PEOPLE OF MI V MARCUS GENE LEWIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241087
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008092-FH
MARCUS GENE LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of malicious destruction of police
property, MCL 750.377b. We affirm.
During the execution of three outstanding bench warrants, defendant resisted arrest which
resulted in damage to the police vehicle when defendant, who was seated in the back seat, kicked
the front passenger seat causing damage to its frame and track, requiring repair. A jury trial on
two counts of resisting an officer serving process, MCL 750.479, and one count of malicious
destruction of police property, MCL 750.377b, resulted in defendant being found guilty of all
three counts.
Thereafter, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the
officers who executed the bench warrants, Michigan State Police Troopers, did not have the legal
authority under MCL 28.6 to execute civil process and, since the bench warrants at issue were
civil process arising from civil contempt proceedings, defendant had the right to resist arrest and
make every attempt to escape. The trial court agreed and granted defendant’s motion with regard
to the resisting charges, holding that the State Troopers “had no authority to arrest this defendant
on civil process.” However, the trial court denied the motion with regard to the malicious
destruction charge holding that, although defendant might have had the right to resist and escape
arrest, he did not have the right to willfully destroy police property. The only issue on appeal is
whether the trial court should have granted the motion with regard to the malicious destruction
charge.
Defendant argues that he was denied due process with regard to the malicious destruction
of police property charge because the jury was not instructed that defendant had the right to resist
arrest. We disagree. Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. People v Hubbard
(After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). In reviewing claims of error in
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jury instructions, we examine the instructions in their entirety. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). “Jury instructions must include all the elements of the charged
offense and must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence supports
them.” People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Even if the
instructions are imperfect, there is no error if they fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected the defendant's rights. Aldrich, supra.
To establish the malicious destruction of police property charge, the prosecutor was
required to prove that defendant (1) willfully and maliciously destroyed or injured, (2) personal
property belonging to the police department. People v Richardson, 118 Mich App 492, 494; 325
NW2d 419 (1982). The jury was instructed, pursuant to CJI2d 32.2, that the prosecutor must
prove that (1) the property belonged to the police, (2) defendant destroyed or damaged that
property, and (3) that defendant “did this knowing that it was wrong, without just cause or
excuse, and with the intent to damage or destroy the property.” Here, defendant claims that “the
jury needed to know that [defendant’s] resistance was justified to decide accurately whether his
actions were malicious.” But, defendant did not kick the seat in an effort to resist arrest, he
kicked it to express his anger after he was placed in the back seat of the police vehicle, in
handcuffs, and sprayed in the face with pepper spray. Therefore, defendant’s argument is
without merit. Viewed as a whole, the court’s instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried
and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. See People v Gaydosh, 203 Mich App 235, 237;
512 NW2d 65 (1994).
Defendant also argues that irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was improperly admitted.
We disagree. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Smith, 456
Mich 543, 549-550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). During the prosecution’s direct examination of one
of the arresting State Police Troopers, James Horn, the prosecutor asked Horn if defendant had
been advised as to why they were at his house. Horn replied that they had advised defendant that
the reason they were at his house was because of a complaint they received that he had
threatened his landlady’s son and defendant’s response was that “he was going to kill that son of
bitch.” Defense counsel did not object to this answer, therefore, our review is for plain error that
affected the outcome of the trial. See MRE 103(a)(1); People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has
any tendency to make the existence of a fact which is of consequence to the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401; People v Crawford,
458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Here, defendant was being tried on two counts of
resisting arrest, the elements of which are that (1) the defendant resisted arrest, (2) the arrest was
lawful, (3) the person arresting the defendant was an officer of the law at the time, (4) the
defendant knew the person was an officer, (5) the defendant knew the person was making an
arrest, and (6) the defendant intended to resist arrest. People v MacLeod, 254 Mich App 222,
226; 656 NW2d 844 (2002). Consequently, it was relevant and necessary for the prosecution to
establish that defendant knew that the Troopers were officers of the law and that defendant knew
why the officers were present. Although Horn responded to the question with more information
than had been requested, defendant failed to object, failed to request that the answer be stricken
from the record, and failed to request a curative instruction. See People v Burch, 170 Mich App
772, 776; 428 NW2d 772 (1988). In any event, we cannot conclude that this unresponsive and
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brief remark deprived defendant of a fair trial; therefore, plain error has not been shown. See
People v Measles, 59 Mich App 641, 643; 230 NW2d 10 (1975)
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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