IN RE YAGER ESTATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARK SOKOLOWSKI and LISA
SOKOLOWSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2003
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
CITY OF CHARLEVOIX, SECOND CHANCE,
INC., SECOND CHANCE BODY ARMOR,
RICHARD C. DAVIS, DENNIS HALVERSON,
WILLIAM CARVER, MICHAEL WIESNER,
JOANNE PATRICK, JAMES YOUNG,
CHARLEVOIX CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
JACQUELINE MERTA, VENETIAN FESTIVAL
COMMITTEE, JOHN TAYLOR, FIREWORKS
NORTH, INC., MICHAEL JAYE, CURTIS
CRAWFORD, LARRY GRISE, WOLVERINE
FIREWORKS DISPLAY, INC., LIDU
AMERICA, SUNNY INTERNATIONAL, and
PYRO SHOWS, INC.,
No. 241037
Charlevoix Circuit Court
LC No. 98-140018-NO
Defendants,
and
SECOND CHANCE BODY ARMOR, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
DEBORAH A. YAGER, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of MARK R.
YAGER, Deceased, and as Conservator of the
Estates of KATIE YAGER and EMILY YAGER,
Minors, MEAGAN YAGER, MARK A. YAGER,
and MARCELLA YAGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 241210
-1-
Charlevoix Circuit Court
LC No. 98-139218-NO
SECOND CHANCE BODY ARMOR, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, VENETIAN
FESTIVAL, FIREWORKS NORTH, INC.,
RICHARD C. DAVIS, MICHAEL JAYE, GLEN
CRAWFORD, LAWRENCE GRISE, DENNIS
HALVERSON, DOUG CARVER, MICHAEL
WIESNER,
WOLVERINE
FIREWORKS
DISPLAY, INC., OLD GLORY MARKETING,
INC., UNITED PYROTECHNICS, INC., HUNAN
PROVINCIAL
FIREWORKS
&
FIRECRACKERS
IMPORT/EXPORT
CORPORATION,
PRYO
SHOWS,
INC.,
DESIGN STAR SPECIALTY, TEMPLE OF
HEAVEN, LIDU AMERICA, and SUNNY
INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs1 appeal by leave granted from an order of the
trial court granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.
(Second Chance) under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
These matters arise from an accident that occurred during a fireworks display, presented
by Fireworks North, which injured several persons. Plaintiffs allege, in pertinent part, that
Second Chance is vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of workers in connection with the
design or construction of the “fireworks launching apparatus” or “trailer” from which the
fireworks were launched. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Second
Chance, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to vicarious
liability.
1
The reference to “plaintiffs” includes both the Sokolowski plaintiffs in Docket No. 241037 and
the Yager plaintiffs in Docket No. 241210.
-2-
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the allegedly negligent workers were
acting within the scope of their employment with Second Chance. We agree.2
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) de novo and consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). Summary disposition is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue with regard to any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alspaugh v Comm Law Enforcement Standards, 246
Mich App 547, 567; 634 NW2d 161 (2001).
Under the well-established doctrine of vicarious liability, also often referred to as
respondeat superior, an employer or “master” is responsible to third parties for wrongful acts
committed by an employee or “servant” while performing some duty within the scope of
employment. See, e.g., Rogers v J B Hunt Transport, Inc, 466 Mich 645, 650-651; 649 NW2d
23 (2002). It is possible for a person to be a servant of two masters simultaneously. Vargo v
Sauer, 457 Mich 49, 68-69; 576 NW2d 656 (1998). This is significant because, even if some or
all of the relevant employees here, Richard Davis, Curtis Glen Crawford, and Lawrence Grise,
could be considered servants of Fireworks North in connection with the design and construction
of the trailer at issue, this would not necessarily preclude a conclusion that they were also acting
as servants of Second Chance.
Second Chance essentially contends that the relevant employees were “loaned” to
Fireworks North with regard to the construction and design of the trailer. In considering the
“loaned servant” doctrine to determine if an employer is liable for the negligence of an
employee, we apply the “control test.” Hoffman v JDM Associates, 213 Mich App 466, 468; 540
NW2d 689 (1995). In Hoffman, this Court has set forth the control test as follows:
The test is whether in the particular service which he is engaged or
requested to perform he continues liable to the direction and control of his
original master or becomes subject to that of the person to whom he is lent or
hired, or who requests his services. It is not so much the actual exercise of control
which is regarded, as the right to exercise such control. To escape liability the
original master must resign full control of the servant for the time being, it not
being sufficient that the servant is partially under control of a third person.
Subject to these rules the original master is not liable for injuries resulting from
acts of the servant while under the control of a third person. [Id. at 468-469,
quoting Janik v Ford Motor Co, 180 Mich 557, 562; 147 NW 510 (1914).]
In Hoffman, this Court concluded that the defendant was not subject to vicarious liability for the
conduct of an employee where it did not “retain any day-to-day control or supervision of his
2
In the related, but not consolidated, case Dobrowolski v Second Chance Body Armor,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 3, 2003 (Docket No.
238007), another panel of this Court ruled similarly.
