IN RE CHARMAGNE CHRISTIAN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARMAGNE CHRISTIAN,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 247604
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-336823
ATASSI CHRISTIAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
FALICIA CHRISTIAN,
Respondent.
In the Matter of CHARMAGNE CHRISTIAN,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 247799
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-336823
FALICIA CHRISTIAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ATASSI CHRISTIAN,
Respondent.
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Before: Cooper, P.J., and Markey and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal by right from the trial court’s order
terminating their parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (i)
and (j). We affirm.
The minor child, who tested positive for marijuana at birth, was removed as a newborn
infant. The petition sought termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights at the initial
disposition based on her history of substance abuse, her history of physical abuse and neglect of
her older children, and her failure to comply with a treatment plan, which led to the termination
of her parental rights to those children. The petition also sought termination of respondentfather’s parental rights at the initial disposition based on his history of substance abuse, criminal
convictions and the prior termination of his rights to his older children for failure to comply with
his treatment plan and abandonment.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “Once a ground for
termination is established, the court must issue an order terminating parental rights unless there
exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.”
Id. at 354; MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews the trial court’s determination for clear error.
In re Trejo, supra at 356-357. A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to
support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In
re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Further, to be clearly erroneous the
decision must be “‘more than just maybe or probably wrong.’” In re Trejo, supra at 356, quoting
In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred because termination of her rights was
clearly not in the child’s’ best interests.1 We disagree. Based on the evidence in the record, we
are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred by terminating
respondent-mother’s parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re JK, supra at 209-210.
Respondent-mother testified that she visited the child any time she could; she was bonded with
the child; she had “totally changed,” and was capable of raising the child without “having an
attitude or being frustrated or yelling at her,” she submitted to drug screens with negative results;
she was attending counseling; and she completed parenting classes in 1997. We find that this
limited evidence does not “clearly overwhelm,” In re Trejo, supra at 364, the fact that the child
tested positive for marijuana at birth and respondent-mother tested positive for marijuana at the
time of the petition, respondent-mother’s extensive history of neglect and physical abuse of her
1
Respondent-mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon to support
the statutory grounds for termination.
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older children and her apparent inability to rid herself of drugs or successfully rehabilitate
herself.
Respondent-mother argues that because of the bond between her and the child it was
contrary to the child’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. But, the trial court found
that no significant bond existed between the child and the parents. This finding was not clearly
erroneous, especially given that the child was removed as a newborn infant, and respondentmother only visited her for a brief period before the termination trial. Therefore, we find that the
trial court properly concluded that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was clearly
not contrary to the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
Next, respondent-father argues that petitioner failed to prove a statutory ground for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
Among the statutory grounds on which the court found that termination was justified was
MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). Termination under subsection (3)(i) was appropriate if petitioner
established by clear and convincing evidence that “parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the
child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and
prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). The
lower court file includes the prior court proceedings, which resulted in the termination of
respondent-father’s parental rights to his older children.2 After the court took temporary custody
of the older children on January 27, 1997, it ordered respondent-father to visit, establish a
suitable home and income, attend and complete parenting classes and counseling, and to be
evaluated by the Clinic for Child Study. Because respondent-father’s failed to make “any
progress whatsoever” on his treatment plan to reunite with his children, failed to visit, support, or
plan for the children, and failed to prove that he had attended parenting classes or counseling, the
court terminated his parental rights to the older children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i)
and (g). The court’s prior order and findings provide clear and convincing evidence that
respondent-father seriously neglected his older children. Further, the findings evidence that
although respondent-father had the opportunity to rehabilitate himself during the proceedings,
any attempt was unsuccessful. Although respondent-father was enrolled in a substance abuse
treatment and prevention program at the time of the termination trial, there was no evidence that
respondent-father successfully addressed the parenting issues leading to his past termination.
Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i).
We note that clear and convincing evidence did not support termination of respondentfather’s parental rights on the other statutory grounds. But, any error is harmless because
petitioner established at least one statutory ground for termination of respondent-father’s parental
rights. In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). Therefore,
extended discussion of the other grounds is not necessary.
Respondent-father also argues that the court erred because termination of his parental
rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. Because respondent-father did not testify or
2
The trial court took judicial notice of the previous orders and findings of the case file.
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present witnesses at the termination trial, limited evidence exists regarding his ability to
successfully parent and care for the child. The only evidence in support of his argument was that
he was employed at the time of the petition, that he was participating in a substance abuse
treatment and prevention program, and that he submitted to two drug screens with negative
results. On the other hand, there was no evidence that respondent-father had visited or bonded
with the child; there was evidence that he seriously neglected his older children resulting in
termination of his parental rights to those children, and there was no evidence that he had
successfully addressed his parenting issues since the past termination. The limited evidence that
supports respondent-father’s argument does not “clearly overwhelm,” In re Trejo, supra at 364,
the past history of serious neglect of his older children. Accordingly, the trial court did not
clearly err by concluding that the evidence, on the whole record, failed to establish that
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. In
re Trejo, supra at 354.
We affirm.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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