PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL PAUL SHERWOOD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242717
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 01-077632-FC
MICHAEL PAUL SHERWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of five counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520(1)(b)(ii) (victim age thirteen to fifteen and actor related to
victim). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 120 to 360 months for each count. We
affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from allegations that, when defendant was age seventeen or
eighteen, he sexually assaulted his sister, who is approximately four years younger than he. Her
testimony indicated that other uncharged acts of sexual conduct between herself and defendant
began much earlier, when she was seven years old and he was approximately eleven years old.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting, under MRE 404(b), the
complainant’s testimony regarding numerous uncharged sexual acts between her and defendant.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278;
662 NW2d 12 (2003), by admitting the testimony at issue. The complainant testified that
defendant engaged in numerous sexual acts and inappropriate touching with her over a period of
many years before the charged acts. Evidence of other sexual acts between a defendant and a
complainant may be admissible if they lived in the same household and, without such evidence,
the complainant’s testimony would seem incredible. People v Layher, 238 Mich App 573, 585;
607 NW2d 91 (1999), aff’d on other grounds 464 Mich 756 (2001). Here, the complainant’s
testimony about the charged acts might well have appeared incredible without the testimony
about the prior acts, because the jury could have found it implausible that defendant would begin
sexually assaulting her when she was a relatively older child after they had lived together as
children in the same household throughout the complainant’s childhood. We likewise determine
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of this
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evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, MRE 403, given its
direct relevance to the complainant’s credibility and that an appropriate limiting instruction was
given to the jury. Id. at 586.
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s limiting instruction regarding the proper use
of this testimony was given too late in the proceedings. First, this argument is not properly
presented because it is not within the scope of defendant’s statement of the issues presented.
People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). Further, defendant did not
preserve this issue by objecting to the timeliness of the instruction below. Therefore, our review
is for plain error only.
The limiting instruction, which was given in the trial court’s final instructions to the jury,
cautioned the jury to consider the complainant’s testimony about the uncharged acts only to help
it “judge the believability of testimony” regarding the charged acts and that it must not decide
that the evidence shows defendant is a bad person or likely to commit crimes, or convict
defendant based on other bad conduct. Defendant cites no case law, nor have we found any,
stating that a limiting instruction given only during the final instructions constitutes error.
Accordingly, because there was no plain error in the content or timing of this limiting
instruction, defendant is not entitled to relief based on this unpreserved issue.
II
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his five CSC I
convictions in this case. In deciding whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and decide
whether any rational factfinder could have found that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 640; 664 NW2d 159
(2003). In the context of this case, CSC I requires that the defendant engaging in sexual
penetration with another person who is at least thirteen years old, but less than sixteen years old,
and who is related to the defendant “by blood or affinity to the fourth degree.” MCL
750.520b(1)(b)(ii). The complainant testified to the occurrence of the five pertinent incidents
that occurred from approximately October 1999 to May 2000, in which defendant vaginally
penetrated her with his penis. Based on the complainant’s testimony as to her birth date, she
would have been either thirteen or fourteen years old at the time of each charged incident. She
also identified defendant as her brother. Thus, we find that there was sufficient evidence to
support defendant’s CSC I convictions. Although defendant argues that the complainant was not
credible and that other evidence undermines her credibility, when assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence we must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the
jury’s verdict. Gonzalez, supra at 640-641.
III
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the late endorsement of
Emily Meinke as a witness. Meinke testified about certain statements that she claimed defendant
made to her. MCL 767.40a(3) requires the prosecution to provide the defense with a list of
witnesses that it intends to produce at trial not less than thirty days before trial. However, MCL
767.40a(4) provides that the prosecution may add witnesses to the list at any time on leave of the
court for good cause shown. In this case, at a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor indicated that the
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police did not learn from Meinke about the statements she claimed defendant made to her until
less than thirty days before trial was scheduled to begin. Because the prosecution was not aware
of the testimony the witness could provide before it was required to send the initial witness list to
the defense, we find there was good cause for allowing the late endorsement. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 402; 633 NW2d
376 (2001).
IV
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts not in
evidence in his rebuttal argument. We disagree. “The test of prosecutorial misconduct is
whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499,
508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). In the pertinent remarks, the prosecutor stated:
Roxanne Doss. A friend of [the complainant’s]? I don’t see her
supporting [the complainant] today. In this courtroom I don’t see her supporting
[the complainant]. People have taken sides. Roxanne Doss has taken a side.
She’s taken the Sherwood family’s side.
Doss testified on defendant’s behalf. The prosecutor’s comments referred to Doss’ friendship
with the Sherwood family as a basis for questioning her credibility. This was supported by
Doss’ acknowledgement on cross-examination by the prosecutor that she had known the
Sherwood family for three years and had contact with them sometimes. Because a prosecutor
may argue from the facts that a witness is not worthy of belief, Avant, supra at 512, the remarks
were not improper.
V
Defendant also argues that this case should be remanded to give him an opportunity for
him to establish that the results of a polygraph examination administered by the state police
pursuant to MCL 776.21(5) were inaccurate and to allow him to move for a new trial on that
basis.1 We disagree. MCL 776.21(5) provides:
A defendant who allegedly has committed a crime under sections 520b to
520e and 520g of Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, shall be given a
polygraph examination or lie detector test if the defendant requests it.
Under the plain language of this statute, defendant was entitled to a polygraph examination or lie
detector test upon request, which was administered by the state police in September 2001. The
implication of defendant’s position on appeal is that he is further entitled to an opportunity to
judicially challenge the results of that polygraph examination, or the interpretation of those
results by the state police. However, nothing in the plain language of MCL 776.21(5) provides a
1
In this regard, defendant argues that a report from an independent polygraph examiner,
obtained after defendant was sentenced, indicates that he was telling the truth in denying that he
had sexual relations with the complainant after he was seventeen years old.
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defendant with the right to any such judicial challenge, particularly post-conviction. Nor may we
properly read such a right into the statute because “a court may read nothing into an
unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the
words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663
(2002). Moreover, we are left to ponder the utility of a new trial on this basis given that
polygraph test results are not admissible at trial. People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 397; 666
NW2d 657 (2003). Thus, we find defendant is not entitled to relief based on this issue.
VI
Finally, defendant argues that this case should be remanded to allow him an opportunity
to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the state police
polygraph results were accurate. We disagree. To establish such a claim, defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and that this prejudiced his defense. People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 140; 659
NW2d 611 (2003). To show the requisite prejudice, defendant must establish that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s deficient performance. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
Here, there is no reasonable probability that further investigation by trial counsel regarding the
state police polygraph test would have affected the outcome of the trial because the results of the
test were not offered into evidence at trial and the defense could not have offered evidence of its
interpretation of the polygraph test results at trial. Phillips, supra at 397 (polygraph test results
inadmissible at trial). Further, in light of the prosecution’s active defense of defendant’s
convictions on appeal, we believe it is evident that there is no reasonable probability that the
opinion of defendant’s polygraph examiner attacking the state police interpretation of its
polygraph test results would have led the prosecution to voluntarily dismiss the charges brought
in this case. Therefore, we conclude defendant cannot establish an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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