PEOPLE OF MI V JASON DENARD SMART
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 236522
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-000926-01
JASON DENARD SMART,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 239838
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-000926-01
JASON DENARD SMART,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and White and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and commission of a
felony while in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.227b, following a jury trial. The trial court
sentenced defendant to fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and a
consecutive two-year sentence for felony firearm. The prosecution appeals as of right in Docket
No. 236522, asserting that the trial court did not have substantial and compelling reasons to
depart downward from the guidelines range in sentencing defendant for murder. Defendant
appeals as of right in Docket No. 239838, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by
reinstating the charge of second-degree murder after the district court ruled that the evidence was
insufficient to bind defendant over on second-degree murder, and ineffective assistance of
counsel. We affirm in both cases.
I
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend, Shanita
-1-
Haywood. At the preliminary examination in January 2001, the district court bound defendant
over on involuntary manslaughter and felony-firearm, noting that there was nothing in the
evidence to suggest that defendant had an intent to kill. In May 2001, the prosecution moved the
circuit court to reinstate the second-degree murder charge. The court granted the motion. The
jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. Defendant hired new
counsel and moved for a new trial, asserting, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately convey a plea offer to defendant. The trial court held a Ginther hearing
limited to the plea offer issue, after which it found that trial counsel had conveyed the plea offer
to defendant, defendant rejected the plea offer of his own free will, trial counsel did not
encourage defendant to do so, and defendant had thus failed to establish the requisite prejudice to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. This appeal ensued.
It is undisputed that defendant shot Haywood; the issue at trial was whether defendant did
so with malice, or whether the shooting was negligent or an accident. At various times after the
shooting, defendant gave differing stories regarding how Haywood was shot. Defendant initially
went to his neighbor David Ray Ellis’ apartment seeking medical assistance and told Ellis that
the victim shot herself. Defendant also told the first officers on the scene that Haywood shot
herself. Later, in an interview with Detroit Police Sergeant Christopher Vintervoghel, defendant
claimed that Haywood found the gun and asked how it worked and when defendant took the gun
back and attempted to close the cylinder, it went off. Apparently, however, after being told that
the gun could not have discharged in such a way, defendant gave another statement to Detroit
Police Detective Kenneth Gardner in which he admitted that when he took the gun from
Haywood, he closed the cylinder and pulled back on the hammer and then began waving the gun
from left to right, when it discharged.
Defendant acknowledges that he attempted to cover up his involvement in the shooting.
He admits that after the shooting, he did not immediately call 911 as Ellis requested he do.
Instead defendant ran outside and threw the gun into the snow. Defendant also admits that he
then went outside and retrieved the gun, brought it back in, cleaned it with a towel, and put it in
Haywood’s hand. He then called 911. Defendant claimed that he did this because no one would
believe the shooting was an accident.
II
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating the
charge of second-degree murder after the district court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to
bind defendant over on second-degree murder.
Any errors associated with allowing a defendant to stand trial are rendered harmless by
the presentation of sufficient evidence at trial. People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 357; 650
NW2d 407 (2002). Therefore, the issue before us is whether the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence at trial to convict defendant of second-degree murder. We conclude that it did.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Stiller,
242 Mich App 38, 42; 617 NW2d 697 (2000). The elements of second-degree murder are (1) a
death, (2) caused by defendant’s act, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification. People v
-2-
Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534-535; 664 NW2d 685 (2003), citing People v Goecke, 457 Mich
442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). “Second-degree murder is a general intent crime, which
mandates proof that the killing was done with an intent to kill, an intent to inflict great bodily
harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death with the knowledge that the act probably
will cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 269; 662 NW2d
836 (2003), citing People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 386; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
The evidence showed, without dispute, that defendant caused the death of his girlfriend
by shooting her in the eye. From this, the jury was permitted to infer that defendant committed
the killing with malice. People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301; 187 NW2d 434 (1971).
