PEOPLE OF MI V LAMONT D MCCLURE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242323
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-005893
LAMONT D. MCCLURE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions, following a jury trial, of second-degree
murder, MCL 750.317, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. He was sentenced to thirty to
fifty years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction, three to five years’ imprisonment on the
felon in possession conviction, and two years’ imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction.
We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises out of a fatal shooting shortly after midnight in a Coney Island restaurant
in Detroit following an altercation between various individuals while patronizing the restaurant.
We shall now summarize the relevant testimony of trial witnesses with respect to the
circumstances that evolved around and at the time of the shooting.
Andre Miller testified that he went to the restaurant along with the victim Jonathan Miller
and Jason Goodman to get something to eat.1 Miller described the restaurant as having bulletproof glass where you order your food and about four rows of booths to sit and eat. The victim,
Miller, and Goodman ordered their food and the victim and Goodman sat down at a booth while
Miller played a video game. At that point in time, there were a male and female sitting in a
booth across from the victim and Goodman, and another male, described as a vagrant, was just
standing around inside the restaurant. From his vantage point at the nearby video machine,
1
For purposes of clarity, Andre Miller shall be referred to as “Miller” in this opinion, and
Jonathan Miller shall be referred to as the “victim.”
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Miller heard Goodman say: “What, you have a problem . . . .” The statement was directed to the
male and female in the adjacent booth. Miller testified that the male and female then left the
restaurant. Miller identified the male as being defendant.
Ten minutes later, according to Miller, a tall, skinny, light-skinned black male
(hereinafter “unknown male”) entered the restaurant followed immediately by defendant. Miller
described defendant as having an “evil expression” on his face. Defendant, pointing to
Goodman, stated: “Who’s with this whore-ass light skinned nigger right here?” Defendant then
displayed a firearm. Goodman was still in the booth, and the victim had joined Miller over at the
video machine. The unknown male then proceeded to punch Goodman in the mouth without
saying a word. The unknown male struck approximately four blows as Goodman cowered.
Miller stated that Goodman was unarmed. The unknown male then turned his attention to the
victim all the while defendant was pointing and waving his gun. Miller moved toward a counter
away from the victim.
As the victim and the unknown male engaged in a verbal exchange, defendant leaped on
a chair in one of the booths and pointed his gun in the direction of the victim. Miller saw the
unknown male and the victim start tussling, and Miller was able to run out the front door of the
restaurant. As Miller ran toward the front door of the restaurant in his escape, he heard gunshots.
Miller said that he heard the gunshots to his rear. But he did not look back because he feared
that he was the target of the shooting. Outside the restaurant, Miller observed a wall which he
jumped over and hid behind. He heard about three or four additional shots while hiding behind
the wall. Miller testified that he then saw defendant and the unknown male exit the restaurant
and drive away in a car. Miller indicated that the unknown male was now limping.
Miller subsequently reentered the restaurant and saw the victim lying on the floor with a
gunshot wound to the head area and blood everywhere. Police soon arrived. A couple days
later, Miller identified defendant from a police photograph. Miller was convinced that defendant
had a gun the night of the crime and shot the victim.
On cross-examination, Miller admitted that he did not know exactly what was transpiring
behind him as he ran out of the restaurant and heard the gunshots. On redirect, Miller testified
that the only person he saw carrying a gun that night was defendant.
Michael Cooper, a member of the military, testified that he was also in the restaurant at
the time of the shooting with a couple of his friends. Cooper did not know any of the individuals
involved in the dispute and shooting at the restaurant. Cooper saw a short black male, 5’6” or so,
enter the restaurant with a gun and then fire the weapon. Cooper stated that the gunshot struck
the shooter’s friend, apparently the unknown male, because the person struck by the bullet stated:
“Well, damn, you hit me.” And the shooter then stated to the victim: “You made me shoot my
boy, you gotta’ catch one for that.” The shooter, according to Cooper, then pinned the victim
between a door and the back of the restaurant and shot him. Cooper testified that defendant, on
observation in the courtroom, looked familiar, but he could not be one-hundred percent certain.
Relevant to this appeal, Cooper testified as follows:
Q. Well, what about – are you afraid, now, Mr. Cooper?
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A. No.
