PEOPLE OF MI V ANTWAIN DEWAIN JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242304
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 02-009227-FC
ANTWAIN DEWAIN JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Owens and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316; second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; two counts of
assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; carjacking, MCL 750.529a; and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent
prison terms of life without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, thirty to sixty years for
the second-degree murder conviction, and fifteen to thirty years each for the assault, armed
robbery, and carjacking convictions, to be served consecutive to a two-year term for the felonyfirearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions for felony
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carjacking, and felony-firearm, but vacate his
convictions and sentences for second-degree murder and armed robbery.
Defendant’s convictions arise from events that took place at the Thrift City Bar in Flint,
Michigan, on July 19, 2001, in which defendant, accompanied by codefendant Tramel Simpson,
fired shots killing Beatrice DuBarry, and injuring Betty Asaro and Scott Mooney during the
course of an alleged robbery or larceny at the bar. Afterward, defendant and Simpson fled the
scene, forced Diane and Edward Jankowiak out of their car at gunpoint, and took their vehicle.
I
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments1 by charging him with first-degree murder and armed robbery.
This Court reviews a prosecutor’s charging decision for an abuse of discretion, which occurs
1
US Const, Ams V and XIV.
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when the prosecutor’s choice was made for a reason that is unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra
vires. People v Barksdale, 219 Mich App 484, 488; 556 NW2d 521 (1996), citing People v
Morrow, 214 Mich App 158, 161; 542 NW2d 324 (1995). As discussed in part IV of this
opinion, we find no merit to defendant’s argument that there was no evidence to support the
charges of first-degree murder and armed robbery. In any event, defendant has made no showing
that the prosecutor’s charging decision was made for a reason that is unconstitutional, illegal, or
ultra vires. Barksdale, supra at 488.
II
Next, we reject defendant’s argument that he was denied a fair trial because of
misconduct by the prosecutor in connection with the testimony of Officer Watson, Sergeant
Eddy, and evidence relating to how the police identified defendant from a fingerprint that he left
at the crime scene.
Defendant objected to only a portion of Sergeant Eddy’s testimony at trial. With regard
to this preserved claim of misconduct, we review the record to determine whether defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 336; 553
NW2d 692 (1996). Concerning the challenged testimony that was not preserved with an
objection at trial, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant first challenges Officer Watson’s testimony that he saw a composite sketch of
two men being circulated at the police department, and recognized one of the suspects as
defendant. Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial and has failed to show that it
constituted plain error. Carines, supra. Indeed, defendant does not provide any argument in
support of his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with this matter, nor does he cite
any supporting legal authority. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
Defendant also challenges the testimony of Sergeant Eddy, who stated that, on the day
after the charged offense, Officer Watson approached him and stated that the composite sketch
“looked like a person that he had arrested on a previous case.” Defendant immediately objected,
whereupon the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and admonished Sergeant
Eddy. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor deliberately elicited this
testimony. Rather, the prosecutor sought to follow up Officer Watson’s testimony to explain
how the police located defendant. We are satisfied that any prejudice that arose from Sergeant
Eddy’s response was cured by the trial court’s instruction to disregard the testimony.
Defendant further argues that he was prejudiced when the prosecutor continued to
question Sergeant Eddy concerning the process of putting together a photographic lineup. In
response, Sergeant Eddy testified, without objection, “we have a computer system now that has
mug shots on it.” Sergeant Eddy later testified, without objection, that “I had [defendant’s] name
come up in a prior interview” involving an unrelated complaint. We review these unpreserved
matters for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra. Although
Sergeant Eddy’s responses alluded to prior contact between defendant and the police, the nature
of this contact, or its result, was never disclosed. Also, the record indicates that the prosecutor
used Sergeant Eddy’s testimony in this regard only to explain the course of the investigation, not
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to demonstrate that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes because of his bad character.
