EDWARD J PODORSEK V LAWYERS TITLE INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EDWARD J. PODORSEK,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORP.,
CAROL STROUPE , BARBARA J. STROUPE,
STATE REALTY, INC., d/b/a CENTURY 21
STATE REALTY, and PATRICIA E.
SPRENGER,
No. 241450
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 00-11474-CH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this real estate case, plaintiff Edward Podorsek appeals as of right the trial court’s
grant of defendants’ motions for summary disposition. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case involves plaintiff’s purchase of a parcel of vacant property in Frenchtown
Township, Monroe County from the previous owners of the land, defendants Carol and Barbara
Stroupe. Defendants Stroupe listed their property with defendant Patricia Sprenger who worked
for defendant State Realty, Inc., d/b/a Century 21 State Realty (“Century 21”).
In September 1999, plaintiff, who was in the market for vacant property upon which to
construct a house, made an offer to purchase the property. Defendants Stroupe and plaintiff
entered into a purchase agreement. Although not legally obligated to do so, defendants Stroupe
gave plaintiff a seller’s vacant land disclosure statement. This statement disclosed that there
were no known easements on the property. Further, the statement indicated, “this statement is a
disclosure of the condition of and information concerning the property known to the seller.” It
went on to state that it was not a warranty of any kind, nor should it be considered a substitute
for an inspection or warranties that the purchaser might wish to obtain. Lastly, the disclosure
statement read, “The following are representations made by solely the seller and are not the
representations of the seller’s agent.”
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The purchase agreement was executed on September 29, 1999. Plaintiff’s agent drafted
this agreement and it contained several contingency provisions including an independent
investigation provision, a geological inspection provision and a traditional inspection provision.
Plaintiff did not have the property inspected.
On October 29, 1999 defendants Stroupe and plaintiff closed the sale; defendants Stroupe
conveyed a warranty deed to plaintiff and plaintiff paid defendants Stroupe $135,417. Defendant
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation issued a title insurance policy providing insurance coverage
in the amount of $135,000. Plaintiff took possession of the property at closing.
Shortly after the closing, plaintiff had a conversation with one of his new neighbors. The
neighbor informed plaintiff that he believed that a drain easement ran across the newly purchased
property. The neighbor stated that the drain was called “Gerrick Drain” and that the Monroe
County drain commission held an easement for the drain and for a portion of the property on
each side of the drain for maintenance purposes. Plaintiff then contacted the Monroe County
drain commission, where an employee verified that a drain easement had been established on the
property in 1919. A survey of the drain conducted in 1919 contained a provision that a strip of
land on each side of the drain shall be taken for convenience in digging and deposit excavations.
The length of this strip of land is unclear, however, because the document says either six feet or
six rods, with the words “rods” and “feet” having been typed on top of one another. A rod is
equal to 16 ½ feet.
It is undisputed that defendants Stroupe never disclosed the existence of this drain
easement to plaintiff, nor was the drain easement noted on the title survey. When plaintiff
learned of the existence of the drain easement, he contacted defendants Stroupe, Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation, Century 21, and Sprenger, all of whom denied any knowledge of the
existence of the drain or the easement. Defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation denied
coverage of the claim, citing paragraph three of the title insurance policy, which listed exceptions
from coverage. Specifically, it stated that the policy holder was not insured against loss, costs,
attorney fees and expenses resulting from easements or claims of easements not shown by the
public records and existing water, mineral, oil and exploration rights.
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants Stroupe, Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation,
Century 21, and Sprenger seeking damages relating to the easement. Plaintiff alleged two counts
against defendants Stroupe, Century 21 and Sprenger.
Count I alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation based upon defendants’ failure to disclose or nondisclosure. Count II alleged
innocent misrepresentation based upon statements contained in the seller’s vacant land disclosure
statement. Plaintiff alleged the third count, for breach of contract, against defendant Lawyers
Title Insurance Corporation. At the conclusion of discovery, defendants brought separate
motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). In three
separate opinions, the trial court granted each of defendants’ motions for summary disposition.
With regard to defendants Century 21 and Sprenger, the trial court determined that these
defendants had never made a material representation to plaintiff, which is a necessary element of
fraudulent misrepresentation. Further, it found that plaintiff cannot rely on the Michigan
Occupational Code to support a private cause of action. Finally, the trial court found that
plaintiff had failed to plead the necessary element of privity of contract with regard to the
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innocent misrepresentation claim. As a result, the trial court granted this motion for summary
disposition.
With regard to defendants Stroupe, the trial court determined that the record did not
reflect that defendants Stroupe intended plaintiff to rely on the seller’s disclosure statement.
Furthermore, the trial court noted that the statement specifically warned plaintiff that he should
obtain professional advice and inspections of the property. Additionally, the trial court found
that plaintiff had failed to establish the elements of innocent misrepresentation and that a
reasonable juror could not conclude that plaintiff relied on the representations made in the
seller’s disclosure statement.
