PEOPLE OF MI V NORMAN MOHEAD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243640
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 01-004686
NORMAN MOHEAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for resisting and obstructing
a police officer, MCL 750.479(b), and assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82.
Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of
sixteen months to two years’ imprisonment for the resisting and obstructing a police officer
conviction and forty months to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction.
We affirm.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that his convictions must be reversed and dismissed
because he was denied his state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial when he was not
brought to trial until nearly fourteen months after his arrest. We disagree.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the federal and
Michigan constitutions, as well as by statute. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, sec 20; MCL
768.1; People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). To preserve a speedy trial
issue for appeal, a defendant must make a formal demand for a speedy trial on the record. Cain,
supra at 111. Defendant did not make a formal demand for a speedy trial on the record and,
thus, the issue is not preserved for appeal. A criminal defendant may obtain relief based upon an
unpreserved error if the error is plain and affected substantial rights in that it affected the
outcome of the proceedings, and it either resulted in the conviction of an innocent person or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings. People v Jones,
468 Mich 345, 355-356; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
In determining whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, four factors must be
balanced: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Barker v
Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182, 2192; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Hill, 402 Mich
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272, 283; 262 NW2d 641 (1978); People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 602; 617 NW2d 339
(2000). A delay of six months is necessary to trigger an investigation into a claim that a
defendant has been denied a speedy trial. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 51; 523 NW2d
830 (1994). The defendant must prove prejudice when the delay is less than eighteen months.
People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 695; 202 NW2d 769 (1972); Cain, supra at 112. A delay of
more than eighteen months is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant, and shifts the burden of
proving lack of prejudice to the prosecutor. Id.
In assessing the reasons for the delays, each period of delay is examined and attributed to
the prosecutor or the defendant. People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 491; 378 NW2d 517 (1985).
Unexplained delays are attributed to the prosecutor. Id. Scheduling delays and delays caused by
the court system are also attributed to the prosecutor, but should be given a neutral tint and only
minimal weight. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 460; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). Delays
caused by the adjudication of defense motions are attributable to the defendant. Id. at 461. The
time between dismissal and reinstatement of a charge is not counted against either party. People
v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 111; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). The defendant’s failure to
promptly assert his right to a speedy trial weighs against his subsequent claim that he was denied
the right. People v Rosengren, 159 Mich App 492, 508; 407 NW2d 391 (1987).
Defendant was arrested on May 10, 2001, and his trial did not begin until July 9, 2002.
In the present case, there was a delay of more than six months but less than eighteen months,
and, as such, further investigation of the speedy trial issue has been triggered. See Cain, supra at
112. Because the delay is less than eighteen months, defendant must prove prejudice. See
Collins, supra at 695; Cain, supra at 112. Defendant has not met his burden.
A defendant can experience two types of prejudice while awaiting trial. Gilmore, supra
at 461-462. Prejudice to the person results when pretrial incarceration deprives an accused of
many civil liberties, and prejudice to the defense occurs when the defense might be prejudiced by
the delay. Id.; People v Ovegian, 106 Mich App 279, 285; 307 NW2d 472 (1981). The latter
prejudice is the more crucial in assessing a speedy trial claim. Id. A general allegation of
prejudice caused by delay, such as the unspecified loss of evidence or memory, or financial
burden, is insufficient to establish that a defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial.
Gilmore, supra at 462; People v Cooper, 166 Mich App 638, 655; 421 NW2d 177 (1987);
People v Wyngaard, 151 Mich App 107, 111-112; 390 NW2d 694 (1986). Anxiety alone is
insufficient to establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Gilmore, supra.