Thus, there is no merit to defendant’s claim that Sergeant Eddy’s testimony implicated MRE
404(b), because it did not involve evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts.2 Further, had
defendant objected to the foregoing testimony, a curative instruction could have eliminated any
prejudicial effect. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). For these
reasons, defendant has failed to show that any error affected his substantial rights.
III
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony
from a police officer that the bartender, Lorrie Nettleton, began crying and shaking after she saw
defendant’s photograph at the police station. Because defendant did not object to this testimony
at trial, we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Carines, supra. We reject defendant’s argument that, by eliciting this testimony, the prosecutor
improperly vouched for Nettleton. The testimony about Nettleton’s reaction was relevant and
admissible to the issue of defendant’s identification. See People v Gwinn, 111 Mich App 223,
246; 314 NW2d 562 (1981) (finding that a police officer’s “testimony about the complainant's
reaction to the photograph of [the] defendant was admissible”). Furthermore, this testimony was
cumulative to Nettleton’s own testimony wherein she stated that she started to tremble when she
viewed defendant’s photograph. Finally, the officer’s testimony was arguably admissible as a
third-party statement of identification. MRE 801(d)(1)(C); People v Sykes, 229 Mich App 254,
266-267; 582 NW2d 197 (1998). Under these circumstances, plain error has not been shown.
IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the charges of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, armed
robbery, and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder.
When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court
reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could persuade a rational trier of fact that
the essential elements of the crime charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People
v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime.
People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993); People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695,
2
Defendant also asserts that testimony concerning the identification of his fingerprint, taken
from a bicycle he had ridden, was improper. We note that the testimony of which he complains
was brought out on cross-examination by defendant’s counsel. This testimony was subsequently
substantiated by an expert in fingerprint identification. Defendant fails to explain how admission
of this evidence violated MRE 404(b) or otherwise constituted plain error that affected his
substantial rights. We will not search for authority to sustain defendant’s position. Watson,
supra at 587. We find no error, let alone plain error, in this testimony.
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702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to support the charge of first-degree premeditated murder.
The offense of first-degree premeditated murder shares the same elements of seconddegree murder, with the additional element of premeditation. People v Carter, 395 Mich 434,
438; 236 NW2d 500 (1975). To convict a defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, the
prosecution must show that the defendant intentionally killed the decedent and that the killing
was premeditated and deliberate. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780
(1995). “Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a
second look.” Id. The elements of premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the killing. Jolly, supra at 466. Among the factors that may be
considered in order to establish premeditation and deliberation are: (1) the previous relationship
between the decedent and the defendant, (2) the defendant’s actions before and after the crime,
and (3) the circumstances surrounding the killing itself, including the weapon used and the
location of the wounds. People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 600; 470 NW2d 478 (1991).
In this case, the evidence established that defendant, accompanied by codefendant
Simpson, walked into a bar with a loaded gun. While sitting together at the bar, the two
discussed how to open the cash register and commit a robbery. Subsequently, defendant took a
ten-dollar bill off a table as he and Simpson walked toward the doorway. At that point, Asaro
became aware that her money was missing when another patron, Marilyn Wilson, yelled, “He
took her money” and “call the cops,” and then chased after defendant and Simpson. Defendant
subsequently pulled out his gun and pointed it straight into Wilson’s face. According to Sergeant
Brown, Wilson told him that defendant said, “We’re going to rob the place.” After exiting the
bar, defendant returned moments later, yelling, “F--- you, mother f---ers,” whereupon he fired six
shots, killing DuBarry and seriously injuring Asaro and Mooney. Defendant’s conduct in
returning to the bar after initially exiting, the words uttered upon his return, and his actions in
opening fire on the patrons, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, were sufficient
to enable a rational jury to infer that the elements of premeditation and deliberation were
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
To establish armed robbery, the prosecution must prove (1) an assault, (2) a felonious
taking of property from the victim’s presence or person, (3) while the defendant is armed with a
weapon described in the statute. MCL 750.529; People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 569; 540
NW2d 728 (1995). Defendant presents a meritorious issue concerning whether the evidence
sufficiently established the offense of armed robbery. In light of our Supreme Court’s recent
decision in People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532, 546; 648 NW2d 164 (2002), it is questionable
whether a robbery was established in this case, given that the evidence showed that defendant
took Asaro’s money from the table as he was walking past it, that he and Simpson then exited the
bar, and that it was not until after defendant reentered the bar that he began his assaultive
conduct. Under these circumstances, it appears the evidence failed to show that the larcenous
taking and the assault were sufficiently contemporaneous to establish a robbery under Randolph.