Q. Have you been threatened?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. How were you threatened, sir?
A. Um, I received a letter to my home. Well, my mother received a letter to her
home on Friday, before I came in town. And a threat was made to an
individual who knows my brother. And he, in turn, contacted my brother and
told him.
Cooper testified that the in-court attempt to identify defendant was the first time he had
been asked to identify defendant. Cooper did testify that he had been in the military and out of
the country for a period of time before the trial; a six-month stint in Kosovo. Cooper further
testified that the shooter’s “friend” was a tall, light-skinned black male. Directly before the
shooting, Cooper saw this tall male scuffling with another individual, not the shooting victim.
Cooper stated that he did not see the shooter in the restaurant when the scuffle was occurring.
He also testified that he saw no one leave the restaurant while the shooting was taking place.
A forensic pathologist testified that she conducted the autopsy on the victim, and that the
victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds. The victim had been shot in the left forehead, the
lower left leg, and the left calf.
Debra Elder testified that she was working at Coney Island at the time of the shooting.
She stated that she saw a male, who was sort of tall, enter the restaurant and punch another guy.
Subsequently, Elder saw a man holding a gun in the air. Elder told police that she had seen the
man with the gun in the restaurant earlier with his girlfriend. lder also told police that the man
with the gun had a small build, although she denied at trial that she made such a statement to
police. In her statement to police, Elder stated that she saw the man with the gun fire the
weapon, and it looked like the bullet struck the ground near the victim’s foot. Elder denied
making such a statement to police. She did agree with police statements in which she indicated
that the man who threw a punch was tall and did not have a gun. Elder was asked to look around
the courtroom to see if she could identify anyone that was in the restaurant at the time of the
shooting. She responded that no one looked familiar. Pertinent to this appeal, Elder testified as
follows:
Q. Now, ma’am, did you bring me a letter, today?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Where did you get that letter from?
A. From my daughter.
Q. And did that letter relate to your being here in court, today?
A. Yes, it did.
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Q. Did that letter frighten you?
A. Not really.
Q. Why not?
A. Because, I – you know, I’m gonna get up here and tell the truth or leave it
alone. And that’s what I’m here for, just to tell the truth.
Q. Where did that letter go to?
A. It came to my house.
Q. Do you know the people whose names are on that letter?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Do you know how they would have gotten your address?
A. No, I don’t.
There was additional testimony presented by police officers, along with a stipulation
regarding forensic evidence, that has little bearing on our analysis. We do note that police
testimony indicated that there were footprints on the top of a table and a chair located in the
restaurant. Pursuant to his constitutional rights, defendant chose not to testify at trial, nor did he
make any statements to police. During the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal argument, he stated:
And you may be able to tell, but I was a little bit surprised by Ms. Elder’s
testimony, today, that she’s taking back a lot of that stuff that she told the police
that night. She said, “I didn’t tell them that, I didn’t tell them that.” Now, certain
things she remembers, but unfortunately those have nothing to do with what this
man looked like. Her memory is convenient. Why? She got a letter, just like
Michael Cooper got a letter. Was she afraid? Well, I would be. She said, “No,
I’m not afraid,” but her memory is convenient. She told the police a lot more that
night, or at least the statement says that that she signed, than she’s willing to say
here, today. Why is that? I’d submit it’s because she’s afraid, the same way Mr.
Cooper told you he got a letter.
Now, why is somebody going to send them a threatening letter unless
they’re afraid something bad is going to happen to them? Why would they do
that?
Defense counsel then objected, arguing that there was “no showing it’s a threatening
letter. We’re going way beyond the evidence.” The trial court then instructed the jury that
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statements made by counsel are not evidence. The prosecutor made no further references to
letters.2
After the jury was selected, but before trial testimony commenced, the prosecutor moved
in limine to exclude any reference to a nervous breakdown allegedly suffered by Andre Miller
shortly after the crime. The prosecutor informed the trial court that he received the information
from Miller’s mother who told him that Miller was hospitalized for about three weeks and
prescribed medicine. Miller lived for a time in “a group-home type situation” but was no longer
taking medicine or under a doctor’s care. Miller currently lived with his mother and was
receiving out-patient support. The prosecutor maintained that, because there no longer was any
type of infirmity or medicine being taken, defendant should be precluded from exploring the
matter during trial. The trial court declined to issue a ruling, taking the matter under advisement
to be resolved when Miller testified if necessary. The record reflects that the issue was never
again broached.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s reference, during the questioning of Cooper and Elder, to threatening letters because
evidence of the letters was inadmissible and prejudicial.
