PEOPLE OF MI V MYRON JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241751
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008286-FC
MYRON JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Hoekstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Myron Jackson appeals as of right his conviction, after a bench trial, of assault
with intent to murder,1 carrying a concealed weapon (CCW),2 felon in possession of a firearm,3
and felony-firearm.4 The trial court sentenced Jackson as a second habitual offender5 to 12 to 25
years’ imprisonment for the assault charge and 2½ to 7½ years’ imprisonment for the felon-in
possession charge, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to the CCW and
felony-firearm charges, for which he was sentenced to 2½ to 7½ years’ and two years’
imprisonment, respectively. Because Jackson did not show that the outcome of his trial was
reasonably likely to have been different but for the alleged errors of his counsel, we affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
This case arose out of the June 5, 2001 shooting of Eric Leeper after a barbecue party
outside the Georgia Manor apartment complex in Flint. Leeper, who had been invited to the
party by his friend Shamise Marks, arrived at the party around noon. Jackson, who Leeper had
never met before, was also at the party. At approximately 6:00 p.m., police arrived at the party
in response to a noise complaint and arrested three people for drinking alcohol in public. Three
1
MCL 750.83.
2
MCL 750.227.
3
MCL 750.224f.
4
MCL 750.227b.
5
MCL 769.10.
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others, including Jackson, were arrested on outstanding warrants and taken to the police station.
Leeper, who had consumed a fifth of gin over the course of the day, was ticketed for drinking in
public, but was not arrested.
According to Leeper, he was standing on a neighbor’s porch later that evening when he
saw Jackson return to the party driving a tan Blazer. Leeper told the neighbors that he planned to
ask Jackson if he wanted to go get more alcohol. Leeper approached Jackson and proposed the
idea of getting more drinks. Leeper testified that Jackson turned to the man next to him, who
Leeper had seen before but did not know by name, and asked, “should I do it?” and the man
turned his back and said he “doesn’t have anything to do with it.” As Leeper extended his hand
to Jackson, Jackson pulled a gun from his left pants pocket and shot Leeper in the chest. Leeper
ran back to the porch and told the people there to call the police; however, Leeper testified that
they did not do so immediately, and when the police did come, the witnesses who had been on
the porch “were acting like they didn’t know nothing.”
Officer Terrence Coon was dispatched to the scene at 10:21 p.m. Leeper told Officer
Coon he had just met the shooter earlier that day, and knew him only as “Meesie.”6 Leeper
described the shooter as a tall, thin black man wearing a blue-and-white shirt and blue jeans.
Officer Coon testified that although he could tell Leeper had been drinking, Leeper’s speech was
normal and Officer Coon did not consider him intoxicated. Officer Coon spoke with three
neighbors who all said that they heard the shot but saw nothing. Officer Coon then followed
Leeper to the hospital, where Leeper further described the shooter as a clean-cut, six-foot-tall
man with a beard, wearing a white polo-type shirt with blue stripes. Leeper also told Officer
Coon that the shooter had been arrested earlier in the day.
After returning to the police department, Officer Coon retrieved the pictures of people
who had been arrested earlier that day and concluded that Jackson’s photograph, which depicted
him with a well-trimmed beard and wearing a white shirt with blue stripes, matched Leeper’s
description of the shooter. Several days later, Leeper was shown the pictures of everyone at the
party who had been arrested, and he identified Jackson as the man he called “Meesie.”
At trial, Leeper testified that, although he had drunk a fifth of gin between the time he
arrived at the party and the time the police arrived at around 6:00 p.m., he was completely certain
that Jackson was the man who shot him. Leeper testified that he had never met Jackson before
that day and did not know why Jackson shot him. Defense counsel had a copy of Leeper’s
hospital lab report, which indicated that his blood-alcohol level was .088; however, a doctor
mistakenly testified at trial that Leeper’s blood-alcohol level was only .02. Despite Jackson’s
urging, his defense counsel, Richard Ponsetto, Jr., did not challenge the doctor’s testimony on
this point.
The only witness for Jackson was Kareem Flanagen, the man for whom the party had
been thrown. Flanagen testified that he saw Leeper not only drink a fifth of liquor but also
6
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Leeper’s friend Shamise Marks was also known as
“Meesie,” and she is occasionally referred to as such in the trial transcripts.
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smoke marijuana between 5:00 and 6:00 that afternoon; Leeper had denied this at trial. Flanagen
also testified that he drove a tan Blazer, and that the only two people he allowed to drive it were
Sam Morgan and Andrew Bernard Shields. Flanagen stated that he left the party in the Blazer
between 8:00 and 8:30 that night, and did not return to Georgia Manor apartments.
Jackson did not testify. During closing arguments, however, the trial court allowed
Jackson to point out discrepancies between Leeper’s preliminary examination testimony and his
trial testimony, including how much he had to drink, how long he was hospitalized, and how he
learned Jackson’s name, as well as discrepancies between Leeper’s trial testimony and
Flanagen’s trial testimony regarding whether Leeper had smoked marijuana and whether Jackson
was driving the tan Blazer that night.