A reasonable jury could have concluded, based on defendant’s testimony, that defendant
was guilty of involuntary manslaughter. However, the jury was not obliged to accept
defendant’s testimony, and acceptance of his testimony would not, in any event, lead only to the
conclusion that he lacked the requisite malice as a matter of law. The question is one of
evidentiary sufficiency. Malice is clearly a necessary element of murder. The jury is free to find
malice, or not, based on its assessment of the evidence. “[I]f it is proved that the conscious act of
the prisoner killed a man and nothing else appears in the case, there is evidence upon which the
jury may, not must, find him guilty of murder.” Morrin, supra at 318, quoting Woolmington v
The Director of Public Prosecutions, AC 462, 480 (1935). In this case, there was evidence that
defendant killed his girlfriend. That evidence of homicide permitted the jury to find malice,
“[b]ut it in no sense compels such a finding.” Morrin, supra at 317 (emphases in original). The
issue of malice was properly submitted to the jury based on the evidence that defendant shot his
girlfriend in the eye. The added evidence of defendant’s efforts to make it look like his girlfriend
shot herself could, if the jury found it appropriate, be used by the jury in assessing and rejecting
defendant’s version of the events. It was not necessary for the prosecution to present any
additional evidence to support the charge of murder.
Further, even if the jury accepted defendant’s version of the events, a finding of malice
would be adequately supported.1 “A jury can properly infer malice from evidence that a
1
In People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 466; 579 NW2d 868 (1998), the Court noted:
As a necessary element of second-degree murder, malice reflects the principle that
criminal culpability must be tied to the actor’s state of mind. However, as we
have repeatedly held, the mens rea for second-degree murder does not mandate a
finding of specific intent to harm or kill. [People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 669;
549 NW2d 325 (1996).] The intent to do an act in obvious disregard of life
endangering consequences is a malicious intent.
Because depraved-heart murder is a general intent crime, the accused need not
actually intend the harmful result. One way of expressing this concept is that
malice may be established even absent an actual intent to cause a particular result
if there is wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency
of a defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.
-3-
defendant intentionally set in motion a force whose natural tendency is to cause death or great
bodily harm.” Goecke, supra at 467 n 29, citing People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 729; 299 NW2d
304 (1980). “[T]he issue of malice must always be submitted to the jury.” Aaron, supra at 729.
The facts and circumstances of this killing were such that the jury could infer the
requisite malice for second-degree murder, Aaron, supra; People v Harris, 190 Mich App 652,
659; 476 NW2d 767 (1991), from the evidence that “the defendant intentionally set in motion a
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Goecke, supra; People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 760; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). A jury could reasonably infer that defendant set in motion a
force likely to cause death by wielding a loaded gun, pulling the hammer back and waving it
within inches of his girlfriend’s face.
III
Defendant also argues on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of showing otherwise.
People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001). A defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so
prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. Knapp, supra. The defendant must also overcome
the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 385
386. This Court will not second-guess counsel regarding matters of trial strategy and, even if
defense counsel was ultimately mistaken, this Court will not assess counsel’s competence with
the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 386-387 n 7.
Whether a person was denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The court first
must find the facts and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the
defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. The trial court’s findings
of fact are reviewed for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
A
At the Ginther hearing, defendant argued he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because defense counsel failed to adequately convey a plea offer. Defendant’s trial
counsel testified at the Ginther hearing that the prosecution had made an offer before the second
degree murder charge was reinstated, that he conveyed the offer to defendant a number of times,
that he thought in was in defendant’s best interest to accept the plea, that he told defendant that it
was not worth the risk of trial, that defendant responded that he could not go to prison, and that
he never encouraged defendant to reject the plea and go to trial. Trial counsel acknowledged that
he did not put the plea offer in writing and did not make a record of it at any court proceeding,
including the final pre-trial conference, which the record indicates occurred on March 2, 2001.
However, the trial court recalled off the record discussions regarding the plea offer and
defendant’s having rejected the offer:
-4-
THE COURT: Okay, let me ask you this. Let me interrupt you, Ms. Woods.
EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
***
Q. Okay. And do you recall one time prior to the Court setting this matter for
Final Conference. That the Court, although it was not on the record, went off
the record and had conversations with you and Mr. Smart regarding this? Do
you remember that?
A. No, Your Honor. But I – just vaguely I remember it.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And there was an offer of six months on the Involuntary Manslaughter and
two years on the Felony Firearm?
A. That sounds like what happened. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And this was prior to the prosecution asking that the case be reinstated. Do
you remember that?
A. Yes, ma’am, I remember from when the motion was filed.
***
Q. All right, so – Okay, so you do vaguely remember that this Court, not no
Judge anybody, but this Court said it off the record.
A. That’s right, we did have a conversation.
Q. And he did not want to do it?
A. That’s right. That’s right.
Q. And at that time he was tearful; is that correct?
A. Yes, ma’am, he was.
Trial counsel further testified that he was sure he conveyed to defendant that he only had so
much time to accept the plea, that it could not be accepted on the day of trial; that he did not tell
defendant in February or March that it was too late to accept the plea; that defendant never
communicated to him that he wanted to accept the plea; and that counsel never advised
-5-
defendant that he would not be convicted of anything more than reckless use of a firearm, or that
if he went to trial and lost, the most he would get would be probation.
Defendant’s brother, Torinio Patty, testified at the Ginther hearing that he heard
defendant’s trial counsel say to defendant that he could plead and get “two years, plus five years
probation.” Patty also testified that at no time did he hear defendant’s trial counsel advise
defendant to take the plea, and that trial counsel had said that defendant should “go to trial
because they don’t have a case against you and more than likely they got to build a case against
you, so we can beat this.” Patty also testified that around February or March of 2001, he heard
defendant tell his trial counsel that he wanted to take the plea, and that trial counsel replied that
the plea “is off the table.”
A cousin of defendant’s, Jerome Smart, testified at the Ginther hearing that he
accompanied defendant to every court appearance and heard defendant’s trial counsel discuss
with defendant whether he should take a plea. Jerome Smart testified that trial counsel told
defendant a plea of two years and probation was being offered, that trial counsel advised
defendant not to accept the plea “because if they [the prosecution] offer him two years they don’t
have a case.” Jerome Smart testified that he never heard trial counsel tell defendant that the plea
offer had to be accepted within a certain time frame. He also testified that he never heard
defendant turn down the plea, and that about 1 ½ to 2 months after trial counsel told defendant
about the plea offer, and before trial, defendant told trial counsel several times, in Jerome
Smart’s presence, that he wanted to accept the plea. Trial counsel responded that it was too late.
The trial court determined that trial counsel conveyed the plea offer to defendant, that
defendant himself rejected the plea, and that trial counsel’s indication to defendant that there
may be a chance they could beat the charges given the plea offer of two years for felony-firearm
and probation for involuntary manslaughter could be considered trial strategy. The trial court
impliedly found that defendant never told trial counsel that he wanted to take the plea. The
court’s findings make clear that it disbelieved defendant and his relatives in this regard and
believed trial counsel. Paying due deference to the trial court’s opportunity to observe the
witness and assess their credibility, we find no error.
B
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to review evidence and
calling defendant as a witness when counsel had not reviewed the 911 tape that was admitted for
impeachment purposes. Defendant raised this issue below in his motion for new trial or
evidentiary hearing, but it was not explored at the Ginther hearing because the circuit court ruled
that only one of defendant’s issues would be addressed at the Ginther hearing—whether the plea
offer was properly conveyed to defendant, as discussed above. Defendant also maintains that
counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the forensic pathologist and Ellis on the
issue whether Ellis properly administered CPR.