The only prejudice defendant alleges is that he suffered general oppressive pretrial
incarceration and that there was a problem with anxiety and concern. Defendant concedes that,
factually, there is no showing that the defense was impaired by the delay in this case. There is
no evidence suggesting that the defense was actually prejudiced by the delay. In addition, there
is no indication or allegation that a potential witness favorable to defendant, or other exculpatory
evidence, was lost due to the delay in bringing defendant to trial. See Gilmore, supra at 461462. Further, defendant was not prejudiced by his continued incarceration awaiting trial because
the record reflects that his pre-trial incarceration was less than eighteen months and that he was
released a few months prior to his trial. And, there is no showing on the record that defendant’s
pre-trial incarceration was excessively oppressive. See Ovegian, supra at 285. General
allegations of prejudice are insufficient to establish that a defendant was denied the right to a
speedy trial. Gilmore, supra at 462. Moreover, defendant's general allegations of increased
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anxiety and mental anguish while awaiting trial are also insufficient to show prejudice to his
person. Id.
Presumably, some time prior to August 24, 2001, defense counsel filed a motion to
withdraw as an order was entered on this day denying the motion to withdraw. On November 6,
2001, defendant filed a motion for an independent psychiatric examination. It appears that trial
was set for November 20, 2001. Apparently, the prosecution was unable to proceed because
material evidence was not available, but planned to reissue and, the trial court, upon a motion
from the prosecution, issued an order of nolle prosequi on November 19, 2001.1 On February
11, 2002, defense counsel filed a motion for a criminal responsibility and competency
examination, and a notice of the defense of insanity/diminished capacity document. On March 7,
2002, the trial court denied the motion for criminal responsibility and competency examination.
The lower court record reveals that a jury trial was originally scheduled for May 14, 2002, but
that instead bond hearings were held on May 14, 2002 and May 16, 2002. On May 16, 2002, the
trial court lowered bond to $15,000 personal recognizance. Around this time, defendant was
released with certain conditions. On May 31, 2002, defendant filed a motion for initial review
and consultation regarding DNA evidence and a DNA discovery demand. On June 13, 2002, the
trial court granted defendant $1,500 for a DNA expert to review and consult with counsel
regarding the prosecution’s DNA evidence. On July 5, 2002, defendant filed a motion to
suppress DNA evidence. On July 9, 2002, the trial began, defendant was found guilty on July
12, 2002, and was sentenced on August 12, 2002.
The most significant delay by the prosecution was causing the dismissal when material
evidence was not available at the time of the original trial date. But, typically, these types of
delays are not counted against either party. See Wickham, supra at 111. At the very least, one
month of the delay can be attributed to defendant. Although some of the delay may, clearly, be
attributed to the prosecution, other delays are attributed to defendant, and the period of delay was
not so substantial or out of the ordinary to show prejudice to defendant. Cain, supra at 112-113.
The fact that the delay was just over a year and partly attributable to defendant, together
with defendant's inability to prove prejudice and the fact that defendant did not assert the right to
a speedy trial below, all weigh in favor of the prosecution. The reasons for the delay, not
attributable to defendant or the prosecution, are not clear on the record before this Court. It is
clear that defendant was filing motions and preparing for trial shortly before the trial began.
Even assuming that the reason for the delay would favor defendant, the fact that the other three
factors weigh heavily against him dictate that the balancing of all the factors results in a finding
against defendant, i.e., that his right to a speedy trial was not violated. Therefore, balancing the
1
We note that part of this procedural history was taken from the prosecution’s brief on appeal as
this Court was not provided the records from this case prior to when it was reissued by the
prosecution. The procedural history is supported by documents attached to the prosecution’s
brief on appeal. We note that it is impermissible to expand the record on appeal. See People v
Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 561 n 4; 599 NW2d 499 (1999). However, the information used
from the prosecution’s brief was supported by appendices which were court documents from the
case prior to reissue and, thus, the prosecution was not expanding the record on appeal as this
information was also before the trial court.
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four applicable factors and based on the record available, we cannot conclude that defendant was
deprived of his right to a speedy trial. See Barker, supra at 530; Hill, supra at 283; Mackle,
supra at 602. Consequently, there was no violation of defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial.2
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that his convictions must be reversed and dismissed
where the district court judge relied on testimony contained in a prior preliminary examination
transcript as the basis for his decision to bind over where the prosecution made no showing that
witnesses were unavailable. We disagree.
