GOMER J POUND JR MD V LEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GOMER J. POUND, JR., M.D., and
EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2003
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 239149
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 00-000911-CK
LEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, BORGESS
HEALTH ALLIANCE, FRITZ
FAHRENBACHER, M.D., KALAMAZOO
EMERGENCY ASSOCIATES, P.C., and
ANDREW LATHAM, M.D.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Sawyer and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition, MCR
2.116(C)(10), on all of plaintiffs’ claims in favor of defendants, and the trial court’s order
denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint pursuant to MCR 2.118(A)(2). We affirm.
Plaintiff Pound provided services at defendant Lee Memorial Hospital (LMH), a wholly
owned subsidiary of Borgess Health Alliance (BHA), for roughly thirteen years in LMH’s
emergency room. LMH contracted with Emergency Care Services, a subset of BHA, to provide
LMH with emergency room staff. BHA, in turn, contracted with Kalamazoo Emergency
Associates, P.C. (KEA), for KEA to provide LMH with emergency room physicians. KEA, of
which defendant Latham was president, then contracted with Emergency Medical Associates,
P.C. (EMA), to provide an emergency room physician to LMH. Pound was the sole employee
and shareholder of EMA. At the request of Fritz Fahrenbacher, LMH’s chief operating officer,
Pound was expelled from LMH after January 28, 2000. The hospital’s stated reasons for the
expulsion were several instances of unprofessional behavior and failure to maintain an
appropriate appearance at LMH. Pound’s staff privileges at LMH, however, remained intact,
despite his being unable to enter the hospital to exercise them.
Pound had been notified on previous occasions that his manner of dress and appearance
at LMH violated hospital conduct standards. In short, there were reports that Pound wore nail
polish, cosmetics and visible female undergarments while on duty at LMH. Plaintiffs contend
that Pound was the victim of gender stereotyping on the basis of his clothing and grooming
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habits, and that this violated the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Plaintiffs further
contend that the trial court erred when it denied their motion to amend their complaint to include
such a claim under MCR 2.118(A)(2). We disagree.
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion to amend a complaint if
the proposed claim would be futile. Jenks v Brown, 219 Mich App 415, 420-421; 557 NW2d
114 (1996). Differential grooming codes for men and women, regardless of whether they are in
writing, do not implicate an inherent characteristic of sex. Bedker v Domino’s Pizza, Inc, 195
Mich App 725; 491 NW2d 275 (1992). The civil rights act does not protect a person’s conduct if
it does not implicate an inherent characteristic of a protected status under the statute. Veenstra v
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 165-166; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). Because differential
appearance codes for men and women do not implicate an inherent characteristic of sex,
plaintiffs’ could not, as a matter of law, state a cognizable claim under MCL 37.2101 et seq, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court should have applied the economic reality test to
determine whether Pound was the employee of KEA. However, this issue was not raised below,
and is not properly before this Court. Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich App 179, 192-193; 667
NW2d 887 (2003). Despite this, although the trial court did not label its application of the
economic reality test, the trial court clearly applied the test and found EMA to be a private
contractor of KEA. Consequently, no manifest injustice would accrue to plaintiffs if this Court
did not consider this issue. See Mantei v Michigan Public School Employees Retirement Sys,
256 Mich App 64, 78-79; 663 NW2d 486 (2003) (setting forth the economic reality test).
Plaintiffs next argue that summary disposition was inappropriate on the question of
whether KEA breached its contract with EMA when it acquiesced to Fahrenbacher’s request to
remove Pound from service at LMH. This Court reviews the trial court’s decision on a motion
for summary disposition, as well as questions of contract construction, de novo. Klapp v United
Ins Group Agency, 468 Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003); Old Kent Bank v Sobczak, 243
Mich 57, 61; 620 NW2d 663 (2000). Based on a reading of the governing contracts, summary
disposition was properly granted in favor of defendants, because KEA properly terminated the
contract under its immediate termination provisions upon receiving a reasonable request from
LMH to remove plaintiffs from service at the hospital.1
A private hospital’s staffing decisions are not subject to judicial review unless those
staffing decisions are in contravention of public policy. Long v Chelsea Community Hosp, 219
Mich App 578, 588-589; 557 NW2d 157 (1996). Plaintiffs claim that Pound was expelled from
LMH as the result of impermissible gender stereotyping in contravention of public policy, and
that this violation of public policy puts Pound’s expulsion from LMH within this Court’s review.
1
The trial court, in a footnote, stated that none of the parties alleged a breach that would invoke
the immediate termination provisions. We disagree. The necessary arguments and facts were set
forth in KEA’s arguments, both on appeal and before the trial court, that once LMH had
requested plaintiffs’ removal from the hospital, both KEA’s and plaintiffs’ performance on their
contract was rendered impossible.
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We disagree, because, as already noted, plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable claim that public
policy was violated.
Similarly, plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference with a business relationship must fail,
because this Court will not review a cause of action that at heart is a review of a private
hospital’s staffing decisions. Sarin v Samaritan Health Ctr, 176 Mich App 790, 794-795; 440
NW2d 80 (1989). Additionally, tortious interference claims require that the defendants commit a
malicious or per se wrongful act before such claims are cognizable. Mino v Clio School Dist,
255 Mich App 60, 78-79; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). Plaintiffs do not establish that any defendant
acted with malice and cannot establish a violation of law constituting a per se wrongful act on
the part of any defendant.
Last, plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly made numerous findings of fact when
it granted summary disposition in favor of defendants. Even if we were to agree with plaintiffs,
the trial court reached the right result when it granted summary disposition in favor of
defendants, and this Court will not reverse the lower court if it reached the right result, albeit for
the wrong reasons. Zimmerman v Owens, 221 Mich App 259, 264; 561 NW2d 475 (1997).
Having determined that plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law, plaintiffs fail to allege error
requiring reversal on this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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