HI-LO HEIGHTS LAKEFRONT PROPERTY OWNERS V COLUMBIA TWP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2003
HI-LO HEIGHTS LAKEFRONT PROPERTY
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP, JACKSON COUNTY
ROAD COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF
CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
CHRISTINE M. BELCHER, DAVID BELCHER,
KATHERINE BURR, SHELLIE D. CHEETHAM,
SCOTT A. CHEETHAM, SANDRA M. COLE,
JACQUELYN DALY, NORMA L. FRANTZ,
PHILLIP J. FRANTZ, MICHAEL HEATH, ROY
M. HOWARD, WALTER D. SHUBERG, JR.,
WILLIAM REITZ, JR., SHIRLEY L. KISTKA,
ROBERT J. KISTKA, NANETTE LONG, JOHN
P. LONG, GRETCHEN MARSHALL, VICTOR
MARSHALL, DAWN NESTOR, LEHR G.
NEVEL, ROBERT NEVEL, Deceased, HELEN
NEVEL, JACK L. PLUMMER, MARGARET
PLUMMER, DEBORAH REITZ, PATRICIA J.
RICHARDSON, RUDOLPH ROCHESTER,
BERNICE ROCHESTER, JEAN SHUBERG,
HOLLY M. SMITH, DONALD E. SMITH,
Deceased, ROBERT SNYDER, JOAN S.
SNYDER, Deceased, JERRY L. SPENCER,
CHARLOTTE K. SPENCER, PAMELA A.
STANSELL, a/k/a PAMELA STANSELLKENNEDY, SANDRA J. THOMPSON,
TIMOTHY THOMPSON, RONALD WHIPPLE,
CATHY WHIPPLE, WILLIAM J. WHITE,
ALICE J. WHITE, LARRY WHITING,
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, and ELIZABETH
WILLIAMS,
Defendants-Appellees,
-1-
No. 241708
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 01-002466 - CH
and
RICHARD BLAIR, WANDA L. BLAIR,
ROBERT W. BLUNT, JAY DUBENDORFER,
HELEN HAWK, JAMES L. NEITLING,
DONALD NESTER, JILL E. ODONAHOE,
MICHAEL ODONAHOE, JACKIE LEE
PLUMMER, RYAN SCHRADER, and VIVIAN
ZWICK,
Defendants.
__________________________________________
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Hi-Lo Heights Lakefront Property Owners Association, Inc., appeals as of right
from the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of all defendants on the
basis that plaintiff’s claim was barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata. We reverse.
The Hi-Lo Heights subdivision abuts Clark Lake, in Columbia Township, Jackson
County. Within the subdivision, an undeveloped strip of land runs parallel to the lake (“the lake
front park”) and five avenues run perpendicular to the lake ending at the lake front park.1 The
undeveloped area where the avenues terminate at the lake front park are known as “road ends.”
Plaintiff, as representative for the interests of the four plot owners nearest to Clark Lake in the
subdivision (“front lot owners”), sued various governmental agencies and all Hi-Lo Heights
subdivision property owners whose property was not adjacent to the lake front park (“back lot
owners” seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the validity and scope of the
dedication of the road ends and the lake front park. Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief
regarding the front lot owners’ riparian rights to the lake along the lake front park.
The back lot owners brought a motion for summary disposition asserting that plaintiff’s
claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims had been adjudicated in an
earlier proceeding brought by Kevin and Jo Lynn Knitter, front lot owners, against certain back
lot owners in this case. The suit arose because of the defendants’ destruction of a fence the
Knitters had erected over the road end of Florida Avenue. On motions by the parties, the trial
court entertained arguments about the scope of the dedication of the lakefront park and Florida
Avenue, as well as the alleged riparian rights of the plaintiffs. The trial court ruled:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all members of the
public, including, but not limited to, the owners of real property located in Hi-Lo
1
These avenues are Broadway, York, Woodward, Pennsylvania, Florida and Michigan.
-2-
Heights Subdivision, shall be entitled to enjoy unfettered access to the public
right-of-way commonly known as Florida Avenue . . . .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all temporary
structures, permanent structures, or other objects, either natural or man-made,
which impede the complete and entire unencumbered use of the totality of the
gravel road commonly known as Florida Avenue . . . shall be removed by the
party responsible for its placement no later than December 15, 2000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the owners of real
property located in Hi-Lo Heights Subdivision . . . shall be entitled to enjoy
unfettered access, by foot traffic only, on the lakefront park which has been
“dedicated to lot owners for passage on foot” as shown on the plat map . . . .