Nonetheless, we conclude that our resolution of this issue is not necessary to the
disposition of this case. To the extent the evidence failed to establish a robbery, the remedy
would be to vacate defendant’s armed robbery conviction. Conversely, even if we were to find
that the evidence could properly be viewed as establishing a robbery, it would still be necessary
to vacate that conviction where it served as the predicate felony for defendant’s felony murder
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conviction. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254,
259; 549 NW2d 39 (1996); see also People v Garcia (After Remand), 203 Mich App 420, 425;
513 NW2d 425 (1994), aff'd 448 Mich 442; 531 NW2d 683 (1995).
In this regard, we also conclude that any deficiency in the evidence with regard to the
armed robbery conviction does not affect defendant’s conviction of first-degree felony murder.
Defendant was charged with felony murder based on separate theories of larceny and armed
robbery, and the jury was instructed on both theories. By determining that defendant committed
a murder during the perpetration of an armed robbery, the jury necessarily determined that the
murder was also committed during the perpetration of a larceny. Randolph, supra at 553. Thus,
although we vacate defendant’s conviction of armed robbery, we affirm his conviction and
sentence for first-degree felony murder.
Although not raised by the parties, because we are affirming defendant’s first-degree
felony murder conviction, we also vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for second-degree
murder, inasmuch as both convictions stem from the death of a single victim. US Const, Am V;
Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v John Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 429-430; 622 NW2d 344
(2000).
Defendant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his two convictions of
assault with intent to commit murder, but advances no argument in support of this assertion.
Therefore, the issue is abandoned. Watson, supra at 587. In any event, there is no merit to this
issue. Defendant’s conduct in reentering the bar, shouting “F--- you, mother f---ers,” and then
opening fire at the bar patrons, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, is sufficient to support
an inference that he acted with the requisite intent to kill. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670,
674; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
V
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on first-degree
premeditated murder. This instructional issue is predicated on defendant’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence of premeditation to support a charge of first-degree premeditated murder.
Having previously reject this argument in part IV of this opinion, we likewise reject defendant’s
claim of instructional error.
VI
Finally, we find no merit to defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly permitted
codefendant Simpson to testify before defendant’s jury. As explained in People v Hana, 447
Mich 325, 361; 524 NW2d 682 (1994), amended 447 Mich 1203 (1994):
[W]hen each defendant testified before his own jury, he thereby waived
his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the events in question. Thereafter, it
became permissible for the prosecution to call that defendant as a witness in the
trial of the codefendant. As the Zafiro [v United States, 506 US 534; 113 S Ct
933, 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993)] Court noted, “[a] defendant normally would not be
entitled to exclude the testimony of a former codefendant if the district court did
sever their trials, and we see no reason why relevant and competent testimony
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would be prejudicial merely because the witness is also a codefendant.” [Id. at
361.]
Because codefendant Simpson waived his right to remain silent, the prosecution was permitted to
call him as a witness before defendant’s jury. Contrary to what defendant argues, this did not
infringe upon defendant’s own right to remain silent. That right does not include the right to
exclude other witnesses from testifying.
We affirm defendant’s convictions for first-degree felony murder, two counts of assault
with intent to commit murder, carjacking, and felony-firearm, but vacate his convictions and
sentences for second-degree murder and armed robbery.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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