PEOPLE OF MI V GARLAND DEON WELCH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241083
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 00-019291-FH
GARLAND DEON WELCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to deliver 225
to 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(2), possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, receiving and concealing a
stolen firearm, MCL 750.535b, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender to terms of twenty to thirty
years in prison on the cocaine conviction, twelve to eighteen months in prison on the marijuana
conviction, twenty-four to ninety months in prison on the felon in possession of a firearm
conviction, one to fifteen years in prison on the receiving and concealing conviction, and to the
mandatory two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction. The sentences on the marijuana,
felon in possession of a firearm and receiving and concealing convictions were concurrent to
each other, while the cocaine sentence is consecutive to the marijuana and felon in possession
sentences,1 and the felony-firearm sentence is consecutive to all of the other sentences.
Defendant now appeals, and we affirm his convictions but remand for modification of his
sentence.
Members of the BAYANET drug enforcement team executed a search warrant at
defendant’s house in Saginaw. The search yielded, among other things, cocaine, marijuana, and
firearms. The search warrant was issued upon information given to the police by a confidential
informant who stated that he had personally observed drugs in defendant’s house and witnessed
defendant selling marijuana to another individual.
1
The judgment of sentence is silent as to whether the cocaine sentence and the receiving and
concealing sentence are concurrent or consecutive to each other. We presume that they are to be
concurrent to each other.
-1-
Defendant first argues that there was legally insufficient evidence to convict him of
receiving and concealing a stolen firearm because there was no evidence to establish that
defendant knew that the firearm was stolen. We disagree. There is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Furthermore, a conviction may be
supported upon reasonable inferences from the evidence, including determinations whether the
defendant had the requisite knowledge required for guilt. Id. at 428-429.
In the case at bar, defendant’s estranged wife testified that a handgun seized from
defendant’s house during the execution of the search warrant belonged to her and that it had been
previously stolen. Moreover, she testified that she discovered it missing following a break-in at
her home, which occurred after she and defendant had separated. It is reasonable to infer from
this evidence that defendant knew that the weapon was stolen. First, it would be unbelievably
coincidental that defendant would have happened to have bought a gun that, unbeknownst to
him, had been stolen from his estranged wife. Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer that
either defendant himself stole the gun from his wife’s house, or that it was stolen by someone
working in concert with defendant. Second, even if we accept the idea that coincidentally
defendant did purchase a firearm that had been stolen from his wife, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that defendant knew that the weapon had been stolen from someone. Defendant, as a
convicted felon, would have had to have purchased the weapon illegally. Therefore, even if
defendant did not know from whom the gun had been stolen, it is reasonable to infer from the
illegal nature of such a transaction that defendant had to have known that it must have been
stolen in order for it to have entered the illegal weapons trade.
Next, defendant argues that his conviction for felony-firearm must be vacated because the
trial court did not instruct the jury on which predicate felony the felony-firearm charge must be
based. As defendant points out, the felony-firearm charge could have been based upon any of
three felony charges: the cocaine charge, the felon in possession charge, or the receiving and
concealing charge. The trial court’s instruction on the felony-firearm charge essentially told the
jury that defendant could be convicted if they found that he committed any of the charged
felonies. Defendant, however, not only failed to object to the instruction as given, but defense
counsel affirmatively stated his satisfaction with the instructions as given except for matters he
had previously placed on the record. Accordingly, defendant has waived any challenge to the
instruction. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
The other argument raised by defendant with respect to the felony-firearm charge is not
so easily resolved. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by making the sentence on the
felony-firearm charge consecutive to all the sentences on the other four convictions. Except with
respect to the marijuana and felon in possession convictions, we disagree. In People v Clark,
463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000), the Supreme Court observed a felony-firearm
sentence is consecutive only to the sentence for the predicate felony:
From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the
Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the
sentence for a specific underlying felony. Subsection 2 clearly states that the
felony-firearm sentence “shall be served consecutively with and preceding any
term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to
-2-
commit the felony.” It is evident that the emphasized language refers back to the
predicate offense discussed in subsection 1, i.e., the offense during which the
defendant possessed a firearm. No language in the statute permits consecutive
sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense.
In this instance, the jury found that the defendant possessed a firearm
while he possessed two bombs with unlawful intent. While it might appear
obvious that the defendant also possessed a firearm while committing the other
crimes of which he was convicted, neither a trial court nor an appellate court can
supply its own findings with regard to the factual elements that have not been
found by a jury. [Footnotes omitted.]
Thus, defendant argues, because there was only one felony-firearm conviction, which must be
linked to one predicate felony, it was improper to make the felony-firearm sentence consecutive
to all three of the felony convictions. An important distinction, however, between Clark and the
case at bar is that in Clark each of the two felony-firearm charges were specifically linked to a
particular predicate felony. In the case at bar, on the other hand, the single felony-firearm charge
was linked to two of the underlying felonies. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clark, supra at
464 n 11, specifically approves linking a single felony-firearm charge to multiple felonies:
At the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, the complaint and the
information could have listed additional crimes as underlying offenses in the
felony-firearm count, or the prosecutor could have filed more separate felonyfirearm counts.
