PEOPLE OF MI V EDWARD L FINLEY JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242368
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008452
EDWARD L. FINLEY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a consecutive
two-year term of imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. Specifically, defendant contends that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was not acting in self-defense when he shot the fourteen-year-old victim, Bernard
Brown, nine times. Defendant also argues that proof regarding the requisite elements of
premeditation and deliberation were deficient. We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court considers the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational finder of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003); People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643
NW2d 218 (2002). This Court must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices
in support of the jury’s verdict, and will not interfere with the factfinder’s role in determining
witness credibility or the weight of the evidence. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614
NW2d 78 (2000); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. Nowack, supra at 400. The prosecution need not
negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence; instead, the prosecution is bound to
prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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A claim of self-defense requires proof that the defendant acted in response to an assault.
Detroit v Smith, 235 Mich App 235, 238; 597 NW2d 247 (1999). As our Supreme Court
recently explained in People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 142; 649 NW2d 30 (2002):
We hold that the cardinal rule, applicable to all claims of self-defense, is
that the killing of another person is justifiable homicide if, under all the
circumstances, the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that he is in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is necessary for him to
exercise deadly force. As part and parcel of the “necessity” requirement that
inheres in every claim of lawful self-defense, evidence that a defendant could
have safely avoided using deadly force is normally relevant in determining
whether it was reasonable necessary for him to kill his assailant. However, (1)
one who is without fault is never obligated to retreat from a sudden, violent attack
or to retreat when to do so would be unsafe, and in such circumstances, the
presence of an avenue of retreat cannot be a factor in determining necessity; (2)
our law imposes an affirmative “duty to retreat” only upon one who is at fault in
voluntarily participating in mutual nondeadly combat; and (3) the “castle
doctrine” permits one who is within his dwelling to exercise deadly force even if
an avenue of safe retreat is available, as long as it is otherwise reasonably
necessary to exercise deadly force. [Emphasis in original.]
Significantly, the Riddle Court rejected the position that the “castle doctrine” included the
outlying areas within the curtilage of the home and, instead, limited its application to the home
and its attached appurtenances. Id. at 121.
Once a defendant introduces evidence of self-defense, the prosecution has the burden of
disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 19-20; 507
NW2d 763 (1993).
The circumstances of the instant case do not support a claim of self-defense. The
evidence indicates that although the fourteen-year-old victim, Bernard Brown, rode his bike past
defendant’s house three times and called out epithets to him, when he left his bike a block away
and walked back to defendant’s house, he did not appear to be armed. Yet defendant, instead of
retreating inside his house, took a rifle from the porch where he had left it in anticipation of
trouble and carried it openly at his side down to the public sidewalk for his confrontation with
Brown. More words were exchanged, but it was defendant who had his gun in hand. Brown
lifted his shirt and displayed a weapon in his belt. In his statement to the police, defendant stated
that Brown then reached for his gun. Although two witnesses supported defendant’s claim, all
who witnessed the incident, including defendant, agreed that defendant began firing before
Brown ever got his gun out; instead, Brown turned and ran. Defendant went into the house to
reload his rifle and then walked out to the median of the street where Brown had fallen,
wounded, in his attempt to get away. There, defendant fired another volley of shots into Brown,
who was fatally wounded by nine gunshot wounds.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to negate defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fortson, supra. Defendant armed himself with a rifle when he saw Brown walking toward his
house even though there was no reason to believe that Brown was armed. Defendant was not
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under attack at that time and he could have retreated into his home or at least the porch, an
avenue he was duty-bound to take. Riddle, supra. Instead, defendant chose to walk out to the
sidewalk, gun in hand, making him the first to escalate the argument from fighting words to
armed combat, in essence the aggressor. Under these circumstances, we conclude that when
defendant armed himself, he did not have an honest and reasonable belief in the imminent danger
posed by Brown, and he did not attempt to retreat. Therefore, defendant’s self-defense claim
must fail. Riddle, supra.
Defendant next contends on appeal that even if the shooting was not justified, the
premeditated murder conviction still cannot stand because he acted out of passion rather than
with due deliberation and reflection. Again, we disagree.
To convict a defendant of first-degree murder, a specific intent crime, the prosecution
must prove that the killing was intentional and that the act of killing was premeditated and
deliberate. MCL 750.316(1)(a); People v Bowman, 254 Mich App 142, 151; 656 NW2d 835
(2002). To premeditate means that a person thinks about an action beforehand, People v
Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 301; 581 NW2d 753 (1998), whereas to deliberate means to
measure and evaluate the major facets of a problem or choice. Id. “Premeditation and
deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look.” People v
Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 656; 599 NW2d 736 (1999). See also People v Kelly, 231 Mich
App 627, 642; 588 NW2d 480 (1998); Plummer, supra at 300. Premeditation and deliberation
can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, but the inferences cannot be merely
speculative and must have support in the record. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415;
633 NW2d 376 (2001); Plummer, supra at 301. A prosecutor may sufficiently prove
premeditation and deliberation through the evidence of the homicide’s particular circumstances
and the defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the homicide. Abraham, supra at 656.
Such particular circumstances include the weapon used and the location of the wounds inflicted.
People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 600; 470 NW2d 478 (1991).
In the instant case, in response to verbal threats, defendant retrieved a rifle and walked
out to the sidewalk to confront the victim. When the victim pulled up his shirt and revealed a
weapon, defendant began shooting in rapid succession. After he fired the first round into Brown,
Brown ran away and made it as far as the median of the road before he collapsed. In his
statement to the police, defendant stated that he went to his house and reloaded his rifle, and then
returned to Brown, who “was still moving.” Defendant then shot the victim four or five more
times in the arms, leg, and shoulder as he was laying on his side “to make sure he was dead.” In
the time it took to reload and walk to the median, defendant could have taken a second look and
he did – he saw that Brown was still alive, so he shot him again.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the elements of premeditation and
deliberation were clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The
evidence was sufficient to establish first-degree murder and underscored that defendant had
ample time to engage in cool-headed reflection and to take a second look before he killed the
victim. Plummer, supra at 301-302. Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is therefore
without merit.
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Defendant next argues that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because the
prosecutor improperly appealed to the “civic duty” of the jurors during his closing argument.
We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448;
669 NW2d 818 (2003). Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct during
trial. “Appellate review of allegedly improper conduct by the prosecutor is precluded where the
defendant fails to timely and specifically object; this Court will only review the defendant’s
claim for plain error.” People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
“Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an
actually innocent defendant or when the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v Barber, 255 Mich App 288, 296; 659 NW2d 674
(2003), citing Carines, supra at 763. See also Ackerman, supra at 448-449.
In the instant case, defendant objects to the prosecutor’s statements to the jury that “we
have to do justice,” and “[w]e have to do the right thing.” While a prosecutor may not advocate
that jurors convict a defendant as part of their civic duty, People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282;
531 NW2d 659 (1995), the prosecutor’s comments must be read as a whole, and evaluated in
context and in light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted
at trial. Ackerman, supra at 45. A prosecutor may argue the evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising from the evidence. Id. at 453.
Here, when viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remarks were not a demand for the jury to
suspend its own judgment and do its civic duty. See People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294, 298299; 193 NW2d 363 (1971). Rather, the prosecutor’s whole argument constituted a proper
evaluation of the evidence and an admonition to the jury to consider, think about, and weigh that
evidence. Defendant has failed to establish outcome-determinative plain error. Schutte, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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