In People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001), our Supreme Court,
addressing the basic principles involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stated:
To justify reversal under either the federal or state constitutions, a
convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984). See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland, supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at
690. “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show the
existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
2
The jury did reflect its concern about the threats when it sent a note to the judge during
deliberations, providing:
Due to the allegations of letters, can we request a 15-minute lapse between
when we leave and the rest of the courtroom? Or, what kind of security can we
expect on the way out?
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Because the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and
prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On
Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
The record reflects that no letters were introduced or admitted into evidence. However,
this did not preclude the prosecutor from inquiring about letters and threats when examining the
witnesses who were subjected to the threats, and a sufficient foundation was laid.3
Evidence of a defendant’s threats against witnesses is generally admissible to show a
consciousness of guilt. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). “A witness’
motivation for testifying is always of undeniable relevance and a defendant is entitled to have the
jury consider any fact that may have been influenced the witness’ testimony.” People v Minor,
213 Mich App 682, 685; 541 NW2d 576 (1995)(citation omitted). Evidence may be admitted to
assist in the evaluation of the credibility of a witness. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 72; 537
NW2d 909 (1995), mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995). “If a witness is offering
relevant testimony, whether that witness is truthfully and accurately testifying is itself relevant
because it affects the probability of the existence of a consequential fact.” Id.
The issue becomes whether trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s
questioning concerning the letters. We cannot ascertain from the record the substance or source
of the letters, nor for that matter can we even determine the existence of the letters, beyond the
testimony of Cooper and Elder.4 Trial counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s discussion of the
letters in closing argument, on the basis that there was no showing that the letters were
threatening, suggests to us that counsel was fully aware of the existence of letters and the
substance of the letters. Not drawing further attention to potentially damaging letters and threats,
including possible concerns that the letters could be admitted into evidence or delved into in far
greater detail, could clearly be a matter of exercising sound trial strategy. See People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 287 n 54; 531 NW2d 659 (1995)(“Certainly there are times when it is better not
to object and draw attention to an improper comment.”). We find that defendant has failed to
overcome the presumption that counsel’s decision not to object constituted sound trial strategy.
Moreover, assuming that trial counsel should have objected, we cannot conclude that there was a
3
Defendant’s argument that reference to the letters and threats constituted hearsay lacks merit.
The prosecutor was not attempting to prove the truth of the matter asserted in any letter or threat
but merely trying to show that threats were received and the impact of threats on the witnesses’
testimony. MRE 801(c). Moreover, the prosecutor’s questioning was not leading as argued by
defendant. Further, defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the letters were required
to be entered into evidence.
4
We note that Cooper’s testimony indicates that a threat was also conveyed verbally to him
through an acquaintance of Cooper’s brother.
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. The prosecutor’s reference to the threats was not extensive and nonspecific, and did
not directly elude to the source of the threats. With that in mind, and considering the direct
evidence of defendant’s identification as the gun-toting individual in the restaurant the night of
the crime as established by Miller’s testimony, along with strong circumstantial evidence of
defendant’s guilt, defendant was not prejudiced.
Defendant next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to
the prosecutor’s reference, during closing rebuttal argument, to the letters and suggestion that
Cooper and Elder may have been cloudy on their identification of defendant because of threats.
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor’s comments were improper and not based on evidence
presented at trial, and that trial counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial.
Generally, prosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 381-382 n 6; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Further, prosecutors
are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their
theory of the case. Id.
We first note that there was evidence of threats predicated on the responses given by
Cooper and Elder, although there were no letters introduced into evidence. For the same reasons
given previously in support of our ruling regarding the ineffective assistance claim and the
prosecutor’s questioning of witnesses, we find that defendant fails to overcome the presumption
that counsel’s action or inaction constituted sound trial strategy and fails to show prejudice.