After the trial court found Jackson guilty of all counts, Jackson appealed, and this Court
remanded for a Ginther7 hearing.8 At the hearing, Jackson testified that, after Leeper testified
that the shooter was an inch or two taller than he was, he asked Ponsetto whether he could testify
that he was shorter than Leeper. However, Ponsetto told him that
the only way that was gonna come out is if I took the stand and testified to
somethin’ that was untrue, which was returning to the scene of the crime—I mean
to the barbeque after I got out of jail, and I told him I was not gonna do that.
According to Jackson, when he told Ponsetto that he would not testify that he had gone back to
the barbecue, Ponsetto cursed at him and told him that he “would have to testify to returnin’ to
the scene of the crime or he was gonna have to tell the courts—stand up and tell the courts that I
was lyin’.” Jackson testified that he never told Ponsetto he had returned to the barbecue, never
told him that he had shot Leeper, and never told him that he planned to testify to walking home
from the jail rather than being driven home by his mother.
Jackson’s mother, Shirley Jackson, also testified at the Ginther hearing. She stated that
she drove Jackson home from the jail, then left him to babysit his two-year-old son after about
fifteen minutes because she was too upset with Jackson to stay home. Shirley Jackson testified
that she took a ten-minute drive to a store, shopped for about twenty-five minutes, then went to a
friend’s house for about forty minutes. Shirley Jackson could not remember exact times, but
agreed that she likely picked Jackson up from jail between 8:20 and 8:30 p.m. based on the jail
records, and therefore returned home between 9:45 and 10:00. When she returned, she saw
Jackson leave the house, return briefly 20 to 25 minutes later, leave again, then return and leave
again around midnight. She testified that Jackson never left his son alone.
Ponsetto told the trial court that when he initially met with Jackson he gave him the same
explanation of lawyer-client confidentiality that he gives all his clients; specifically, that if
Jackson testified to something on the stand that contradicted something he had told Ponsetto
7
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
8
People v Jackson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 11, 2003 (Docket
No. 241751).
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previously, Ponsetto would have to make a motion to withdraw from the case. Ponsetto testified
that Jackson changed his mind several times about whether he wanted to testify. According to
Ponsetto, Jackson told him that the trial would not go forward because Leeper would not be
testifying.
Ponsetto further testified that although Jackson told him that he had an alibi, Jackson
initially refused to tell him what it was. When Ponsetto explained that he would have to give the
prosecution notice of the alibi, Jackson told Ponsetto he did not want to give notice. Ponsetto
“kept asking him what his alibi was,” but “he wouldn’t tell me.” Eventually, Jackson told
Ponsetto that he had spent the evening with his mother after she paid his bond and took him
home from jail. However, when Ponsetto called Jackson’s mother shortly thereafter, she told
him that she left the house after bringing Jackson home, and when she returned some time later
no one was home. According to Ponsetto, when he told Jackson that his mother would not be
able to provide an alibi, Jackson became angry and said, “You should’ve let me talk to her first.”
Ponsetto acknowledged reading Jackson’s initial statement in which Jackson told police
that he was arrested at the barbecue between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., was bonded out by his mother
2½ to 3 hours later, and did not return to the barbecue that night. Ponsetto further acknowledged
that Jackson never told him he had shot Leeper or gone back to the party, and never announced
an intention to lie on the stand. However, Ponsetto said Jackson had “crossed the cognitive
dissonance threshold” when he announced his intention to testify that he would not have had
enough time to walk from the jail to his house and then back to the party. When Ponsetto
confronted him with his previous statement that he had not walked home but had been driven
home by his mother, Jackson reportedly responded, “That’s between you and me . . . you can’t
tell anybody I’m planning on lying.” At this point, Ponsetto stated, he “knew [Jackson] was
planning on lying,” and reminded Jackson that he would withdraw from the case if Jackson
testified falsely.
In addition, Jackson had written a letter detailing discrepancies in Leeper’s testimony,
and Ponsetto was concerned that this letter included the phrase “when I fled in the Blazer,”
which appeared to acknowledge that Jackson had been at the scene of the shooting. Jackson
explained that he had written the letter from Leeper’s perspective, not his own, and was only
paraphrasing Leeper’s statements.
With respect to the doctor’s testimony that Leeper’s blood-alcohol level was .02,
Ponsetto testified that although this surprised him, he assumed that he himself must have read the
lab report results incorrectly. Jackson confronted Ponsetto about his failure to correct the
testimony, which Jackson believed was incorrect based on a conversation his mother had with a
hospital employee; however, Ponsetto testified that Jackson refused to name that employee so
that he or she could be called as a witness. Ponsetto explained that he did not challenge the
testimony because he was not a doctor and thought he might have read the lab report incorrectly,
and because Leeper had already testified that he was drunk.
After the hearing, the trial court issued a ruling. The trial court explained that it had
based its original decision “not only on the identification of the victim,” but on the circumstantial
evidence such as Jackson being taken into police custody, the booking photograph in which
Jackson’s clothing matched that of the shooter, and the timing of Jackson’s release from custody
in relation to the shooting. The trial court stated that there was nothing presented at the Ginther
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hearing “that causes me to reconsider in any way the conclusions I reached at the end of the
bench trial.”
