PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT JAMES STEPHENS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241565
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-176314-FH
ROBERT JAMES STEPHENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3).1 He was sentenced to a prison term of two to fifteen years and appeals as of right.
We affirm.
I. Underlying Facts
Defendant’s conviction arises from allegations that, on the afternoon of November 2,
2000, he and his wife, codefendant Chanda Stephens,2 entered the complainant’s attached, open
garage in a Lake Orion Township subdivision and stole a leaf blower and grass trimmer to sell to
obtain money to purchase drugs. Chris Chlebek, the complainant’s neighbor, testified that he
observed a man and a woman quickly moving down the complainant’s driveway, carrying lawn
equipment. Chlebek indicated that the woman was moving faster than the man. According to
Chlebek, the man and woman threw the lawn equipment in the backseat of a white Pontiac and
sped away, with the woman driving. Chlebek followed them out of the subdivision, wrote down
the license plate number, and reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, Chlebek contacted
the complainant, who called 911.
Oakland County Sheriff’s Deputy David Fournier testified that the police ran the license
plate number for the white Pontiac, which was registered in codefendant Stephens name, and
made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the suspects at the listed address. In late
1
Defendant was originally charged with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2).
2
Codefendant Chanda Stephens was charged with first-degree home invasion, to which she
pleaded guilty. A videotape of her plea was played for defendant’s jury.
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November 2000, the police discovered that codefendant Stephens was in jail for another offense.
Deputy Fournier testified that, on December 4, 2000, he went to speak with codefendant
Stephens in jail, but she invoked her Miranda3 rights. On December 27, 2000, codefendant
Stephens requested to speak with the police about the Lake Orion incident. After waiving her
Miranda rights, codefendant Stephens gave an oral statement and a written statement, which
were admitted at defendant’s trial. According to her statements, she and defendant were addicted
to drugs and were riding around the area looking for something to sell to obtain money to
purchase drugs. When they noticed the complainant’s open garage, she parked in front, and
defendant went into the garage and gestured for her to come. She stated that she then went into
the garage and defendant handed her a leaf blower, and he then picked up a grass trimmer. She
stated that she came out of the garage first with defendant behind her, they put the items in the
trunk of their car, and she drove away.
Codefendant Stephens told the officer that defendant was also in the same jail. The
officer then spoke with defendant. According to the officer, defendant waived his Miranda
rights and gave a written statement, which was admitted at trial. In his statement, defendant
claimed that he and codefendant Stephens, who were both “sick from not doing heroin,” were
driving around looking for items to sell to purchase drugs. He stated that, when they saw the
complainant’s open garage, codefendant Stephens got out of the car, went into the garage, and
took a leaf blower and grass trimmer.
At trial, however, defendant denied that he was guilty of the charged offense. He
indicated that he had previously pleaded guilty to an unrelated charge of receiving or concealing
stolen property, but did not plead guilty in this case because he was innocent. Defendant
admitted that, on the day of the incident, he and codefendant Stephens, who were both addicted
to heroin, were driving around an affluent neighborhood looking for aluminum scrap. He
indicated that, when codefendant Stephens noticed the items in the open garage, she said that she
was sick and was going to steal something to sell to purchase drugs. Defendant testified that,
when he told codefendant Stephens that he was leaving, she took the car keys so he could not
leave. He also indicated that he could not run away because the strap on his prosthetic leg was
broken. Defendant claimed that codefendant Stephens then went into the garage, took the items,
and put them into the backseat of the car. Defendant denied ever getting out of the car.
During defendant’s testimony, the defense presented a letter, written by codefendant
Stephens, dated June 26, 2001, exonerating defendant from any wrongdoing, and indicating that
her previous statements were fallacious. Defendant denied threatening codefendant Stephens to
persuade her to write the exculpatory letter.
II. Admission of the Codefendant’s Statements Under MRE 804(b)(3)
Defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the hearsay
statements made by codefendant Stephens, wherein she implicated defendant, because they did
not constitute declarations against her penal interest and violated his constitutional right of
confrontation. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an
3
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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abuse of discretion. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 575; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). An
abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial
court acted, would conclude there was no justification or excuse for the ruling. People v Ullah,
216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). A decision on a close evidentiary question
ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 289; 531 NW2d
659 (1995). To the extent that this issue implicates the Confrontation Clause of the federal and
state constitutions,4 the constitutional issue is reviewed de novo. People v Beasley, 239 Mich
App 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000). Also, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact
regarding the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement for clear error. People v Barrera, 451 Mich
261, 268-269; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
“Hearsay is a ‘statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” MRE 801(c); People v
Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 159; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). Hearsay is not admissible as
substantive evidence unless an exception applies. MRE 802. MRE 804(b)(3) provides that when
a declarant is unavailable as defined in MRE 804(a),5 the declarant’s out-of-court statement
against interest may avoid the hearsay rule if certain thresholds are met:
Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered
to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Whether a statement is admissible under MRE 804(b)(3) depends on: “(1) whether the
declarant was unavailable, (2) whether the statement was against penal interest, (3) whether a
reasonable person in declarant’s position would have believed the statement to be true, and (4)
whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statement.”