A magistrate’s ruling that alleged conduct falls within the scope of a criminal law is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo for error, but a decision to bind over a defendant based
on the factual sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 452; 662 NW2d 727 (2003); People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659
NW2d 604 (2003); People v Hotrum, 244 Mich App 189, 191; 624 NW2d 469 (2000). To
warrant reversal, an error in a preliminary examination procedure must have affected the
bindover and must have adversely affected the fairness or reliability of the trial. People v
McGee, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 241147, issued 10/2/03) slip op p 8. A
magistrate’s erroneous conclusion that sufficient evidence was presented at the preliminary
examination is rendered harmless by the presentation at trial of sufficient evidence to convict.
People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 357; 650 NW2d 407 (2002). Further, error due to
improperly admitted evidence at a preliminary examination will not require that a later verdict be
set aside unless, on the whole record, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. People v
Hall, 435 Mich 599, 603-604, 613; 460 NW2d 520 (1990); McGee, supra at slip op pp 7-8.
To preserve for appeal a claim of errors or irregularities relating to the preliminary
examination, a defendant must raise the issue before or during trial. People v Missouri, 100
Mich App 310, 347-348; 299 NW2d 346 (1980). Defendant never objected to the court’s second
preliminary examination based on the use of the testimony from the prior proceeding, but, rather,
only objected based on his argument that res judicata should apply. Id. "An objection based on
one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a different ground."
People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478 (1996).
In Michigan, the right to a preliminary examination is solely a creation of the Legislature3
and is not a procedure that is based on the constitution. Hall, supra at 603; People v Jones, 195
2
We note that the prosecution’s brief on appeal attempts to characterize the issue as a 180-day
rule issue. Although it does not appear that defendant has referenced the 180-day rule, MCL
780.131, this rule is inapplicable to the instant case because MCL 780.131 imposes the 180-day
rule only when the defendant is sentenced to a state prison, the rule does not affect charges
against inmates incarcerated in county jail while awaiting trial, People v McLaughlin, ___ Mich
App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 234433, issued 9/25/03) slip op p 3, and there is no
indication that defendant was so affected. See, generally, People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274,
280; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). Furthermore, defendant has framed his issue and analysis in terms
of a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
3
The right to a preliminary examination derives from MCL 767.42(1), which states in part:
(continued…)
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Mich App 65, 66-67; 489 NW2d 106 (1992). This Court in McGee, supra at slip op 6-7, recently
provided the following with regard to preliminary examination and its purpose:
An accused does not have a constitutional right to a preliminary
examination, a procedure established by Legislature, MCL 766.1 et seq., and
recognized by court rule, MCR 6.110(A).4 Hall, supra at 603; People v Johnson,
427 Mich 98, 103-104; 398 NW2d 219 (1986). Where a criminal prosecution is
initiated by the filing of an information rather than by indictment, the accused has
a statutory right to a preliminary examination. MCL 766.1; [People v Glass
(After Remand), 464 Mich 266, 277; 627 NW2d 261 (2001)]. The right to a
preliminary examination is more than a matter of procedure. Id. at 282. The
magistrate's bindover to circuit court after examination or defendant's waiver of
examination, authorizes the prosecutor to file an information. MCL 767.42(1);
Hunt, supra at 362. . . .
Although the preliminary examination may assist in fulfilling the
constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature of the
charge, Johnson, supra at 104, the primary function of the preliminary
examination "is to determine if a crime has been committed and, if so, if there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it." Glass, supra at 277.
Thus, a preliminary examination "primarily serves the public policy of ceasing
judicial proceedings where there is a lack of evidence that a crime was committed
or that the defendant committed it." Johnson, supra at 104-105.
The original case against defendant was dismissed and the prosecution elected to reissue.5
The following occurred at the second preliminary examination held on December 3, 2001:
(…continued)
An information shall not be filed against any person for a felony until such person
has had a preliminary examination therefore, as provided by law, before an
examining magistrate, unless that person waives his statutory right to an
examination.
4
MCR 6.110(A) provides the following, in part, with regard to a preliminary examination:
The people and the defendant are entitled to a prompt preliminary examination. If
the court permits the defendant to waive the preliminary examination, it must bind
the defendant over for trial on the charge set forth in the complaint or indictment.