With regard to defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, the trial court opined that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate an easement shown by public records. The trial court noted that
the title insurance policy specifically did not cover easements not shown by public records.
Further the policy defined public records as, “title records that give constructive notice of matters
affecting your title – according to the state law where land is located.” The trial court relied on
Peaslee v Saginaw Cty Drain Commr, 365 Mich 338; 112 NW2d 562 (1961), which held that a
filing at the county drain commissioner’s office did not serve as constructive notice. The
Peaslee Court concluded that an easement is a conveyance of an interest in land that must be
recorded with the local register of deeds (which was not done in this case). The trial court
concluded that defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation appropriately denied coverage
under the clear terms of the policy issued to plaintiff. Plaintiff now appeals all three decisions as
of right.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court relied on both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) when it granted
defendants’ motions for summary disposition. Summary disposition of all or part of a claim or
defense may be granted when:
[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter
of law. [MCR 2.116(C)(10).]
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual
support for a claim. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). The purpose of summary disposition is to avoid extensive discovery and an evidentiary
hearing when a case can be quickly resolved on an issue of law. American Community Mutual
Ins Co v Comm'r of Ins, 195 Mich App 351, 362; 491 NW2d 597 (1992).
When deciding a motion for summary disposition, a court must consider the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597
NW2d 517 (1999). A motion for summary disposition based on the lack of a material factual
dispute must be supported by documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b), Meyer v City of
Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 574; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).
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On appeal, a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de
novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 656 NW2d 175 (2003). This Court must
review the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine whether the movant
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins, 458 Mich 288, 294;
582 NW2d 776 (1998). Review is limited to the evidence which had been presented to the trial
court at the time the motion was decided. Peña v Ingham County Road Comm, 255 Mich App
299, 313 n 4; 660 NW2d 351 (2003).
Summary disposition against a claim may be granted on the ground that the opposing
party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8), Horace v City
of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests
the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone; the motion may not be supported with
documentary evidence. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). All
factual allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true, as well as any reasonable
inferences or conclusions which can be drawn from the facts, and construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817
(1999). A grant or denial of summary disposition based upon a failure to state a claim is
reviewed de novo on appeal. Beaty v Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 253; 571 NW2d
716 (1997).
III. DEFENDANTS CENTURY 21 AND SPRENGER
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants Century 21 and
Sprenger’s motion for summary disposition with regard to fraudulent misrepresentation because,
in addition to being the seller of the property, defendant Barbara Stroupe was a real estate agent
employed by defendants Century 21 and Sprenger’s. We disagree.
A claim for fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, as outlined in M & D, Inc v McConkey,
231 Mich App 22, 27; 585 NW2d 33 (1998), requires:
(1) the defendant made a material representation; (2) the representation was false;
(3) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew that it was
false, or made it recklessly, without knowledge of its truth as a positive assertion;
(4) the defendant made the representation with the intention that the plaintiff
would act upon it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it[1]; and (6) the plaintiff
suffered damage.
In the present case, plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence that defendants Century
21 and Sprenger made “material representations” as required to establish a prima facie case of
fraud. In fact, when asked, “So what representations did they (Century 21 and Sprenger) make
regarding this property, if any?” Plaintiff replied, “I don’t know.” Furthermore, plaintiff
admitted that his lawsuit against defendants Century 21 and Sprenger was based upon, “an
1
Additionally, Novak v Nationwide Mut Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 689-691; 599 NW2d 546
(1999), modifies this fifth element, requiring the reliance to be reasonable.
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omission of material fact.” Plaintiff asserts that because defendant Barbara Stroupe worked for
defendants Century 21 and Sprenger, her signature on the seller’s disclosure statement
constituted a material representation on the part of defendants Century 21 and Sprenger. This
argument is without merit. The seller’s disclosure statement explicitly states “the following are
representations made by solely the seller and are not the representations of the seller’s agent.”
When she signed the seller’s disclosure statement, defendant Barbara Stroupe was signing as the
seller of the property and not as an employee of defendants Century 21 and Sprenger. The trial
court correctly determined that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the element of material
representation as required to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants Century 21 and
Sprenger’s motion for summary disposition with regard to innocent misrepresentation because
privity of contract is not required is not requried. We disagree.
The elements of innocent misrepresentation are: False and fraudulent misrepresentations
made by one party to another (1) in a transaction between them, (2) any representation which are
false in fact, (3) and actually deceive the other (4) are relied on by him to his damage are
actionable, irrespective of whether the person making them acted in good faith in making them,
(5) where the loss of the party deceived inures to the benefit of the other. Phillips v General
Adjustment Bureau, 12 Mich App 16, 20; 162 NW2d 301 (1968).
