BRIAN M BISHOP V H R KRUEGER MACHINE TOOLS INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BRIAN M. BISHOP and CAROLANN BISHOP,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 242898
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-034475-NO
H. R. KRUEGER MACHINE TOOLS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Brian M. Bishop went to defendant’s premises to give a sales presentation. After the
presentation, defendant’s employee escorted Bishop to the same stairway he had used to ascend
to the second floor. The stairway was made up of approximately twelve steps. Bishop, who was
six feet tall and weighed approximately 300 pounds, began to descend the stairway on the left, so
that he could utilize the only available handrail. After descending two stairs, Bishop observed
someone at the bottom of the stairs, coming up. Bishop then moved to the right to the side of the
staircase without a handrail. At the third or fourth stair, his foot “got off the end of the stair;” he
lost his balance, reached to the right for the absent handrail, and fell, sustaining injuries.
Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Bishop was on defendant’s premises as a business
invitee, and that defendant negligently failed to maintain the premises in a safe condition and to
warn of the unsafe condition. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), arguing that it had no duty to warn Bishop of the condition of the stairway because
the condition was open and obvious, and that the condition was not unreasonably dangerous.
The trial court granted the motion, finding that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue
whether the condition of the stairway was open and obvious. The trial court concluded that no
special aspect of the stairway made it unreasonably dangerous notwithstanding its open and
obvious condition.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Auto
Club Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2001).
-1-
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached the duty; (3) that the
defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) that the plaintiff
suffered damages. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).
A possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an invitee from an
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land. A possessor of land may
be held liable for injuries resulting from negligent maintenance of the land. The duty to protect
an invitee does not extend to a condition from which an unreasonable risk of harm cannot be
anticipated, or from a condition that is so open and obvious that an invitee could be expected to
discover it for himself. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
The open and obvious danger doctrine attacks the duty element that a plaintiff must
establish in a prima facie negligence case. Id., 612. Whether a danger is open and obvious
depends on whether it is reasonable to expect that an average person with ordinary intelligence
would have discovered the danger upon casual inspection. Novotney v Burger King Corp (On
Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 474-475; 499 NW2d 379 (1993). If special aspects of a condition
make even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, a possessor of land must take
reasonable precautions to protect an invitee from that risk. If such special aspects are lacking,
the open and obvious condition is not unreasonably dangerous. Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464
Mich 512, 517-519; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
Steps are encountered as an everyday occurrence. A reasonably prudent person will
watch where he or she is going and take appropriate care for his or her own safety. Bertrand,
supra, 616. The trial court correctly found that reasonable minds could not differ on whether any
danger posed by the stairway was open and obvious. Novotney, supra.
Plaintiffs further contend that even if the condition of the stairway was open and obvious,
it still presented an unreasonable risk of harm. We disagree. The stairway was equipped with a
safety device, the hand rail. Plaintiffs contend that Bishop’s size forced him to move to the side
without the handrail to allow another person to pass. However, Bishop’s size was not a special
aspect of the stairway itself. Lugo, supra. Moreover, Bishop chose to let go of the rail and move
aside when he saw a person begin to ascend the stairs. He could have continued down the
stairway using the handrail, or he could have moved aside and remained there until the other
person passed and he could resume his descent with the aid of the rail. Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate the existence of any special aspects that made the condition unreasonably dangerous
in spite of its open and obvious nature. Summary disposition was proper.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.