[Knitter v Snyder, et al, unpublished order of the Jackson Circuit Court, entered
January 19, 2001 (Docket No. 00-000796-NZ), p 2-3.]
The court issued a final order, from which no appeal was taken, dismissing with prejudice the
plaintiff’s complaint and the defendant’s countercomplaint. Based on this order, the trial court in
this case dismissed plaintiff’s claims as being barred by res judicata.
We first note that collateral estoppel, rather than the related doctrine of res judicata, is the
more appropriate doctrine to use.2 Regardless, the pertinent requirement that our decision is
based on, identity of parties, is present in both doctrines. Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich App
569, 576-577; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). Collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of an issue in a
different, subsequent action between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding
resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the
prior proceeding.” Dearborn Hts School Dist No. 7 v Wayne Co MEA/NEA, 233 Mich App 120,
124; 592 NW2d 408 (1998). The applicability of this doctrine is a question of law which we
review de novo on appeal. Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243 Mich App 28, 34; 620
NW2d 657 (2000). We also review de novo the trial court’s summary disposition ruling. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
On appeal, plaintiff argues that its claims are not barred because the issues and parties in
Knitter, supra, are different than those in the current one. Regarding identity of the issues, we
find that plaintiff is partially correct. Plaintiff’s claims regarding the dedication and scope of the
road ends of Broadway, York, Woodward, Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues were not at
issue in Knitter, nor should they have been given the limited scope of the dispute in Knitter, and
2
Res judicata deals with claim or transactional preclusion, while collateral estoppel involves
issue preclusion. Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 60 Mich App 606,
610-611; 231 NW2d 479 (1975), aff’d 399 Mich 449 (1976). The Knitter case arose because the
defendant had dismantled a fence installed by the plaintiffs. This case was filed to determine the
front lot owners’, back lot owners’, and the public’s rights regarding the subdivision’s road ends
and lakefront park. Thus, the issues in the Knitter case are also involved in this case, not the
same cause of action.
-3-
thus, cannot be barred by collateral estoppel. With regard to plaintiff’s remaining claims, the
scope of the road end of Florida Avenue and the validity of the dedication and scope of the
lakefront park, these issues were decided in Knitter.
However, we find that collateral estoppel does not apply to these issues either because
there is not substantial identity of parties. As this Court stated in Dearborn Hts, supra at 126
127:
The purpose of the substantial-identity rule is to ensure that collateral estoppel is
applied only where the interests of the litigating party are adequately represented
in the first proceeding. Thus, a nonparty to an earlier proceeding will be bound
by the result if that party controlled the earlier proceeding or if the party’s
interests were adequately represented in the original matter. A party is one who
was directly interested in the subject matter, and who had a right to defend in, or
control, the proceedings, and who had a right to appeal from the judgment.
[Internal citations omitted.]
Here, several governmental entities are named defendants, while in Knitter, the defendants were
all back lot owners. Although the two sets of defendants may take the same position in regards
to the instant issues, none of the governmental defendants in this case controlled the proceedings
in Knitter vis-à-vis those defendants, and we cannot say that the government’s interests were
adequately protected by the back lot owners in Knitter. Therefore, without substantial identity of
parties, plaintiff’s issues regarding Florida Avenue and the lakefront park are not barred by
collateral estoppel.3
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Knitter raised specific issues regarding the scope, i.e.,
permissible uses, of Florida Avenue and the lakefront park. But the court only issued a broad
order given certain persons “unfettered access” to the road end and lakefront park. The court did
not address the permissible uses of these areas in regards to boat mooring and recreational
activities. Also, the court did not delineate the riparian rights of the front lot owners, back lot
owners, and the public in relation to the Florida Avenue road end or the lakefront park. In the
order, the court gave no justification for its ruling and the record as presented to this Court leaves
us to speculate as to its reasoning. “Collateral estoppel applies only when the basis of the prior
judgment can be clearly, definitely, and unequivocally ascertained.” Ditmore, supra at 578.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in determining that the Knitter case barred
3
Because the governmental defendants in this case are not in privity with the defendants in
Knitter, we need not address whether privity exists between the other parties. However, we note
that plaintiff and individual defendants in this case are in privity with the plaintiffs and the
defendants, respectively, in the Knitter case.
-4-
plaintiff’s cause of action in this case and, consequently, erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition on this basis.
Reversed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