Barrera, supra at 268; see also People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 715-716; 613 NW2d 370
(2000).
A declarant’s hearsay statement against penal interest that also implicates another person
may be admissible as substantive evidence against the other person (1) if the statement is
admissible as a matter of the law of evidence, MRE 804(b)(3), and, (2) its admission would not
violate the defendant’s right of confrontation. People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 162; 506 NW2d
505 (1993). The first inquiry focuses on the reliability of the hearsay statement and takes into
consideration its content and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. at 160161. With regard to the second inquiry, the statement must be examined to determine whether it
contains “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” considering the totality of the
4
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
5
Neither party challenges the trial court’s ruling that codefendant Stephens was unavailable
because she invoked the spousal privilege not to testify.
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circumstances to allow its admission as substantive evidence although the defendant is unable to
cross-examine the declarant. Schutte, supra at 717-718, quoting Poole, supra at 165. In this
regard, our Supreme Court has stated:
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a
statement: whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends,
colleagues, or confederates—that is, to someone whom the declarant would likely
speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and
without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a
finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes
the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3)
was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant
had a motive to lie or distort the truth.
Courts should also consider any other circumstance bearing on the
reliability of the statement at issue. While the foregoing factors are not exclusive,
and the presence or absence of a particular factor is not decisive, the totality of the
circumstances must indicate that the statement is sufficiently reliable to allow its
admission as substantive evidence although the defendant is unable to crossexamine the declarant. [Poole, supra at 165 (citation omitted).]
We agree with the trial court that the statements attributed to codefendant Stephens,
although hearsay, were admissible as statements against her penal interest under MRE 804(b)(3).
First, insofar that she implicated herself in the crime, the statements were clearly against her
penal interest. Also, a reasonable person in her position would not have made the incriminating
statements unless she believed they were true, especially considering her admission that both she
and defendant were equally culpable in the crime. Additionally, her statement that both she and
defendant went into the garage and stole the items comported with the report from the
eyewitness, who observed the two coming down the complainant’s driveway.
Furthermore, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, codefendant
Stephens’ statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted against defendant,
despite his inability to cross-examine her. Although codefendant Stephens made her statements
to police officers, they were voluntary, made without prompting, and made after she initiated
contact with the police to talk to them about the incident. Also, as the trial court noted, her
statements were given in a narrative form. And, contrary to what defendant argues, the
statements did not minimize her role in the crime or shift the blame solely onto defendant.
Additionally, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the statements were made to avenge
codefendant Stephens or to curry favor, that codefendant Stephens had a motive to lie or distort
the truth, or that she was suffering from drug withdrawal, as defendant claims. To hold that the
statements were not sufficiently trustworthy would require this Court to conclude that
codefendant Stephens was attempting to deceive the police, even though she implicated herself
in the crime, and there was no factual support for that conclusion.
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In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
codefendant Stephens’ statements were within the scope of MRE 804(b)(3), and contained
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” considering the totality of the circumstances to
allow their admission as substantive evidence against defendant without violating his right of
confrontation. See Poole, supra; Schutte, supra.6
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant alleges that he was denied a fair trial by numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews preserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct case by case, examining
the challenged remarks in context to determine whether the defendant received a fair and
impartial trial. Bahoda, supra at 266-267; People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325,
336; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). When a defendant fails to object to an alleged prosecutorial
impropriety, the issue is reviewed for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights, i.e,
affecting the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-753, 763-764;
597 NW2d 130 (1999); Schutte, supra at 720.
B. Improperly Calling Codefendant Stephens as a Witness
We reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he called
codefendant Stephens as a witness knowing that she would invoke her spousal privilege and
refuse to testify, thereby prejudicing defendant. Defendant correctly acknowledges that
Michigan courts have recognized that there is a “danger that an adverse inference may be drawn
from a claim of testimonial privilege” when an alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the
presence of the jury. See People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642, 645-646; 250 NW2d 492 (1977)
(citation omitted). Therefore, a lawyer may not knowingly call a witness knowing that she will
claim a valid privilege and refuse to testify. See id. at 645.
Here, defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s action below, and there is no
reasonable likelihood that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s alleged improper conduct. First
and foremost, the prosecutor did not call the witness in the presence of the jury. Rather, before
trial, the witness was questioned and given an opportunity to invoke her testimonial privilege
outside the presence of the jury. In fact, the jury selection process had not yet commenced.
