PEOPLE OF MI V JON PATRICK KITTLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
JON PATRICK KITTLE, a/k/a JON TACKET,
a/k/a TIMOTHY L. PATRICK WILLIS,
No. 240491
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 97-011715-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Sawyer and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of MCL 750.520b(1)(b), and was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12,
to four concurrent terms of 30 to 70 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction of
right, and we vacated his first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions and remanded for
entry of a judgment of conviction of four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(a). People v Kittle (Unpublished per curiam, docket No. 211628,
rel’d 8/11/00). The remand was predicated on an error in the jury instructions. Defendant was
resentenced to four concurrent terms of 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment, and now appeals his
resentencing as of right.
Defendant argues that his sentence is disproportionate.1 We review the trial court’s
imposition of sentence for an abuse of discretion. People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich
App 559-560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). A trial court’s sentence is an abuse of discretion if it
violates the principle of proportionality, which requires that a sentence be proportionate to the
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn,
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Because the crime in the instant case was committed before January 1, 1999, the judicial
sentencing guidelines would normally apply. People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 253; 611
NW2d 316, lv den 463 Mich 918; 619 NW2d 548 (2000). However, the judicial sentencing
guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders, and may not be considered on appeal in
determining an appropriate sentence for an habitual offender. People v Cervantes, 448 Mich
620, 625 (Riley, J.), 630 (Cavanagh, J.); 532 NW2d 831 (1995); People v Gatewood (On
Remand), 216 Mich App 559-560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996).
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435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990); People v Moorer, 246 Mich App 680, 684; 635 NW2d
47 (2001).
“Permissible factors that may be considered by the court when imposing a sentence
include the severity and nature of the crime, the circumstances surrounding the criminal
behavior, the defendant’s attitude toward his criminal behavior, the defendant’s social and
personal history, and the defendant’s criminal history, including subsequent offenses.” People v
Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). Additionally, the trial court may consider
the effect of the crime on the victim. People v Compagnari, 233 Mich App 233, 236; 590 NW2d
302 (1998).
The record of the initial sentencing and the resentencing reveal that the trial court
considered all of the above-listed factors in determining defendant’s sentence. The trial court
considered the severity and nature of the crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
commenting that “the nature of the offense is one which is of some concern to the Court, and
there is a certain predatory quality about it, and it’s a situation where you, obviously, abused a
father’s trust in order to obtain access to his son in order to abuse him.” Additionally, the trial
court acknowledged that the sentence for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, as opposed to the
original sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, “even as an habitual offender, is for a
less serious offense,” and that “there is appropriate basis here for sentencing you more
moderately th[a]n the Court sentenced you at the prior hearing.” The trial court determined that
based on the “the fact that we were here on a different level offense tha[n] we are now, warrants
the Court giving you consideration and allowing for a reduced, albeit [], I don’t think,
dramatically reduced sentence in this case.”
The trial court considered the circumstances surrounding defendant’s criminal behavior:
[T]he jury, in convicting you, found that roughly between 1992 and 1996
you systematically groomed and then sexually abused the victim in the case, [].
You, apparently, became acquainted with the defendant’s stepfather by
frequenting his bar and in 1994 actually took up residence with the victim and his
stepfather.
It appears you began with full body massages with the victim when he was
only about 12. Supplied him with alcohol and marijuana by the time he was 13
and began performing anal and oral sexual penetration with him by the time he
was age 14.
The presentence investigation report, which the trial court considered in determining
defendant’s sentence, noted defendant’s attitude toward his criminal behavior, indicating “when
interviewed . . . defendant adamantly denied any sexual contact with the victim.” The PSIR also
stated “also worth mentioning is that when interviewed for the PSI on the previously mentioned
CSC offense [second-degree with 4-year-old daughter of then girlfriend], the defendant
adamantly denied any involvement.” The investigating agent commented:
[N]ot only is the defendant’s ongoing involvement in predatory sex
offenses disturbing, but equally disturbing is his ongoing denial of wrongdoing in
the Instant Offenses, much like that of past offenses, and the fact that he has
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received community supervision for his past offenses as well as sex offender’s
therapy, and was in fact being supervised in the community on his most recent sex
offense . . . when involved in the Instant Offenses.
Additionally, the trial court commented on defendant’s attitude toward his criminal
behavior at the first sentencing hearing:
Well, Mr. Kittle, I understand that you are maintaining your innocence,
and certainly that is your prerogative, and under the circumstances if you maintain
your innocence I can expect that you would be unhappy with having been
convicted at trial, although as a practical matter, having presided over the trial, it
seemed to be the evidence was quite substantial and one might say fairly
overwhelming and I have considerable confidence in the findings of the court and
the verdict of the jury.
Concerning defendant’s social, personal, and criminal history, especially the trial court’s
correct assertion that defendant is a sexual predator, the trial court referred to its comments at the
first sentencing hearing, where it noted that defendant was a fifth felony offender and a third
felony sex offender. The trial court characterized defendant as a someone who is “clearly
dangerous and cannot be allowed to roam in the public at large.” The trial court also
recommended that defendant be “continued in programming to deal with the underlying
pathology that causes the sex offenses of which [he] ha[s] been convicted.” At the first
sentencing hearing, the trial court also considered the effect of the crime on the victim,
commenting that “given the fact that there was not serious or permanent physical injury imposed
here, and we’re not dealing with a young child but a teenage victim who I think ultimately will
get over the offense, although after having suffered a serious psychological harm from the
process.”
