PEOPLE OF MI V JONAKI RAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241559
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 01-007058-FC
JONAKI RAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Jonaki Ray appeals as of right her jury trial conviction of voluntary
manslaughter, MCL 750.321. She was sentenced to five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the
manslaughter conviction, which was an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines.1 We
affirm defendant’s conviction, but remand for resentencing.
The instant conviction stems from the stabbing death of defendant’s husband, Dinesh
Balagangadbar, after they argued and fought at their DeWitt residence. It was the prosecution’s
theory that defendant intentionally stabbed her husband to death. The defense theory was that
defendant wanted only to stop the violence, not kill her husband, and acted in self-defense
because her husband was physically abusing her. Originally charged with open murder,
defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter following a three-day jury trial.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to articulate on the record
substantial and compelling reasons for its upward departure from the statutory sentencing
guidelines. We agree.
Defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range was scored at nineteen to thirty-eight
months for the voluntary manslaughter conviction.2 The trial court sentenced defendant to a
1
Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney Charles D. Sherman has chosen not filed an appellate
brief or otherwise defend the appeal. A letter advising Mr. Sherman that no brief has been filed
on behalf of the people was sent by the clerk of this Court on April 1, 2003.
2
Because the offense for which defendant was convicted occurred after January 1, 1999, the
legislative sentencing guidelines apply. MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250,
(continued…)
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minimum of five years in prison. The trial court’s sole comment in justifying this upward
departure was that “I am satisfied that the guidelines don’t adequately reflect the need to
properly punish the consequences of the offense or deter others.” The trial court also completed
a sentencing guidelines departure evaluation form, which stated: “The guidelines range did not
adequately reflect the nature and extent of the loss caused by the defendant’s criminal act and the
need to impose a sentence that would have the effect of deterring others from like conduct in
similar circumstances.”
Defendant now argues that she is entitled to resentencing because the court exceeded the
sentencing guidelines for reasons that were already taken into account in calculating the
guidelines and that were not substantial and compelling.
This Court reviews the sentencing court’s determination of the existence or nonexistence
of a particular factor for clear error. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264-265; 666 NW2d 231
(2003), quoting People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 75-76; 624 NW2d 479 (2000). We review
de novo the determination that a sentencing factor is objective and verifiable. Id. A trial court’s
determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in a particular case constitute
substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an
outcome falling outside the permissible principled range of outcomes.” Id. at 274.
In the recently issued Babcock decision, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of
departure from the statutory sentencing guidelines and set forth a trial court’s responsibilities in
this regard. The Court initially noted that “[f]ollowing the enactment of these guidelines, the
trial court is required to choose a sentence within the guidelines range, unless there is a
‘substantial and compelling’ reason for departing from this range.” Id. at 255-256. Substantial
and compelling reasons only exist in exceptional circumstances, and the reasons justifying
departure should keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention and be recognized as having
considerable worth in determining the length of a sentence. Id. at 257, 271. The Babcock Court
further explained:
The statutory sentencing guidelines, MCL 769.34(3), require the trial court
to “state[] on the record the reasons for departure.” Therefore, it is not enough
that there exists some potentially substantial and compelling reason to depart from
the guidelines range. Rather, this reason must be articulated by the trial court on
the record. Accordingly, on review of the trial court’s sentencing decision, the
Court of Appeals cannot affirm a sentence on the basis that, even though the trial
court did not articulate a substantial and compelling reason for departure, one
exists in the judgment of the panel on appeal. Instead, in such a situation, the
Court of Appeals must remand the case to the trial court for resentencing or
rearticulation. The obligation is on the trial court to articulate a substantial and
compelling reason for any departure. . . .
(…continued)
253; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
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Further, the trial court must go beyond articulating a substantial and
compelling reason for some departure. Rather, the trial court can depart from the
guidelines range only “if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for
that departure . . . .” MCL 769.34(3) (emphasis added). [Id. at 258-259.]
“The court may depart from the guidelines for nondiscriminatory reasons where there are
legitimate factors not considered by the guidelines or where factors considered by the guidelines
have been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.” People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App
423, 425; 636 NW2d 785 (2001), citing MCL 769.34(3)(a), (b). See also Babcock, supra at 272.
This Court must determine whether the trial court articulated a substantial and compelling reason
to justify its departure from the guidelines range. Id. at 261-262.