Furthermore, contrary to what defendant argues, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by
seeking to admit codefendant Stephens’ out-of-court statements under MRE 804(b)(3). An
invocation of the spousal privilege serves only to prevent a spouse from testifying on the witness
stand; out-of-court statements, if otherwise allowable, are not excluded by the privilege. See
6
Although defendant argues that Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116; 119 S Ct 1887; 144 L Ed 2d 117
(1999), supports reversal, this Court has held that Poole, supra, remains binding precedent
because Lilly was a plurality opinion and a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that
the Confrontation Clause imposes a blanket ban on the use of accomplice statements. See
Beasley, supra at 558-559.
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People v Fisher, 442 Mich 560, 575; 503 NW2d 50 (1993). Accordingly, this claim does not
warrant reversal.
C. Voir Dire
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly “began to paint him as a
violent criminal like Jesse James” during voir dire. Contrary to what defendant argues, the
prosecutor’s remarks did not suggest that there was evidence known to the prosecutor that
defendant was a train or bank robber, or a violent criminal. Rather, viewing the prosecutor’s
remarks in context, they were focused on illustrating to the jury the concept of aiding and
abetting, which at least one juror did not understand. Furthermore, even if the example used by
the prosecutor did not exactly comport with the law, any error was not outcome determinative.
The court properly instructed the jury on the concept of aiding and abetting, instructed the jury to
follow the law as instructed by the court, advised the jury that the lawyers’ comments were not
evidence, and advised the jury that the case should be decided on the basis of the evidence,
which was sufficient to cure any perceived prejudice. People v Long, 246 Mich App 582; 588;
633 NW2d 843 (2001), citing Bahoda, supra at 281. Juries are presumed to follow their
instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Accordingly, this
claim does not warrant reversal.
D. Opening Statement
Defendant next claims that, during opening statement, the prosecutor inappropriately
“painted” him as a heroin addict, vouched for the credibility of the police, and limited the jury to
either acquitting him or finding him guilty of the primary offense, i.e., first-degree home
invasion. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s opening statement, and no clear or
obvious error is apparent. Carines, supra. First, we find no error in the comments relating to
defendant’s use of heroin, or the purchase of drugs as being the motive for the crime. Opening
statement is the appropriate time to state a fact that will be proven at trial, People v Johnson, 187
Mich App 621, 626; 468 NW2d 307 (1991), and these facts were presented by the prosecution
through the admission of codefendant Stephens’ statements. In those statements, codefendant
Stephens stated that she and defendant were heroin users, and committed the crime because they
needed money to buy more drugs. In addition, from the inception of trial, the defense
acknowledged that defendant was addicted to drugs at the time of the offense. Accordingly, this
claim is without merit.
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
police during opening statement. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness by
conveying that he has some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully, or express
his personal opinion about the defendant’s guilt. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 382; 624
NW2d 227 (2001). Although the challenged comments, viewed in isolation, may seem
problematic, otherwise objectionable comments do not require reversal if they are made in
response to defense arguments. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354
(1996). Here, during voir dire, defense counsel asked several questions regarding whether the
prospective jurors believed that police officers could lie, have their own agenda, or have personal
reasons to be untruthful. Viewed in context, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the
police officers’ credibility or limit the jury’s verdict, but rather permissibly advanced the
prosecution’s theory that the evidence would demonstrate that defendant committed the crime.
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Moreover, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the witnesses’
credibility, and that the lawyers’ comments were not evidence, which was sufficient to cure any
perceived prejudice. Long, supra. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant reversal.
E. Elicitation of Prejudicial Evidence
We also reject defendant’s claim that, during the prosecutor’s direct examination of a
police witness, he improperly elicited testimony that defendant was in jail on another offense at
the time of the officer’s initial contact with defendant. Because defendant did not object to this
comment below, we review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Carines, supra. At trial, part of the defense was that, after the date of the
offense in this case, defendant pleaded guilty to an unrelated offense because he had committed
that crime, but did not plead guilty to the subject crime because he was innocent. Given the
defense strategy, it is highly unlikely that the fact that defendant was jailed when the police were
investigating this case affected the outcome. Therefore, reversal is unwarranted on this basis.