In relation to the alleged infringement of Jackson’s right to testify, the trial court noted
that Jackson appeared to have taken contrary positions, claiming at the hearing that his counsel
kept him from testifying while, at the trial, complaining that his counsel tried to force him to
testify. The trial court observed that Jackson was “not all that credible as a witness” and was
“attempting to engage in some revisionist history to serve his needs on appeal.” Regarding
counsel’s failure to challenge the testimony regarding Leeper’s blood-alcohol level, the trial
court acknowledged that the testimony indicating the test showed a .02 “did not accurately
reflect the victim’s state of intoxication”; however, the trial court explained that because “the
victim himself testified to his state of intoxication and the amount that he drank[,] . . . the blood
alcohol level numbers . . . did not play any role in the determination of defendant’s guilt.”
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that “if counsel was deficient in the manner he handled
[the blood-alcohol level issue], and I don’t believe that he was, it did not impact the decision in
this case.”
II. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law.9 This determination requires a judge first to find the
facts, then determine “whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.”10 We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear
error and review de novo its constitutional determination.11
B. Legal Standards
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and that, but for counsel’s error, it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have
been different.12 Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy
burden of proving otherwise.13 To show an objectively unreasonable performance, the defendant
must prove that counsel made “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”14 In so doing, the defendant must overcome
9
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
10
Id. at 579.
11
Id.
12
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 314, 318; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
13
People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
14
LeBlanc, supra at 578, quoting Strickland, supra at 687.
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a strong presumption that the challenged conduct might be considered sound trial strategy.15 The
defendant must also show that the proceedings were “fundamentally unfair or unreliable.”16
C. Threat To Withdraw
Jackson argues that Ponsetto’s threat to communicate to the judge that Jackson was lying
if he testified in a certain way violated Jackson’s right to testify and present witnesses as well as
his right to a fair trial, and therefore constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well
established that a criminal defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf.17 However, it is
also well established that a defendant has no right to testify falsely.18 In the context of an
ineffective assistance claim, this means that, “[a]lthough counsel must take all reasonable lawful
means to attain the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any way
assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law.”19
Jackson argues that the trial court’s finding that Ponsetto had reason to believe Jackson
would have lied if he had testified was clearly erroneous. Jackson further argues that even if
Ponsetto believed that Jackson was going to lie if he testified, Ponsetto should not have
threatened to disclose to the judge that the testimony was perjured because the judge was also
sitting as the factfinder. As Jackson points out, Michigan law is not clear what standard to apply
when reviewing counsel’s determination that a client intends to testify falsely, or whether a
threat to withdraw is an appropriate response when the finder of fact is a judge rather than a jury.
We need not address these issues to resolve the case. Even if the trial court’s finding was
clearly erroneous and Ponsetto’s threat to withdraw was improper, Jackson has not shown that,
but for these alleged errors, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have
been different.20 The trial court indicated that it based its decision on Leeper’s identification of
the shooter as well as circumstantial evidence such as Jackson being taken into police custody,
the booking photograph in which Jackson’s clothing matched that of the shooter, and the timing
of Jackson’s release from custody in relation to the shooting. Had Jackson testified that he did
not return to the party or shoot Leeper, it would only have required the trial court to weigh
Jackson’s credibility against the strength of the contradictory evidence. Given the trial court’s
observation that Jackson was “not all that credible as a witness,” as well as its statement that
nothing at the Ginther hearing caused him “to reconsider in any way the conclusions I reached at
the end of the bench trial,” we are unconvinced that Jackson suffered actual prejudice by being
dissuaded from testifying. Moreover, because Shirley Jackson’s testimony indicated only that
15
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
16
People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2002).
17
See Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44, 51-52; 107 S Ct 2704; 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987); People v
Solomon (Amended), 220 Mich App 527, 534; 560 NW2d 651 (1996).
18
Nix v Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173; 106 S Ct 988; 89 L Ed 2d 123 (1986); People v Adams,
430 Mich 679, 694; 425 NW2d 437 (1988).
19
Nix, supra at 166.
20
Strickland, supra at 694; Pickens, supra at 314, 318.
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Jackson was in and out of the house several times over the course of the evening in question, we
are unconvinced that presenting this testimony at trial would have changed the outcome.
Therefore, we conclude that reversal is not required.
D. Failure To Correct Testimony Regarding Leeper’s Blood-Alcohol Level
Jackson argues that Ponsetto’s failure to correct the testimony regarding Leeper’s blood
alcohol level constituted ineffective assistance. The trial court acknowledged that the testimony
regarding Leeper’s blood-alcohol level was flawed. However, the trial court noted that Leeper
himself testified that he had drunk a fifth of gin before the shooting, and that he was “drunk, real
drunk” when he got to the hospital. Leeper testified unequivocally that he was completely
certain that Jackson was the shooter despite his intoxication. Moreover, the trial court expressly
ruled that the flawed blood-alcohol reading “did not play any role in the determination of
defendant’s guilt.” Again, we conclude that Jackson has failed to show that, but for counsel’s
error, it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different.21 Accordingly,
reversal of his conviction is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
21
Id.
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