We read that footnote as endorsing the practice of linking multiple predicate felonies to a single
felony-firearm charge, allowing the sentence on that single felony-firearm count to be
consecutive to all of the listed predicate felonies for that felony-firearm count. In the case at bar,
the cocaine and the receiving and concealing charges were linked as predicate felonies to the
felony-firearm count. Therefore, it was appropriate to make the felony-firearm sentence
consecutive to both of these sentences.2
But, as Clark observed, only felonies are predicate offenses to a charge of felony-firearm
and the felony-firearm sentence can only be consecutive to the sentence for a predicate felony.
Accordingly, the trial court did err in making the felony-firearm sentence consecutive to the
sentence for misdemeanor marijuana possession, as the prosecutor concedes. Therefore, we also
modify defendant’s sentence to make the felony-firearm sentence and the marijuana possession
sentence concurrent to each other.
2
For reasons not at all clear to us, the felon in possession charge was not listed in the
information as a predicate felony for the felony-firearm charge despite the fact that it was listed
as such in the complaint and the district court bound defendant over on the basis of all three
felonies as predicates for the felony-firearm charge. In any event, due to this oversight in the
drafting of the information, the felony-firearm sentence is modified to be concurrent to the felon
in possession sentence.
-3-
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to give him a hearing to
determine whether to determine whether the search warrant was procured through the use of
false statements. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of
the warrant. That motion was discussed at a hearing on a motion to adjourn the trial. At that
hearing, it was noted that the suppression motion had just been filed and that the prosecutor had
not had an opportunity to respond to the motion. Although it was agreed that the trial needed to
be adjourned to permit response to the motion, the prosecutor did not believe that an evidentiary
hearing on defendant’s motion was necessary, while defendant’s motion did request an
evidentiary hearing. The prosecutor was given two weeks to respond to the motion. The trial
court indicated that if, after the prosecution filed its response, defense counsel believed that an
evidentiary hearing was needed, counsel would contact the court and a hearing would be set.
Otherwise, the trial court would presumably rule based upon the briefs and the preliminary
examination transcript.
Approximately five months later, the trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
denied defendant’s motion in a written opinion dated October 12, 2001. There is no indication
from the lower court record that defendant ever renewed his request for an evidentiary hearing
on the motion. For that matter, another motion to adjourn was heard on October 16, 2001, for
the purpose of allowing defense counsel more time to review the trial court’s opinion on the
motion and adjust his trial preparation accordingly. At no time during that hearing did trial
counsel indicate any objection based upon the trial court having decided the motion without a
hearing despite the fact that defendant had renewed his request for a hearing. Accordingly,
defendant is incorrect in his assertion on appeal that the trial court denied his request for a
hearing on this issue. Rather, the trial court indicated it would schedule a hearing upon
defendant’s request after the prosecutor’s response to the motion was filed. There is no
indication that such a request was ever made; therefore, we can only conclude that defense
counsel determined, after receiving the prosecutor’s response, that the motion could, in fact, be
decided based upon the preliminary examination transcript and the parties’ written submissions
and that an evidentiary hearing was not, in fact, necessary.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request that the
court interview the confidential informant in chambers. We disagree. In denying defendant’s
request, the trial court relied on People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599; 282 NW2d 411 (1979).
In Poindexter, this Court concluded that a mere allegation that a confidential informant does not
exist is not sufficient to require the trial court to order the production of the informant for an in
camera interview. Rather, the “defendant’s attack must be more than conclusory” and “it is not
mandatory to produce the informant whenever a defendant makes a bald statement that no
informant exists.” Id. at 609-610. In the case at bar, defendant made no showing that there is a
basis for believing that no informant actually existed beyond defendant’s statement in his motion
that it is his belief that the prosecution would be unable to produce the “nonexistent confidential
informant” for cross-examination or for an in camera interview. Thus, the trial court correctly
concluded that defendant failed to establish a basis under Poindexter to require production of the
informant for an in camera interview.3
3
We also note that even if we were to accept as true defendant’s allegations that certain
(continued…)
-4-
Furthermore, the case relied upon by defendant, People v Underwood, 447 Mich 695; 526
NW2d 903 (1994), does not support defendant’s position. First, Underwood dealt with the
circumstances under which an informant’s identity must be disclosed to the defendant, not with
the production of an informant to determine if he actually exists. Second, if anything,
Underwood, supra at 706-707, underscores the principle that the defendant must first
demonstrate the need for the informant to be produced for an in camera interview before the
court will order such production.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the evidence where the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. Defendant,
however, presents no argument beyond the generic proposition that the illegally seized evidence
must be suppressed. Defendant not having established that the search was, in fact, illegal, there
is no basis for applying this principle.
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, but this matter is remanded to the trial court for
modification of defendant’s sentence to make the sentences on the marijuana and felon in
possession convictions concurrent with, rather than consecutive to, the felony-firearm sentence.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
(…continued)
statements in the affidavit in support of the search warrant were false, that does not establish the
nonexistence of the informant. At worst, if those statements are false, it merely indicates that the
police did not corroborate the informant or his information to the extent alleged. It does not
establish that the informant does not exist.
-5-
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