IN RE KISER/FIELDS/MARKS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MELISSA JO-ANN KISER,
LINDSEY NICOLE KISER, JEANA MARIE
FIELDS and TERRELL MWENDEL-EUGENE
MARK, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 245575
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-393368
VINCENT EUGENE MARK,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DONNA LEE KISER and ROBERT GLENN
KISER,
Respondents.
In the Matter of MELISSA JO-ANN KISER,
LINDSEY NICOLE KISER, JEANA MARIE
FIELDS and TERRELL MWENDEL-EUGENE
MARK, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 245692
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-393368
DONNA LEE KISER,
Respondent-Appellant,
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and
VINCENT EUGENE
GLENN KISER,
MARK
and
ROBERT
Respondents.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Vincent Eugene Mark and Donna Lee Kiser
appeal as of right from the trial court’s order terminating respondent Kiser’s parental rights to all
of the minor children, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and respondent Mark’s
parental rights to Jeana and Terrell, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
The court took jurisdiction over the three eldest minor children on the grounds of cruelty
by respondent Mark and failure of respondent Kiser to protect the children. The evidence clearly
supported the conclusion that respondent Kiser remained unable to protect the minor children
and that this condition would not be rectified in the reasonable future. Until the final day of trial,
respondent Kiser continued to live with respondent Mark even though she stated that he was
abusive to her. While there was some suggestion that respondent Kiser could parent the children
at some time in the future if she resolved her drug problem, there was unfortunately no evidence
to suggest that she was likely to do so in the reasonable future. Respondent continued to test
positive even while undergoing drug treatment and, only one week before trial, admitted she was
still using cocaine. There was ample basis in the record to conclude that respondent would not
be able to protect her children from abuse in the reasonable future. Therefore, the trial court did
not clearly err by terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In re Sours, 459
Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
The trial court also did not err by terminating the parental rights of both respondents on
the ground that the children would be harmed if returned to them. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). As
already noted, respondent Kiser continued to live with respondent Mark even though he was
abusive to her and the children. Her continuing use of cocaine would certainly compromise her
ability to separate from an abusive partner in order to protect her children, and her use of cocaine
while pregnant with Terrell further suggests a likelihood that drugs will take priority over the
children’s needs in the future as well. Respondent Kiser’s failure to complete the domestic
violence and anger management classes required by the parent-agency agreement supplies
further evidence that she is likely to fail to make appropriate judgments to protect the children
from physical abuse as she has done in the past.
The evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that Jeana and Terrell would likely
be harmed if returned to respondent Mark. We are disturbed, as the trial court was, by
respondent’s open display of the belt that he had used on the children on the wall even after
being asked to remove it. His statements in the Clinic for Child Study minimizing his actions
indicate little likelihood of a change in respondent Mark’s future conduct. The risk of harm to
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the children is only compounded by his drug use and by his lack of commitment to the children,
the latter shown by his infrequent and irregular visits. We find that the trial court did not clearly
err by terminating both respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Sours, supra.
With regard to respondent Kiser, we further conclude that the trial court did not err by
terminating her parental rights on the ground that she failed to provide proper care and custody
for the children and would be unable to do so in the reasonable future. Respondent failed to
provide proper care and custody for the three eldest children by failing to protect them from
physical abuse. She failed to provide proper care and custody for Terrell by ingesting cocaine
during her pregnancy. Respondent failed to carry out several important requirements of her
treatment plan, including remaining drug free and completing domestic violence and anger
management classes. A parent’s failure to carry out the parent-agency agreement is evidence of
the parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202,
214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Especially where respondent Kiser continued to use cocaine until
the time of trial, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by terminating her parental
rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Sours, supra.
With regard to respondent Mark, we conclude that the termination of his parental rights
to Terrell was not warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Because Terrell was placed in care
immediately after his birth and was never in the custody of respondent Mark, there is no
evidence that he failed to provide proper care or custody for him. However, reversal is not
warranted because another ground for termination was clearly established. Termination need be
based on only one statutory ground. In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 247; 599 NW2d 772 (1999).
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent Mark failed to provide proper care
and custody for Jeana and would remain unable to do so in the reasonable future. All of the
evidence already cited with respect to respondent Mark applies equally under statutory
subsection (g). Also extremely significant was respondent’s failure to visit the children
regularly. His infrequent and irregular visits indicate little commitment to the children, a factor
reflecting on respondent’s ability to provide proper care and custody for Jeana in the future.
We are unpersuaded by respondent Mark’s contention on appeal that termination of his
parental rights was premature because he had only seven months to complete the requirements of
his parent-agency agreement, from the time when termination of his parental rights was first
sought until the time of trial. We note that the establishment of jurisdiction over a child
empowers the court to make determinations against any adult. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185,
202; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). Indeed, the court may even terminate the parental rights of a person
with respect to whom adjudication was not concerned. Id. at 203.
In this case, while termination was not sought with respect to respondent Mark until
March 2002, he was provided with a parent-agency agreement well before that time, at least by
November 2001. Even before that point, respondent Mark was specifically directed by the court
to enroll in parenting classes and establish paternity of Jeana. Therefore, respondent’s
contention that he was not given adequate time to comply with the requirements of the treatment
plan is without merit.
Finally, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents’ parental rights was
clearly not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). Although respondent Kiser was well bonded with Melissa and Lindsey, it was clear that
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she had not resolved her drug problem, and there was no evidence that she had permanently
separated from respondent Mark, who was physically abusive to the three older children. Under
these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent
Kiser’s parental rights was not clearly contrary to the best interests of the children. With respect
to respondent Mark, there was no evidence to suggest that termination of his parental rights was
clearly contrary to the best interests of his children. Terrell had never lived with respondent and
Jeana was removed from his care at approximately one year of age. Furthermore, he visited his
two young children infrequently.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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