IN RE CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON III MINOR [Revised]
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON,
III, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248807
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000561-NA
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent.
In the Matter of MICHAEL AARON SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248808
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000562-NA
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent.
-1-
In the Matter of RAYMOND STUART
SAMPSON, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248809
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000563-NA
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent.
In the Matter of THOMAS ALLEN SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248810
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000564-NA
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent.
-2-
In the Matter of TANNER BOWHEN SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248811
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000565-NA
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent.
In the Matter of CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON,
III, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248812
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000561-NA
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent.
-3-
In the Matter of MICHAEL AARON SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248813
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000562-NA
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent.
In the Matter of RAYMOND STUART
SAMPSON, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248814
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000563-NA
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent.
-4-
In the Matter of THOMAS ALLEN SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248815
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000564-NA
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent.
In the Matter of TANNER BOWHEN SAMPSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248816
Cass Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000565-NA
CHARLES LLOYD SAMPSON, II,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAWN LYNN SAMPSON,
Respondent.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Sawyer and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
-5-
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the trial court order
terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We affirm.
Both appellants raise issues relating to the adjudication trial in this matter. Respondent
mother asserts that counsel for petitioner prejudiced and misled the jury by stating during voir
dire and in argument that the taking of jurisdiction meant the court could order the respondents to
comply with services, and by stating that termination was not being sought, when in fact a
termination petition was filed only ten days after the verdict finding jurisdiction was rendered.
Respondent mother also asserts that the judge should have instructed the jury that evidence of
services rendered to respondents in the past was irrelevant and that petitioner’s reference to the
ultimate disposition of the case was improper. Respondent father challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting jurisdiction.
These issues are not properly before the court because they relate to the court’s exercise
of jurisdiction, which cannot be collaterally attacked in an appeal from the order terminating
parental rights. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 439, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re Powers,
208 Mich App 582, 587; 528 NW2d 799 (1995). While lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
collaterally attacked, the exercise of that jurisdiction can be challenged only on direct appeal. In
re Hatcher, supra; In re Powers, supra. Neither respondent appealed from the order of
adjudication or moved for rehearing as directed by MCL 712A.21. Therefore, we decline to
review these issues.
Both respondents also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
termination of parental rights. Because the termination petition was filed only ten days after the
jury’s verdict finding jurisdiction was rendered and no dispositional review hearings were held,
this case is most appropriately reviewed as a termination of parental rights at the initial
disposition. MCR 3.977(E).1 When termination is ordered at an initial dispositional hearing, the
trial court must find by clear and convincing legally admissible evidence that one or more of the
allegations of the termination petition are true, and establish one of the statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights. MCR 3.977(E).2 A decision terminating parental rights is
reviewed for clear error. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
1
The trial court did hold a disposition hearing on February 27, 2003, where it continued the
children in foster care and ordered the parents to comply with the service plan. However, this
case was never directed at reunification. At the initial disposition hearing the court ordered that
the matter be forthwith scheduled for a termination trial. The court’s order directed no visitation,
referencing the pending petition for termination.
2
Effective May 1, 2003, the court rules governing proceedings regarding juveniles were
amended and moved to the new MCR subchapter 3.900. We note that the amended rule
governing termination at the initial disposition permits the use of legally admissible evidence
admitted at the adjudication trial or plea proceedings as well as that introduced at the disposition
hearing, MCR 3.977(E)(3), while the former MCR 5.974 (D)(3) only permitted the use of legally
admissible evidence introduced at the adjudication trial or plea proceedings. The new rules came
into effect prior to the conclusion of the termination trial on May 8, 2003 and were thus
applicable to the then still pending matter. See MCR 1.102.
-6-
Although the trial court did not expressly find that one or more of the allegations of the
petition were true, the court found facts that clearly and convincingly supported that conclusion.
The termination petition outlined the extensive services that were provided to respondents from
April 2000 until the filing of the termination petition. The petition cited the removal of the
children on two occasions prior to their removal in October 2002 and sought termination based
on respondents’ inability to maintain a proper environment or adequately supervise the children.