With regard to the 911 tape, when defendant took the stand, he denied telling the 911
operator that the victim had shot herself. The prosecutor thereafter played a copy of the 911
tape, which apparently revealed that defendant had in fact told the operator that the victim shot
herself. Defendant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to examine the tape before trial and
for calling defendant at trial without preparing him to testify. As a result, defendant maintains,
-6-
he was called to testify unprepared, and testified that he did not tell the 911 operator that the
victim shot herself, only to be impeached with the tape by the prosecution. The record suggests
that the 911 tape was not disclosed to trial counsel by the prosecution. However, the record also
suggests that trial counsel should have known of the existence of the 911 tape and requested the
tape specifically from the prosecution. However, even assuming that the failure to examine the
tape was attributable to trial counsel, defendant has not demonstrated the requisite prejudice in
light of defendant’s admissions that he lied to the police officers that arrived on the scene and
that he attempted to cover up his involvement in the shooting. Under these circumstances, where
the jury was aware that defendant had given conflicting versions of the events to the authorities
(after the 911 calls), we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to obtain the 911 tape before trial
and failure to prepare defendant to respond to the tape at trial did not cause the requisite
prejudice, i.e., defendant has not shown that the result of the proceeding would have been
different absent these deficiencies. Knapp, supra.
C
Similarly, defendant has failed to demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel regarding the questioning of Ellis concerning his qualifications to perform CPR.
Defendant asserts that the victim may have survived the gunshot wound had she received proper
medical treatment, and that it is possible that Ellis administered the CPR improperly and caused
the victim further harm. Only grossly negligent treatment of otherwise nonfatal wounds can
constitute an intervening cause of death. Herndon, supra at 399-400. Thus, even if Ellis did
administer CPR negligently, that negligence would not serve as a defense for defendant.
Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s actions were
strategic, and we find no error amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, regarding defendant’s argument that counsel failed to file responsive pleadings
and failed to confer with defendant before waiving witnesses, defendant fails to identify which
pleadings were not filed, or what prejudice that had on his case. Similarly, defendant fails to set
forth which witnesses were waived without his consultation, and what effect, if any, that had on
his case. We find no error amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Docket No. 235622
The prosecution challenges the trial court’s downward departure from the minimum
guidelines range, asserting that several of the court’s reasons were not compelling or substantial.
The statutory guidelines apply to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1999, MCL
769.34(2). Because defendant’s crime was committed on December 29, 2000, the statutory
guidelines apply. A court is only permitted to depart from the statutory guidelines when it has a
“substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for
departure.” MCL 769.34(3); People v Babcock (After Remand), 469 Mich 247, 267; 666 NW2d
231 (2003).
[T]he Court of Appeals must determine, upon a review of the record, whether the
trial court had a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines,
recognizing that the trial court was in a better position to make such a
determination and giving this determination appropriate deference. The deference
-7-
that is due is an acknowledgement of the trial court’s extensive knowledge of the
facts and that court’s familiarity with the circumstances of the offender. The
Court of Appeals is to conduct the thorough review required by MCL 769.34(11),
honoring the prohibition against departures not grounded in a substantial and
compelling reason. MCL 769.34(3).
***
“‘[T]he existence or nonexistence of a particular [sentencing] factor is a factual
determination for the sentencing court to determine, and should therefore be
reviewed by an appellate court for clear error.’”
“ “The determination that a particular [sentencing] factor is objective and
verifiable should be reviewed by the appellate court as a matter of law.’”
“ ‘A trial court’s determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in
a particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the
statutory minimum sentence shall be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’” An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside
the permissible principled range of outcomes.
***
If a trial court articulates multiple “substantial and compelling” reasons for a
departure from the guidelines, and the Court of Appeals determines that some of
these reasons are substantial and compelling and others are not, the panel must
determine whether the trial court would have departed, and would have departed
to the same degree, on the basis of the substantial and compelling reasons alone.
MCL 769.34(3).
[Babcock (After Remand), supra at 270, 272-274, citations omitted.]
The guidelines range was 225 to 562 months, thus defendant’s fifteen-year minimum
sentence (i.e., 180 months) reflected a downward departure from the guidelines range. As
required, the trial court noted on the record at sentencing its reasons for departing downward.