-3-
specific work activities” or have the right to control his “detailed activities.” Hoffman, supra at
473. Thus, we must inquire here whether there was evidence that the employees were under the
general control of Second Chance at the time of the relevant work on the trailer and whether any
work performed could be considered part of their job duties for Second Chance. Contrary to
what Second Chance argues, we need not further inquire into whether the work served the
business purposes of Second Chance.
Applying the control test to the present case, we conclude that plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the relevant
work was performed by employees acting within in the scope of their employment with Second
Chance. At his deposition, Grise testified with regard to work related to fireworks that they “had
to piece it in between times when we were working” on other work for Second Chance,
indicating that the work was performed during the course of his work for Second Chance at his
normal work location. Also, Crawford indicated in his deposition testimony that he obtained a
“HAZMAT license” primarily so he could haul fireworks and that he received a pay raise from
Second Chance for obtaining that license. Moreover, Crawford testified that, while he was
working on the trailer, he was working for Davis, who was the president of Second Chance.
From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Davis was acting in that
capacity in directing Grise and Crawford to perform work on the trailer within the course of their
employment with Second Chance. Thus, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, there was
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the relevant work was performed by
employees of Second Chance while acting within the scope of their employment, such that
Second Chance may be vicariously liable for any negligence in connection with that work.3
In arguing that authorization is unimportant to determining whether an employer is
vicariously liable, Second Chance discusses at some length our Supreme Court’s decision in
Barnes v Mitchell, 341 Mich 7; 67 NW2d 208 (1954). But the import of that decision was that
an employer may be liable for conduct within the apparent authority of an employee, although
the employee was not actually authorized to engage in the conduct. Id. at 13-14 (noting that “it
is neither reasonable nor just that the liability should depend upon any question of the exact
limits of the servant’s authority” and that an injured party cannot “always be expected to know or
be able to discover whether [the servant’s conduct] was or was not without express sanction”).
This is simply inapposite to the present issue in which there is evidence that Second Chance
authorized, and indeed directed, relevant work by its employees on the trailer. It does not
reasonably follow from the conclusion in Barnes that apparent authority may provide a basis for
imposing vicarious liability that actual authorization is not also a factor in support of finding
vicarious liability.
Second Chance also relies on the following language from Barnes:
3
While the parties attach significance to whether there was evidence of either Fireworks North
or Davis reimbursing Second Chance for the relevant work, we do not because the question of
payment is not significant to the control test. See May v Harper Hosp, 185 Mich App 548, 555;
462 NW2d 754 (1990) (indicating that “who pays the employee” is significant for workers’
compensation purposes, but not for the control test for vicarious liability in a tort suit).
-4-
The phrase “in the course or scope of his employment or authority,” when
used relative to the acts of a servant, means while engaged in the service of his
master, or while about his master’s business. [Id. at 13, quoting Riley v Roach,
168 Mich 294, 307; 134 NW 14 (1912).]
This language actually undermines Second Chance’s basic position that an act must further the
narrowly understood business interests of the employer in order to be considered within the
scope of employment. Rather, this language reflects that it is enough if the servant is “engaged
in the service of his master.” In this case, there was evidence that could reasonably support a
conclusion that the relevant employees were engaged in the service of Second Chance with
regard to the work on the trailer, regardless whether this furthered the company’s business
interests.
Second Chance also cites language in Anderson v Schust Co, 262 Mich 236; 247 NW 167
(1933), related to vicarious liability in the employment context. However, in Kiefer v Gosso,
353 Mich 19, 29; 90 NW2d 844 (1958), our Supreme Court referred to Anderson as “one of a
long list of cases wherein this Court modified the owner liability statutory test . . . by the
additional test, in employee driver situations, of scope of employment.” The Court in Kiefer also
referred to the justices who joined the earlier plurality opinion in Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich
363; 86 NW2d 585 (1957), as having “voted to overrule this judicial modification of the owner
liability statute” and then proceeded to apply the reasoning of the Moore plurality decision to
resolve the matter in Kiefer. We interpret this as a complete overruling of Anderson, depriving it
of any precedential value, inasmuch as that case involved only one basic issue concerning
liability for use of a car, and the commentary in Anderson, regarding a master’s liability for a
servant’s conduct, was directed to that issue. Accordingly, Second Chance’s reliance on
Anderson is not warranted.
Second Chance also invokes Martin v Jones, 302 Mich 355; 4 NW2d 686 (1942), a case
in which the operator of a Standard Oil service station shot a customer following an argument.
In holding that Standard Oil was not vicariously liable, our Supreme Court emphasized both that
the shooting was not done to further the company’s business and that being armed was not one of
the operator’s duties. Id. at 357-358. The holding in Martin is inapposite because there is
evidence here that the relevant employees performed the work on the trailer as part of job duties
assigned to them within their employment with Second Chance.
Finally, we note that, contrary to what Second Chance suggests, our holding does not
equate with a conclusion that an employer will always be vicariously liable for sponsoring
charitable activity or allowing its employees to work on charitable projects while being paid by
the company. In a circumstance in which an employer clearly relinquishes control of an
employee’s activities to a charity, there would be no basis for imposing liability on the employer
under the control test. In the present case, a genuine issue of material fact exists and therefore
summary disposition is inappropriate.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-5-
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