“The factors considered in imposing sentence should be balanced with the following
objectives: (1) reformation of the offender, (2) protection of society, (3) punishment of the
offender, and (4) deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” People v Rice (On
Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). In the instant case, the trial court
focused primarily on the reformation of defendant and the protection of society. As noted above,
at the original sentencing hearing, the trial court commented that defendant was a “clearly
dangerous” “sexual predator,” who “cannot be allowed to roam in public at large,” and needed to
“be incarcerated for a very, very long period of time until [he] no longer pose[d] a threat to
public safety.” To reform defendant, the trial court recommended “that during [defendant’s]
long confinement [he] be placed in intensive and ongoing programming to deal with the sexual
maladjustment issues which ha[d] brought [him] to this position and which [we]re reflected in
[his] prior criminal history as well as in the hopes that [he] may ultimately gain some control
over the problem that gives him difficulty.” At the resentencing hearing, the trial court
recommended continued programming for defendant to deal with his sexual dysfunction.
The record reveals that the trial court carefully considered the relevant and permissible
factors when determining defendant’s sentence, and balanced those factors with the objectives of
imposing sentence. The sentence imposed by the trial court of four concurrent terms of 25 to 50
years’ imprisonment for four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct was proportionate to
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the circumstances surrounding defendant and the crimes he committed, and did not constitute an
abuse of discretion.
Defendant next argues that he is “legally and factually innocent of all degrees of criminal
sexual conduct,” and in a standard brief that his trial counsel was ineffective. “Where an
appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal
case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on
remand. From the second appeal under those circumstances, a defendant is entitled to the full
panoply of ancillary rights, such as the right to the assistance of appointed counsel if indigent.”
People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481; 522 NW2d 880 (1994). Our Supreme
Court has held that “the scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand.”
People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). Because this Court remanded the
case specifically for resentencing, the issues in the instant appeal are limited to issues arising out
of resentencing. Because the issues defendant now raises did not arise out of resentencing, and
because defendant did not raise them on his first appeal as of right, he has forfeited his right to
review of the issues by failing to timely assert them. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216;
612 NW2d 144 (2000). Even if we were to consider these factors, we hold that the evidence
presented at trial warrant conviction and further, that defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that his prior and current appellate counsel were ineffective.
Because the issues in the instant appeal are limited to issues arising out of resentencing, this
Court may only consider defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to his current
appellate counsel, and not his appellate counsel on his initial appeal as of right. A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be preceded by an evidentiary hearing or motion for new
trial before the trial court, or will be considered by this Court only to the extent that claimed
counsel mistakes are apparent on the record. People v Johnson, 144 Mich App 125, 129-130;
373 NW2d 263 (1985). Again, were we to consider these arguments we would hold they are
without merit. Because we are to consider only those issues before us, defendant cannot claim
that prior appellate counsel was ineffective when most of these same issues were raised in
defendant’s initial appeal to this Court.
Defendant also asserts that his current appellate counsel’s “untimely filing [of the
appellate brief] has already prejudiced defendant’s right to appeal by the forfeiture of oral
argument. MCR 7.212(A)(4),” and that “counsel is intentionally attempting to prejudice
defendant’s appeal of right through the artificial creation of procedural default.” MCR
7.212(A)(4) provides that “any party failing to timely file and serve a brief required by this rule
forfeits the right to oral argument.” However, defendant has not demonstrated that his appellate
counsel’s deficiency, i.e., the failure to timely file resulting in forfeiture of oral argument,
seriously prejudiced defendant. Defendant has failed to show that his current appellate counsel’s
performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness, or how any such
deficiency prejudiced defendant; therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new appeal.
Defendant next argues that he was erroneously convicted of offenses that he was never
charged with, and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence,
pursuant to MRE 404(b). Where this Court considered and ruled on the same issue which
defendant again raises in his second appeal as of right, “the doctrine of ‘law of the case’ is
dispositive.” People v Radowick, 63 Mich App 734, 739; 235 NW2d 28 (1975). “The doctrine
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is explained in People v Whisenant, 384 Mich 693, 702; 187 NW2d 229 (1971), where [our
Supreme] Court cited with approval the opinion of this Court in People v Whisenant, 19 Mich
App 182, 189; 172 NW2d 524 (1969):
It is fundamental law that the last utterance of an appellate court
determines the law of the case, and upon remand for another trial subsequent to
the appeal, the trial court is bound to follow the law as stated by an appellate
court. If a litigant has any objection to the law as stated by the appellate court, his
redress is an application for rehearing to the deciding court or an appeal to a still
higher tribunal.” [Radowick, supra, 739.]
This Court has already determined that defendant established plain error affecting his
substantial rights, where the trial court “failed to state that the prosecution must also prove
defendant was a member of the same household as the complainant,” and that “because the
aggravating circumstance [necessary for a finding of guilt on first-degree criminal sexual
conduct] was omitted, the instruction given was that appropriate for a charge of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct.” This Court held that it was not necessary to order a new trial:
Rather, because the jury returned a verdict on what were proper
instructions for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, we vacate defendant’s
conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and remand for entry of a
judgment of conviction of four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
See People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 606; 470 NW2d 478 (1991);
People v Garrett, 161 Mich App 649, 652; 411 NW2d 812 (1987). [People v
Kittle (Unpublished per curiam, docket No. 211628, rel’d 8/11/00.]
Additionally, this Court has already determined that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence that “defendant had sexually abused another male, similar in age
to the complainant in this case, a number of years earlier,” under MRE 404(b), where such
evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of showing defendant’s modus operandi, and
where its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Pursuant to the doctrine of law of the case, this Court will not reconsider issues which have
already been decided.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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