In addition, our Supreme Court, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co v Black, 412
Mich 99, 120; 313 NW2d 77 (1981), stated that the rule of innocent misrepresentation only
applies to parties in privity of contract. Here, plaintiff did not establish that he was in privity of
contract with defendants Century 21 and Sprenger. In fact, plaintiff acknowledges in his
amended complaint and in his deposition that defendants Century 21 and Sprenger were not his
agents. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendants Century 21 and Sprenger’s
motion for summary disposition on the issue of innocent misrepresentation where defendants
Century 21 and Sprenger were not in privity of contract with plaintiff.
IV. DEFENDANTS STROUPE
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants Stroupes’ motion for
summary disposition with regard to fraudulent misrepresentation because genuine issues of
material fact exist on whether defendants Stroupe knew or should have known that an easement
existed and on whether plaintiff relied on the seller’s disclosure statement. We disagree.
Here, the trial court found that plaintiff had failed to establish an element of fraudulent
misrepresentation; namely that defendant intended plaintiff to rely on the representation. Jaffa,
supra at 640-641. The seller’s disclosure statement specifically stated that it was not based on
expertise, was not a warranty and should not be a substitution for an inspection of the property.
In fact, the statement warns, “purchaser should obtain professional advice and inspections of the
property to determine the condition of the property.” This language clearly indicates that
defendants Stroupe did not intend for plaintiff to rely on the seller’s disclosure statement and that
they actually encouraged plaintiff to obtain an outside inspection of the property. The trial court
did not err in concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that defendants Stroupe intended for
plaintiff to rely on the seller’s disclosure statement.
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Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants Stroupe’s motion for
summary disposition with regard to innocent misrepresentation because . We disagree.
A claim of innocent misrepresentation is shown if a party detrimentally relies on a false
representation in such a manner that the injury suffered by that party inures to the benefit of the
party who made the representation. M & D, Inc, supra, at 27. There is no need to prove a
fraudulent purpose or an intent by the defendant that the misrepresentation be acted on by the
plaintiff; however, it must be shown that an unintendedly false representation was made in
connection with the making of a contract and that the injury suffered as a consequence of the
misrepresentation inured to the benefit of the party making the misrepresentation. Id. at 28.
In the present case, the seller’s disclosure statement provided that it was “a disclosure of
the condition and information concerning the property, known to the seller.” Further, it stated,
“the seller discloses the following information with the knowledge that even though this is not a
warranty, the seller hereby specifically makes the following representations based upon the
seller’s knowledge at the signing of the document.” The plain language of this statement
indicates that it is a representation of the seller’s knowledge of the property in question, not a
representation of the actual status of the property. The statement specifically instructs the buyer
to obtain an outside inspection. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that he relied on the representations contained in the disclosure.
V. DEFENDANT LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation’s motion for summary disposition on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because the
insurance policy only excludes coverage of easements not shown by public records.” Plaintiff
argues that a filing of the easement in the office of the county drain commissioner fits within the
definition of “public records” found within the insurance policy. We disagree.
The title insurance contract clearly states that easements not shown by public records are
not insured against loss. Further, the contract defines “public records” as “title records that give
constructive notice of matters affecting your title—according to the state law where the land is
located.” A trial court may grant summary disposition against a breach of contract claim as a
matter of law where the terms of the contract are plain and unambiguous, and subject to only one
reasonable interpretation. Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 132; 602
NW2d 390 (1999).
Plaintiff argues that the drain easement was filed in the office of the drain commissioner
and that such a filing should be considered a “public record” pursuant to the contract. Plaintiff
asserts that MCL 280.6 does not require that drain easements established before 1952 be
recorded at the register of deeds. Defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation argues that in
order to give constructive notice of the easement, the drain easement should have been filed with
the register of deeds in the county where the property is located.
This Court addressed the issue of notice and the recording of a drain easement in Allen v
Bay Co Drain Comm'r, 10 Mich App 731; 160 NW2d 346 (1968). In Allen, supra at 732, the
defendant drain commission obtained an easement for drain purposes from the owners of
property in 1917. The easement was recorded at the drain commissioner's office, but was not
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recorded in the register of deeds office. Id. The plaintiffs subsequently purchased the property
and filed an action to enjoin the defendant from constructing a new drain and to quiet title. Id. at
733. This Court held that an easement that is "not recorded with the register of deeds office is
void against subsequent purchasers in good faith." Id. at 733-734. This Court determined that
the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the plaintiffs did not have actual or constructive
notice of the portion of the easement at issue and affirmed the trial court's determination that the
easement was void against the plaintiffs. Id.
Thus, this Court has previously determined that a drain easement filed in a drain
commissioner’s office, rather than with the register of deeds, did not provide constructive or
actual notice of the easement. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the drain
easement filed in the drain commissioner’s office did not provide constructive notice of the
easement in the present case. The plain language of the title insurance policy indicates that
easements not shown by public records (defined by the contract as “title records that give
constructive notice of matters affecting your title”) are not insured against loss.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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