JILLIAN BOGATER V HOMETOWN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JILLIAN BOGATER,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 241476
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-035672-NZ
HOMETOWN COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Gage and Kelly, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
After she was discharged from her position at the Milford Times, plaintiff brought this
action claiming that she had been discriminated against because of a handicap or perceived
handicap. Plaintiff alleged that she went on sick leave due to a depressive condition and upon
her return she was “summarily dismissed.” Defendant sought summary disposition on the
ground that it was not plaintiff’s employer. Defendant asserted that its subsidiary, HomeTown
Newspapers, Inc., doing business as the Milford Times, was plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff has
never disputed that Hometown Newspapers is a subsidiary of defendant, but has maintained that
since defendant in effect owns the Milford Times, it can be held liable.
In essence, plaintiff claims that the corporate veil between the parent and the subsidiary
should be pierced because defendant is an owner “either directly or indirectly.” In Seasword v
Hilti, Inc., 449 Mich 542, 547-548; 537 NW2d 221 (1995)(footnote omitted), the Court stated:
It is a well-recognized principle that separate corporate entities will be
respected. Wells v Firestone, 421 Mich 641, 650; 364 NW2d 670 (1984).
Michigan law presumes that, absent some abuse of corporate form, parent and
subsidiary corporations are separate and distinct entities. See, e.g., Herman v
Mobile Homes Corp, 317 Mich 233, 243; 26 NW2d 757 (1947); Gledhill v Fisher
& Co, 272 Mich 353, 357-358; 262 NW 371 (1935). This presumption, often
referred to as a "corporate veil," may be pierced only where an otherwise separate
corporate existence has been used to "subvert justice or cause a result that [is]
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contrary to some other clearly overriding public policy." Wells, supra at 650;
Helzer v F Joseph Lamb Co, 171 Mich App 6, 9; 429 NW2d 835 (1988). More
specifically, Michigan courts have generally required that a subsidiary must
"become 'a mere instrumentality' of the parent" before its separate corporate
existence will be disregarded. Maki v Copper Range Co, 121 Mich App 518, 524;
328 NW2d 430 (1982). See also Shirley v Drackett Products Co, 26 Mich App
644; 182 NW2d 726 (1970).
This law makes it clear that in order to state a claim for tort liability based on an
alleged parent-subsidiary relationship, a plaintiff would have to allege: (1) the
existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship, and (2) facts that justify piercing the
corporate veil. . . .
Plaintiff has not suggested that there are any facts that could establish the criteria
necessary for piercing the corporate veil. The mere assertion that the parent is in effect the
owner of the subsidiary will not suffice.
We note that plaintiff indicates on appeal that it could accommodate defendant by
amending the defendant name if defendant wished for financial considerations or accounting
purposes. However, plaintiff never requested the opportunity to amend her complaint in the
court below, and we will not entertain such a request on this appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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