Next, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial
court’s refusal to rule on the prosecutor’s motion in limine regarding Miller, failing to request a
ruling at the time Miller testified, and failing to request an evidentiary hearing on Miller’s state
of mind and use of medications. Defendant states:
Defendant is not claiming that there was information that would have
assisted him in his defense, nevertheless, to forfeit the chance to gather pertinent
information, in order to subject the adversarial case to a meaningful testing
process constitute a denial of due process . . . .
First, we see no reason or purpose for trial counsel to object to the trial court’s
determination to take the prosecutor’s motion under advisement until trial and Miller’s
appearance to testify. Second, with respect to counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial during
Miller’s testimony, we fail to see the relevance of the information concerning Miller’s apparent
breakdown as that information was described by the prosecutor to the trial court. His breakdown
could be viewed as supporting the prosecution’s contention that Miller observed a traumatic
event and make the jury feel sympathetic towards Miller. Third, in regard to a failure to request
an evidentiary hearing on the matter, defendant himself states that there is no claim that pertinent
information would have been forthcoming. Further, based on Miller’s demeanor at trial and his
competence in answering questions, trial counsel may simply have decided it was best not to
broach the subject of Miller’s apparent breakdown following the shooting.
We question
whether, assuming Miller remained on medication and was suffering from anxiety or depression
at the time of his testimony, the information would have been pertinent to Miller’s recollection of
events surrounding the shooting, where there is no indication that he was on medication or
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suffering a psychiatric disability when the shooting occurred. We conclude that defendant fails
to overcome the presumption that counsel’s action or inaction constituted sound trial strategy and
fails to show prejudice.
Finally, in the context of defendant’s ineffective assistance claims, he argues that the
prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s right to remain silent, which comment should
have been objected to by defense counsel. The prosecutor stated in closing: “Now, I don’t know
if you’ve been able to watch Mr. McClure while this case has been going on, but I noticed he’s
been sitting there acting like he’s bored.” We find that the prosecutor’s comment does not
equate to a comment or argument concerning defendant’s right to remain silent. Any objection
would have been futile; therefore, there is no basis to support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referencing the threats
and letters during closing argument and by indicating that Cooper’s and Elder’s inability to
positively identify defendant was affected by the threats. Defendant maintains that there was no
evidence to support the prosecutor’s comments as the letters were not admitted into evidence and
Cooper and Elder both testified that their testimony was not affected by the threats.
Additionally, defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly indicated that Cooper’s and
Elder’s testimony confirmed Miller’s identification of defendant.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied his right to a fair
and impartial trial. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). As noted
earlier, prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the
evidence as it relates to their theory of the case. Knapp, supra at 381-382 n 6.
There was evidence presented, through the testimony of Cooper and Elder, that
threatening letters and threats were received; therefore, the prosecutor’s comments during
closing were proper. Moreover, despite Cooper’s and Elder’s testimony to the contrary, a
reasonable inference could arise, from the evidence indicating that threats were made, that the
failure to positively identify defendant was because of the threats, especially in Elder’s case
where her trial testimony was an almost complete retreat from statements made to police which
were damaging to defendant. Finally, with respect to the comments that Cooper and Elder
confirmed Miller’s identification of defendant, we conclude that the prosecutor was simply
indicating that Cooper and Elder confirmed that the “tall” guy was not the shooter; the shorter
male was the shooter. Reversal is not warranted.
C. Evidentiary Issues
Defendant argues that the trial court committed error by taking the motion in lmine under
advisement and by failing, sua sponte, to exclude or bar questioning, testimony, and references
regarding the threatening letters.
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed by this Court for an
abuse of discretion. Knapp, supra at 377. If the decision to admit evidence involves a question
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of law, this Court reviews the issue de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
With regard to the motion in limine, there was no error where the trial court merely took
the motion under advisement and neither party sought a ruling when Miller testified. Defendant
cites no relevant authority to support his position that a ruling was required. Further, as to the
threatening letters, we find no plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Thus, reversal is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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