could not be
considered by the jury for any purpose. As our Supreme Court stated in People v Townes, 391
Mich 578, 589; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), “[t]o reduce a homicide to voluntary manslaughter the
fact finder must determine from an examination of all of the circumstances surrounding the
killing that malice was negated by provocation and the homicide committed in the heat of
passion.” (Emphasis added). However, an examination of the entire record reveals that the jury
was clearly made aware that it could consider all of the surrounding circumstances with respect
to voluntary manslaughter, and, in light of the record, we fail to see how the jury would have
thought otherwise based on the brief statements made by the trial court.
First, extensive evidence regarding the history of the victim’s interaction with defendant
was in fact presented to the jury.
Next, directly following the trial court’s sua sponte interjection during defense counsel’s
closing argument, counsel stated, without objection or any comment by the judge, as follows:
Okay. I submit to you that the provocation at this time was Traci’s
scream, but you can consider everything that Mr. Williams testified to that went
into his state of mind or his feelings before. . . .
***
[I] submit to you that was not enough time to formulate a plan for murder
in the first degree, not considering everything that you believe that may have been
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in my client’s persona, everything that occurred under that reign of terror.
[Emphasis added.]
Finally, as part of the trial court’s instructions on voluntary manslaughter and heat of
passion – adequate provocation, the court stated:
This emotional excitement must have been the result of something that
would cause a reasonable person to act rationally or on impulse. The law does not
say which things are enough. That is for you to decide. Second, the killing itself
must result from this emotional excitement. The Defendant must have acted
before a reasonable time had passed to calm down and returned to reason. The
law does not say how much time is needed. That is also for you to decide.
The test is whether reasonable time had passed under the circumstances of
this case. You must think about all the evidence in deciding what the Defendant’s
state of mind was at the time of the alleged killing. [Emphasis added.]
We conclude that the jury instructions fairly presented the issues for trial and sufficiently
protected defendant’s rights. Reversal is not warranted.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony
related to the victim’s alleged mental problems and reputation for violence. However, contrary
to what defendant argues, the offer of proof regarding the proposed testimony of the victim’s
brother did not establish that he was prepared to testify that the victim had a reputation for
violence or delusions or other mental problems. Further, defendant did not preserve for review
by making an appropriate offer of proof under MRE 103(a)(2) regarding testimony from other
defense witnesses regarding whether the victim suffered from delusions, other mental problems,
or had a reputation for violence. Because defendant has failed to show that a plain error affected
his substantial rights, this unpreserved issue does not warrant appellate relief. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
III
Finally, defendant advances a claim of error based on the court’s written manslaughter
instruction that was given to the jury in response to a request during deliberations. The record
discloses that defense counsel affirmatively approved the instruction that was given. Counsel’s
conduct extinguished any error in this regard. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612
NW2d 144 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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