ALAN L SNOOK V CHRISTINE T SNOOK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALAN L. SNOOK,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 242193
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 99-029958-DM
CHRISTINE T. SNOOK,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s property and alimony award in the parties’
judgment of divorce. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
Plaintiff first argues that the court erred by not considering the tax consequences that he
will face when he sells some of his stock. We disagree. In reviewing a trial court’s property
distribution, we first determine whether the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.
Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). “If the findings of fact are upheld,
[we] must next decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those
facts.” Id. at 151-152. However, a dispositional ruling also requires a measure of discretion, so
we affirm it unless we have the firm conviction that the property division was inequitable. Id. at
152.
Plaintiff’s expert witness testified that when plaintiff’s personal stock savings plan
(PSSP) is withdrawn and the value realized, the asset will “lose anywhere from 15 to possibly 36
percent because it would be taxed at a capital gains rate.” Plaintiff offered no evidence that he
had a need or interest in withdrawing from his PSSP. Because plaintiff offers no evidence that a
sale or other taxable event was planned or contemplated, the trial court did not err by failing to
consider tax consequences in its division of the property. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App
278, 300-301; 527 NW2d 792 (1995).
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court failed to credit plaintiff’s distributional amount by
premarital contributions to his PSSP’s predecessor stock plan. We disagree. Plaintiff himself
offered conflicting evidence of whether he liquidated the predecessor plan’s stock or rolled all or
some portion of it into the current PSSP. “This Court gives special deference to the trial court’s
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findings when they are based on the credibility of witnesses.” Stanton v Dachille, 186 Mich App
247, 255; 463 NW2d 479 (1990). So the trial court did not clearly err in failing to credit plaintiff
with the value of premarital stock that may no longer exist.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to account for alimony and payments
plaintiff made to preserve marital assets during the pendency of the proceedings. Although the
trial court did not conduct an accounting to ascertain the specific amount defendant spent during
the pendency of the divorce, the court stated that it considered the amount plaintiff paid and
credited his award accordingly. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate clear error in the amount of the
credit, so we affirm it.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court failed to further reduce defendant’s property
award based on defendant’s respective fault for the relationship’s dissolution. Fault remains a
factor in the determination of a property settlement in Michigan, but “none of [our] cases has
held that it is the only factor.” Sparks, supra at 158. “Marital misconduct is only one factor
among many and should not be dispositive.” Id. at 163. The court awarded plaintiff fifty-four
percent of the marital assets, and plaintiff points to no evidence to persuade us that defendant’s
infidelity entitled plaintiff to an even greater share of those assets. Therefore, the trial court did
not err by failing to further reduce defendant’s portion of the property based on fault.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it awarded defendant alimony without
first making specific factual findings concerning her actual needs or the effect of the payments
on his standard of living. We agree. Conspicuously absent from the trial court’s reasoning are
the factual underpinnings for its finding that the property settlement itself is “insufficient for the
suitable support and maintenance of” defendant, and that the alimony is “just and reasonable
under the circumstances.” MCL 552.23. We vacate the award of alimony and remand this issue
to the trial court. On remand, the trial court must make specific factual findings regarding the
actual needs of defendant and the award’s affect on plaintiff. We affirm the trial court’s order in
all other respects. In the trial court’s discretion, it may conduct additional hearings on the issue
of alimony.
Plaintiff finally argues that the trial court erred when it granted non-modifiable alimony
for seven years without explaining why it precluded modification. In light of our disposition of
this case, we do not reach this issue.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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