SAMUEL KALLABAT V SOHAIL GIRGIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAMUEL KALLABAT,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 242529
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-119169-CZ
SOHAIL GIRGIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Markey and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant, and we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In February 2001, defendant entered a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement with
Fiaz Ayar and Nick Najjar for the sale of a business, Retirement House of America, LLC,
located at 1901 Southfield Road in Lincoln Park. Despite contract language to the contrary, on
the date set for closing, May 1, 2001, plaintiff’s counsel sent a facsimile transmittal to defense
counsel and demanded that (1) defendant extend the closing date, and (2) defendant consent to
the assignment of Ayar and Najjar’s interest in the purchase agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel also
faxed a one-page document entitled “Assignment of Purchaser’s Interest in Membership Interest
Purchase Agreement.” The document states that Ayar and Najjar assigned their interest in the
purchase agreement to plaintiff, Samuel Kallabat. Kallabat did not sign the “assignment”
document, but the document indicates that Ayar and Najjar signed it on May 1, 2001.
Defendant apparently did not consent to the assignment and no sale took place. On June
7, 2001, plaintiff filed this action and alleged that defendant unfairly withheld his consent to the
assignment and tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s business relationships and expectancies.
Plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment, specific performance and exemplary damages. On
March 27, 2002, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(C)(10). Following oral argument, the trial court granted defendant’s motion in a written order
entered on June 14, 2002.
II. Analysis
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Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing this case because (1)
defendant was obligated to consent to the assignment under a requirement of good faith and fair
dealing, (2) defendant raised a genuine issue of material fact that defendant tortiously interfered
with Ayar and Najjar’s financing through Comerica Bank, and (3) discovery was not complete
because plaintiff wanted to take the deposition of another Comerica employee.1
As noted, plaintiff maintains that the trial court should have enforced the assignment to
Kallabat because defendant breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
declining to consent to the assignment. At the outset, we note that any implied covenant in the
purchase agreement applies to the parties to the agreement, defendant, Ayar and Najjar. Kallabat
was not a party to the purchase agreement, he denies that he was a third party beneficiary to the
agreement, and he does not have standing to enforce its terms. See Krass v Tri-County Sec, Inc,
233 Mich App 661, 665; 593 NW2d 578 (1999). We further observe that Michigan does not
recognize an independent action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Belle Isle Grill Corp v City of Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 476; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).
Those issues aside, it is well settled that “[a] lack of good faith cannot override an
express provision in a contract.” Eastway & Blevins Agency v Citizens Ins Co of America, 206
Mich App 299, 303; 520 NW2d 640 (1994). The purchase agreement states, in pertinent part:
3. The closing shall take place on or before May 1, 2001 (“Closing
Date”). Time is of the essence.
4. This Purchase Agreement may not be assigned by either party in whole
or in part without the express written consent of the other party.
***
9. . . . If the closing does not occur on the Closing Date for any reason
whatsoever, and provided that the Seller is not in default hereunder, then this
1
As this Court explained in Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 255 Mich App 165, 172-173; 660
NW2d 730 (2003):
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de
novo. Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 301-302; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). In
reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
the court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Haliw, supra at 302. Summary
disposition may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine
issue with respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. Summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone; the
motion may not be supported with documentary evidence.
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Purchase Agreement shall be deemed automatically terminated, and the Seller
shall have no further liability or obligation to the Purchaser.
It is “the bedrock principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see
fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual
circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy.” Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins
Co, 469 Mich 41, 51; 664 NW2d 776 (2003). Under the plain terms of the purchase contract, the
parties agreed that (1) the contract may not be assigned without defendant’s written consent, and
(2) the contract automatically terminates if, “for any reason whatsoever,” closing does not occur
on or before May 1, 2001. The record is devoid of evidence regarding any alleged “bad faith” in
defendant’s apparent lack of consent but, were we to discern any, the plain contract terms
provide that any “assignment” not agreed to in writing was patently invalid and the purchase
agreement automatically terminated. Dismissal was clearly appropriate.
Plaintiff also contends that he established an issue of fact regarding his tortious
interference claim and that summary disposition was premature because testimony by a bank
employee will show that defendant interfered with financing through Comerica Bank. “The
elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are the existence of a valid business
relationship or expectancy, knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
defendant, an intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy, and resultant damage to the plaintiff.” Mino v Clio
School Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). In his complaint, plaintiff alleged
that defendant interfered with his business relationship with Comerica. Defendant presented
evidence (plaintiff’s own testimony), that plaintiff never attempted to obtain financing through
Comerica. Plaintiff then argued that defendant interfered with the Ayar and Najjar’s relationship
with Comerica by interfering with their attempt to obtain financing.
“[A]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” City of
Kalamazoo v Richland Twp, 221 Mich App 531, 534; 562 NW2d 237 (1997). “A real party in
interest is the one who is vested with the right of action on a given claim . . . .” Id. Plaintiff has
failed to show he had a valid business relationship with Comerica and he has established no right
to litigate Ayar and Najjar’s alleged claims against defendant. For these reasons, and regardless
whether further discovery might produce additional evidence from Comerica, the trial court
correctly granted summary disposition to defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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