In the instant case, although the trial court found that the legislative guidelines were
accurately scored with regard to defendant, who had no prior record, the trial court nonetheless
found the recommended range of nineteen to thirty-eight months to be far too low under the
circumstances and sentenced defendant to five to fifteen years’ imprisonment, stating that “the
guidelines don’t adequately reflect the need to properly punish the consequences of the offense
or deter others.”
However, even assuming arguendo the accuracy of the trial court’s observations, we
agree with defendant that resentencing is required because the trial court failed to articulate such
substantial and compelling reasons for departure on the record, thereby failing to meet its
obligations under MCL 769.34(3). Babcock, supra at 258-259. Although the trial court
expressed the view, in the departure evaluation form, that the guidelines “did not adequately
reflect the nature and extent of the loss . . . and the need to impose a sentence that would have the
effect of deterring others,” the court failed to acknowledge that the offense variables already take
into account the loss of life in a homicide and the basic and primary sentencing function of
deterrence. See People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995); People v Coles, 417 Mich
523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983); People v Snow, 386 Mich 586; 194 NW2d 314 (1972). As
previously noted, the Legislature has clearly authorized sentencing judges to find that a reason
already accounted for in the guidelines has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight,
and therefore, is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the recommended guidelines
range. However, a court may do so only if it expressly finds that the characteristic has been
given inadequate or disproportionate weight. Babcock, supra at 267-268. Here, the sentencing
court, in its brief and generalized comment, did not articulate any specific offense characteristic
that was given inadequate weight by the guidelines. The trial court failed to adequately articulate
any reason for this particular, extensive departure. Id. at 258-259.
Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the recent Babcock decision and did not
comply with the procedures required by it, we remand for resentencing or rearticulation of a
substantial and compelling reason, based on objective and verifiable factors, to justify a
particular departure. MCL 769.34(11); Babcock, supra at 260-261.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in scoring ten points to OV 19. As
provided in MCL 777.49, OV 19 permits the scoring of ten points when “[t]he offender
otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice.” In the
instant case, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court agreed with the prosecution that the
variable was properly scored because of the different stories defendant told the officers and
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detectives, and because she did not tell the truth right away. The trial court opined that if a
person speaks to the police, “I think they have a duty to speak truthfully.”
After the sentencing occurred in this case, this Court for the first time directly addressed
the issue of scoring of OV 19 in People v Deline, 254 Mich App 595; 658 NW2d 164 (2002), lv
granted 468 Mich 942 (2003). In Deline, the trial court scored OV 19 at ten points because the
defendant attempted to evade OUIL charges by switching seats with the passenger of his vehicle
and refusing an immediate blood-alcohol content test. This Court set forth the following
definition and analysis of interference with justice:
“Interference with” justice is equivalent in meaning to “obstruction of”
justice. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed), p 611. Obstruction
of justice “is a broad phrase that captures every willful act of corruption,
intimidation, or force that tends somehow to impair the machinery of the civil or
criminal law.” Id. (emphasis added). Interference with the administration of
justice thus involves an effort to undermine or prohibit the judicial process by
which a civil claim or criminal charge is resolved. See, e.g., People v Coleman,
350 Mich 268; 86 NW2d 281 (1957) (affirming a conviction of obstruction of
justice involving witness tampering).
Defendant here did not engage in any conduct aimed at undermining the
judicial process by which the charges against him would be determined. Instead,
he tried to evade those charges altogether by switching seats with his passenger
and refusing an immediate blood-alcohol content test. If we were to conclude that
this evasive and noncooperative behavior justified the imposition of points under
OV 19, that variable would apply in almost every criminal case. Defendants
almost always seek to hide their criminal behavior and rarely step forward to offer
evidence proving their guilt.
Accordingly, the imposition of ten sentencing points against defendant
under OV 19 was error. [Id. at 597-598.]
In light of our determination that resentencing is already required because the trial court
imposed a sentence outside of the legislative guidelines range without stating on the record a
substantial and compelling reason for the departure, we conclude that on remand the court should
review again its scoring of the offense variables, taking into consideration the recently issued
Deline decision as it pertains to OV 19, in determining what sentence is appropriate in this case.
We affirm defendant’s conviction, but vacate her sentence and remand for resentencing.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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