The court stated that this very sad situation came about because of defendant’s failure to exercise
restraint while showing the victim the handgun. The court noted that, there having been no
witnesses to the shooting, defendant could have chosen not to make a statement to the police, but
that he did not take that option and confessed, and that it was his confession that led to his
conviction. The court noted that defendant sought help from a neighbor that was medically
trained, and that defendant wanted to help the victim. The court noted that although defendant
had given false statements to the police, he eventually was “forthcoming.” The court also noted
that throughout the proceedings, defendant had expressed great remorse.
The trial court completed an SIR Departure Evaluation form, as required. The form asks
the sentencing judge to state the “aspects of this case [that] led me to impose a sentence outside
the recommended range,” under which the court stated:
-8-
Substantial and compelling reasons:
1. The defendant sought the aid of a neighbor who was a nurse to attend to the
victim shortly after the victim was shot [sic].
2. The defendant panicked and threw away the gun. The neighbor immediately
told the defendant to retrieve the gun which the defendant did.
3. When there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting the defendant confessed to
the shooting, the victim [sic]. This confession was substantial evidence toward
establishing the defendant’s guilt.
4. The defendant expressed great remorse [sic] for the victim throughout the
court proceedings.
We conclude that the first three reasons stated by the court in the SIR Departure
Evaluation form, that he sought the help of a medically-trained neighbor, that he retrieved the
gun after the same neighbor said he should, and the fact of defendant’s confession, were factual
findings that were not clearly erroneous. We cannot agree with the prosecution that the first and
second reasons cited by the trial court were not supported by the facts. The prosecution urges
that the facts demonstrate that defendant did not go to the neighbor’s apartment for the purpose
of obtaining medical help, but rather, to hide the gun. Defendant testified that he went
downstairs to get help, and the neighbor testified that defendant came to his door, indicated the
victim had shot herself and tried to hand him the gun. That different inferences regarding
defendant’s motivation in going to the neighbor’s apartment could be drawn does not change that
he did in fact go to the apartment of a medically trained neighbor and advised that the victim was
hurt. The court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
Similarly, the prosecution argues there were no facts to support the conclusion that
defendant retrieved the gun that he had attempted to hide. We again disagree. The neighbor
testified that as he went upstairs to aid the victim defendant fled and said he had to ditch the gun
because it was dirty. The neighbor testified that he ordered defendant to get the gun and that
defendant did so. The factual finding that defendant retrieved the gun was not clearly erroneous.
Babcock (After Remand), supra. The factual finding that defendant confessed was also not
clearly erroneous.
We conclude that the trial court’s determinations that the three reasons cited in the SIR
departure form constituted substantial and compelling reasons for departing downward were not
an abuse of discretion. As discussed above, although there was sufficient evidence of intent to
convict defendant of second-degree murder, a jury may well have convicted him of the lesser
offense of involuntary manslaughter given the absence of evidence that defendant intended to
harm the victim and absence of evidence of animus between defendant and the victim.
The fourth factor the court relied on, that defendant expressed great remorse throughout
the court proceedings, was held as subjective and thus not permissibly taken into account in
determining whether to depart from the guidelines in People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 8; 609 NW2d
557 (2000) (noting that a defendant’s expression of remorse is not a permissible factor in
determining whether to depart from a minimum statutory sentence, citing People v Fields, 448
-9-
Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 [1995]). Cf. Babcock (After Remand), supra at 279 (Cavanagh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“certain factors, such as a defendant’s remorse or a
defendant’s family support [ ] may be considered objective by one sentencing judge and
subjective by another.”)
We conclude that three of the trial court’s four reasons were objective and verifiable and
constituted substantial and compelling reasons for departure from the guidelines. We also
conclude given the trial court’s extensive statements at sentencing that, absent the fourth
reason—defendant’s remorse--the trial court would have departed to the same degree on the
basis of the three substantial and compelling reasons alone. Babcock (After Remand), supra at
273.
We affirm in both Docket Nos. 236522 and 239838.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.