The court found that respondents are unable to make changes; that despite intensive services
changes had not occurred; that there were two prior removals; and that the house was in total
chaos with improper supervision. A review of the record reveals that all of these findings are
amply supported by the evidence. Moreover, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
these conditions established the grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Various witnesses indicated that, over a course of two years, the condition of the house
was inconsistent. Significantly, witnesses indicated that the condition of the house would
deteriorate when the Wraparound Program services would be reduced or absent for a period of
time and would improve when workers would advise respondents that some action would be
necessary. Respondents never got to the point of maintaining the house in acceptable condition
on their own. There was specific testimony that respondent father was inconsistent with regard
to maintaining an acceptable standard of cleanliness over the years and would avoid the home
when things got chaotic. The majority of the time the home was cluttered with clothing
everywhere throughout, remnants of food in the living area, and days’ worth of dirty dishes
stacked up in the kitchen. On October 8, 2002 the home was extremely dirty and cluttered, with
cigarette butts on a chair and food on the floor of the living area. The kitchen was cluttered with
a lot of dirty dishes and trash was on the floor. The youngest children were observed eating
cocoa powder off of the floor by the handfuls while playing in it. Respondent mother did not
intervene. She did not intervene in fighting, kicking and biting or in climbing on the table.
Based on all of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that both respondents
failed to provide proper care and custody for the minor children.
The evidence also amply supported the trial court’s conclusion that respondents lacked
the ability to change, a condition that indicates there is no reasonable likelihood that either
respondent will be able to provide proper care and custody for the minor children in the
reasonable future. The psychological evidence indicated that respondent father significantly
minimized the seriousness of problems and even was unwilling to recognize problems, instead
blaming his wife and the system. Respondent mother was more open to admitting problems, but
the problems remained the same and her ability to change did not shift. Psychologist William
Schirado indicated that the proof of respondent mother’s prognosis would be in her response to
services. Somewhat similarly with respondent father, Dr. Schirado recommended a gradual
return of the children to allow him to demonstrate an ability to manage the home and parent the
children, with a poor prognosis if this did not work out. The evidence overwhelmingly showed
that, despite intensive assistance and interventions over two years, and the gradual return of the
children on two separate occasions, respondents did not consistently improve in their ability to
keep the home minimally clean or to effectively supervise the children.
Respondent father points out on appeal that the home was immaculate in a visit that
occurred after the last removal of the children and after respondent mother had moved from the
home. However, the evidence showed that, over the years, the problem was the maintenance of
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an acceptable standard. The evidence indicated that numerous confrontational meetings with
respondents would result in immediate improvement that was not subsequently maintained.
Respondent father also argues that the prior return of the children to the home on two
separate occasions indicates that he was able to comply with a service plan, thus demonstrating
parental fitness. See In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). This case is
distinguishable from In re JK, supra, because, even assuming that respondents did demonstrate
fitness at specific times in history, the subsequent removal of the children demonstrates that the
same problems resurfaced. Furthermore, in this unusual case, the return of the children to the
home did not indicate that respondents were able to maintain a fit home. There was express
testimony that the return of the children did not necessarily indicate that progress had been made.
Rather, the children were returned because there was a comprehensive support team in place
including Wraparound, the schools, and Early On. Wraparound workers testified that they did
not believe the children would be safe with their parents without the assistance of Wraparound.
Based on all of this testimony, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that both respondents
would be unable to provide proper care and custody for the minor children in the reasonable
future.
Finally we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was
in the best interests of the children. Dr. James Henry described a trauma bond exhibited by the
three eldest children, in which the children needed the parental relationship because of an outside
threat, but respondents were not meeting the needs of the children. Dr. Henry opined that
Charles’ moving forward would depend on the system severing the parental relationship,
allowing him to grieve and process that loss and then to develop a relationship with another
primary adult. With respect to Michael, Dr. Henry noted that the closer he gets to his foster
parents, the more afraid he becomes of betraying respondents. His confusion as to what will be a
permanent relationship prevents his development of a positive, safe and secure relationship. Dr.
Henry testified that Raymond experiences confusion as to the security of his primary relationship
and at age four desperately needs to develop a secure attachment. With respect to the twins
Thomas and Tanner, Dr. Henry opined that to return home would be very harmful to their
development because of the lack of parenting and inability of respondents to change. With
respect to all of the children, Dr. Henry testified that it was critical that stability be established.
He indicated that they have all benefited from stability in recent months while in foster care.
While the testimony clearly indicated that respondents love their children and there is a parental
bond, it did not establish that termination was clearly contrary to the best interests of the
children. Since May 2000, the children have been removed from the home three times because
of the condition of the home and inadequate supervision. The evidence showed that the home
remained chaotic and unsafe despite over two years of intensive assistance. At this time the
children need permanency and stability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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