F. Improper Inference that Defendant Prevented Codefendant Stephens from Testifying
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial when the prosecutor made
objections and comments suggesting that the defense “was doing something underhanded” to
prevent codefendant Stephens from testifying, even though she was unavailable because she had
invoked her spousal privilege. We disagree. We initially note that, through his partial and
selective recitation of the record, defendant has mischaracterized the proceedings. Contrary to
what defendant argues, we do not agree that the prosecutor’s comments require reversal for
several reasons. First, as noted by the trial court, defense counsel placed the matter of
codefendant Stephens’ absence and ultimate sentence before the jury, despite the trial court’s
pretrial ruling that no mention was to be made regarding the witness’ unavailability or her
ultimate sentence. Because defendant “opened the door” to this matter, he cannot now complain
of an error he precipitated. To hold otherwise would allow defendant to harbor error as an
appellate parachute. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Furthermore, given defense counsel’s actions, the prosecutor’s comments were not
intended to imply that the defense did something “underhanded” to prevent codefendant
Stephens from testifying, but were focused on refuting the defense’s potential insinuation that the
prosecution was thwarting the witness from testifying. Otherwise improper prosecutorial
remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised by defense counsel. Kennebrew,
supra. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the witness was “unavailable to testify
for reasons not attributable to either the prosecution or the defense,” that the lawyers’ comments
were not evidence, and that the jury should follow the law as instructed by the court. The court’s
instructions were sufficient to cure any perceived prejudice stemming from the prosecutor’s
alleged improper comments. Long, supra. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted on this basis.
G. Infringement of Defendant’s Right to Remain Silent
We reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor infringed on his constitutional right to
remain silent when he questioned defendant concerning his disclosure of a June 26, 2001,
exculpatory letter written by codefendant Stephens. We initially note that, despite defendant’s
posit of the issue, it does not concern his constitutional right to remain silent. In any event, we
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conclude that the prosecutor’s general questions regarding when the letter, which was admitted
during defendant’s direct examination, was received and disclosed, were not improper.
Although a prosecutor may not imply that a defendant must prove something or present a
reasonable explanation because such an argument tends to shift the burden of proof, see People v
Guenther, 188 Mich App 174, 180; 469 NW2d 59 (1991), he may question a witness on those
matters that were raised by the defense on direct examination. People v Jones, 73 Mich App
107, 110; 251 NW2d 264 (1976).
Furthermore, after the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to the question
regarding whether defendant directed defense counsel to disclose the exculpatory letter to the
police, defendant failed to request a curative instruction or otherwise request any other action by
the trial court. The prosecutor did not pursue this line of questioning any further or mention it
during closing argument. Finally, in its final jury instructions, the court instructed the jury that
defendant did not have to offer any evidence or prove his innocence, and that the prosecution
was required to prove the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, which were
sufficient to cure any possible prejudice. Long, supra. In sum, because defendant has failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s conduct, reversal is not warranted on this
basis. Carines, supra.
H. Denigration of Defendant
Defendant next argues that, during cross-examination, the prosecutor denigrated him by
ridiculing his socio-economic status and his intelligence level. We disagree. A prosecutor “must
refrain from denigrating a defendant with intemperate and prejudicial remarks.” Bahoda, supra
at 283. But, in this case, viewed in context, the record does not demonstrate that the prosecutor
engaged in inappropriate cross-examination. Rather, it appears that, in most instances, the
prosecutor was directing defendant to answer the questions. This conclusion is supported by the
record, which reveals numerous instances where defendant’s answers were either not responsive
or argumentative. A prosecutor is not required to make his points using the blandest possible
terms. See, generally, Schutte, supra at 722. We also note that, immediately before the
prosecutor asked defendant if he knew the meaning of “chivalry,” defendant had volunteered that
“[he] ain’t got that bright of an education.” In sum, under the circumstances, we find no
prosecutorial misconduct for which relief is warranted.
I. Rebuttal
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was improper.
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks below and, thus, we review this
unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor’s comments affected his substantial rights. The
prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in context, were focused on refuting defense counsel’s assertions
made during closing argument that codefendant Stephens was culpable and that the police took
advantage of her because of her “heroin withdrawal,” and defense counsel’s discussion of
defendant’s injuries and shortcomings.
As previously indicated, otherwise improper
prosecutorial remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised by defense counsel.
Kennebrew, supra. Further, although the prosecutor’s discussion regarding his and defense
counsel’s “bickering” may have been improper, the remark was fleeting, involved only a brief
portion of the argument, and was not so inflammatory that defendant was prejudiced. Finally,
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the trial court’s instructions that the lawyers’ comments are not evidence, that the case should be
decided on the basis of the evidence, and that the jury should follow the law as instructed by the
court, were sufficient to cure any perceived prejudice. Long, supra. In sum, this claim does not
warrant reversal. Carines, supra.
IV. Sentencing
Defendant’s final claim is that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
improperly scored offense variable (“OV”) 9 (number of victims),7 and improperly enhanced his
sentence on the basis of its determination that he was guilty of first-degree home invasion.
However, we note that defendant has fully served his minimum sentence and is no longer
incarcerated. According to the Michigan Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), he was
placed on parole on April 23, 2003. Because it is impossible for this Court to fashion a remedy
for the alleged sentencing errors, the issues are moot and we need not decide them. People v
Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 204; 526 NW2d 620 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
7
Because the offense of which defendant was convicted occurred after January 1, 1999, the
legislative sentencing guidelines apply to this case. MCL 769.34; People v Reynolds, 240 Mich
App 250, 253-254; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
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