5
Apparently, as stated in defendant’s brief on appeal and not disputed by the prosecution, a
preliminary examination was held on May 22, 2001, and defendant was bound over on charges
of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(f), and resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL
750.479. The charges were dismissed in November 2001 without prejudice as the trial court
granted the prosecution’s motion for nolle prosequi. Then, the prosecution elected to reissue
(continued…)
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MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, because this is a reissued matter and there was an
exam conducted the first time, the People do not intend on calling any
witnesses and would move the Court to bind over on the charges listed based
on the transcript from the previous examination.
THE COURT: Mr. Downing?
MR. DOWNING: Object to the proceedings, your Honor. This matter has been
dismissed. We hold res judicata would apply. Ask that the matter be
dismissed again.
THE COURT: Well, there is a case on the situation that covers this. The state has
the right to move based upon the prior testimony unless there is a distinct
showing on the record that there would be new and different testimony
produced by defendant if there was a preliminary examination. I find that’s
not the case on this record. So I’ll grant the motion.
Probable cause that the defendant has committed the crime is established by evidence
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt. Yost, supra at 126. To establish that a crime has been
committed, a prosecutor need not prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, but he must
present some evidence of each element. Yost, supra; People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 37; 566
NW2d 21 (1997). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence can be
sufficient. People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 444; 661 NW2d 616 (2003).
In the present case, no transcript was provided from the initial preliminary examination.
The appellant must provide this Court with the lower court record. People v Elston, 462 Mich
751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). This Court will refuse to consider issues for which the
appellant failed to produce the transcript. People v Coons, 158 Mich App 735, 740; 405 NW2d
153 (1987). As such, we refuse to consider any issue that relates to what evidence was produced
at the initial preliminary hearing, and whether the evidence presented at the initial preliminary
examination was sufficient to bindover to circuit court. Additionally, defendant does not even
appear to argue that sufficient evidence was not produced at the initial preliminary hearing, but,
rather, appears to only argue a procedural error exists.
In Jones, supra, the defendant moved to quash the information at a second preliminary
examination unless the prosecution could produce new evidence showing probable cause to bind
him over. Id. at 67. The district court decided that there was no reason to hold another
preliminary examination because it was undisputed that the evidence to be offered was the same.
Id. This Court determined that the defendant waived his right to a preliminary examination by
his failure to dispute the fact that the evidence presented at the first preliminary examination was
sufficient to determine probable cause to bind him over. Id. at 67-68.
(…continued)
charging defendant with two counts of first-degree CSC, MCL 750.520b(1)(f), resisting and
obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479, and assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82.
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Defendant did not, and does not on appeal, dispute that the evidence presented at the
initial preliminary hearing was not sufficient to determine probable cause or bind him over; nor
did defendant present the transcript of the original preliminary examination to this Court. See
Jones, supra at 68; Coons, supra at 740. Moreover, as noted, defendant never objected to the
second preliminary examination based on the use of the testimony from the prior preliminary
examination. Id.; Asevedo, supra at 398. Defendant, similar to the defendant in Jones, supra,
did not dispute whether the evidence from the prior hearing was sufficient to bind him over to
circuit court. See Jones, supra at 68. Consequently, we find that defendant waived his right to a
preliminary examination under MCL 767.42(1). See id.6
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
6
Even if there was error, a magistrate’s erroneous conclusion that sufficient evidence was
presented at the preliminary examination is rendered harmless by the presentation at trial of
sufficient evidence to convict. Libbett, supra at 357. Further, error due to improperly admitted
evidence at a preliminary examination will not require that a later verdict be set aside unless, on
the whole record, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Hall, supra at 603-604; McGee,
supra at slip op pp 7-8. In addition, "[n]o judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a
new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal case . . . for error as to any matter
of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire
cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice." MCL 769.26. Because defendant’s conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt we can surmise that had a typical preliminary examination been conducted defendant
would have been bound over to circuit court for trial because the examination utilizes the lesser
standard of probable cause. See McGee, supra. No error exists with regard to defendant’s
preliminary examination that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
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