PEOPLE OF MI V DEANGELO EARLY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 243036
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-006340
DEANGELO EARLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.
He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve consecutive terms of
imprisonment of two years for the felony-firearm conviction, to be followed by fifty to eighty
years for the assault conviction. He appeals as of right. Because the trial court failed to
determine if the complaining witness was competent to testify,1 we reverse.
On the evening of December 28, 2000, outside a house in Detroit that apparently operated
as an unauthorized tavern, the complaining witness was shot several times in the back and leg.
The complainant immediately, and consistently thereafter, identified defendant as the shooter.
The prosecutor relied exclusively on the complainant’s account of the event for defendant’s
identification.
The complainant had a long history of mental illness, manifesting itself in schizophrenia,
delusions, and hallucinations. During the preliminary examination, the witness justified breaking
in neighborhood doors by explaining that he was the police and further testified that he worked
as a Lieutenant for the FBI. The complainant denied drinking or smoking cigarettes, and stated,
“Only thing I do is smoke crack.” He admitted residing at a mental institution and denied that he
was properly medicated at the time of preliminary examination or during the shooting. The
1
Under the facts of the present case, the trial court had a legal duty to determine if the
complainant was competent to testify. MRE 601.
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preliminary examination was punctuated by odd, disruptive behavior from the witness and
members of his family.
The preliminary examination testimony regarding the actual shooting was also devoid of
any indication that the witness could competently testify. The witness presented contradictory
evidence, first indicating that he ran away from defendant, then indicating that he ran around
defendant’s car while defendant shot at him. He stated that he could not see anything because of
the bright, blinding snowfall but also testified that the shooting occurred at night. According to
the complainant, defendant had been shooting at him for a month before he shot him outside the
after-hours bar. The witness lapsed so far into incoherent or extraordinarily fanciful testimony at
the preliminary examination that the district court interrupted the proceedings until an expert
could evaluate the witness’s competence. The expert, complainant’s psychiatrist, equivocated on
the issue of complainant’s competence, but the district court judge decided that the issue of
competency was better left to the jury.
At trial, defense counsel repeatedly asked the trial court to assess the complainant’s
competence to testify, but the court repeatedly responded that competence was a matter for the
jury. While the complainant attempted to explain that his earlier testimony was impaired by his
lack of medication, he failed to fully explain his preliminary examination responses and repeated
much of the questionable testimony. He also reiterated his denial that he was taking medication
at the time of the shooting. It became apparent at trial that the complainant had provided
completely different explanations for why defendant shot at him. To the police, he claimed that
defendant wanted repayment that the complainant said he never owed. To his psychiatrist he
stated that defendant tried to rape his eighteen-year-old daughter. At trial, the complainant
admitted that he did not have an eighteen-year-old daughter, and could not otherwise explain the
statement except to say that he was heavily medicated during the interview. The prosecutor used
the same psychiatrist and interview to suggest to the jury that the complainant was mentally
competent to testify, but the expert’s ultimate opinion of the complainant’s competence to testify
truthfully about the events was never elicited.
Most striking was the complainant’s recollection that he told defendant’s sister, a friend
of his, to ask defendant to stop shooting at him about a week before the shooting. The
complainant provided this trial testimony in conjunction with his reiteration that defendant had
been shooting at him for a month. The defense presented undisputed evidence at trial that
defendant’s sister died several years before the shooting.
The question of witness competence is within the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed
on appeal for an abuse of discretion. People v Breck, 230 Mich App 450, 457; 584 NW2d 602
(1998). But a court’s determination of whether it or the jury should determine competency is a
preliminary question of law we review de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
The trial court’s deference to the jury on the question of witness competence was legal
error. The applicable rule, MRE 601, provides, “Unless the court finds after questioning a
person that the person does not have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation
to testify truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.” So although competence is generally presumed, the court,
not the jury, must initially investigate and decide the matter of competence. Breck, supra at 457.
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In this case, the complainant’s undisputed history of mental illness and drug abuse and
his repeated testimonial delusions militated in favor of granting defense counsel’s requests for a
determination of competence. The court’s repeated indications that the jury should decide the
question was an error of law. This legal misconception tainted its discretionary decision to allow
the jury to hear the witness’s testimony. People v Green, 205 Mich App 342, 346; 517 NW2d
782 (1994). Because the prosecutor’s entire case rested on the highly questionable factual
recitation of this witness, we must reverse. In light of our disposition, we do not reach
defendant’s other challenges on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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