PEOPLE OF MI V GERMAIN SKINNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 236876
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003756-FC
GERMAIN SKINNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Cooper and C. L. Levin*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (victim under thirteen years of age), second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under thirteen years of age), and first-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). He was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to
concurrent prison terms of forty to sixty years for the first-degree CSC conviction, and fifteen to
thirty years for the second-degree CSC conviction, to be served consecutive to a twenty- to fortyyear term for the home invasion conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of breaking into a home during the night and sexually
assaulting an eleven-year-old girl. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial because of a
deadlocked jury. After the second trial, defendant was convicted as charged. The primary
defenses were that the complainant was not assaulted, and some of the DNA found at the scene
matched a different man—a relative of the complainant—who may have committed the offense.
Other DNA implicated defendant.
I. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial
attorney failed to move for a mistrial after the officer-in-charge testified on direct examination
that he had not supplied the defense with exculpatory discovery materials because “there is no
evidence to support [the claim] that Mr. Skinner is not the person responsible for this crime.
Everything has led to him – ah – from the early onset of the investigation, to what has been
testified here in court today regarding the DNA evidence. Had it not been Mr. Skinner, I’m
* Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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certain that – ah – there would be someone else sitting here [as defendant].” There was no
objection to this testimony.
A timely request for, and an appropriate instruction could have cured any prejudice.
Defendant’s lawyer, rather, sought, on cross-examination, to continue the inquiry whether the
officer had properly investigated other possible leads.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged conduct might be considered sound
trial strategy. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). It appears that
defendant’s trial attorney sought to use the officer’s testimony to buttress the defense claim that,
in a rush to judgment against defendant, the police were blind to evidence pointing to other
suspects.
II. Disqualification of Prosecutor
Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial when the assistant prosecutor
failed to disqualify himself from the prosecution of this matter. Defendant argues that the
assistant prosecutor was disqualified because he was endorsed as a witness.
The assistant prosecutor had conducted a pretrial interview with the complainant, and
defendant argued that the assistant prosecutor had influenced the complainant’s preliminary
examination identification testimony by suggesting that the person who committed the offenses
would be appearing in court. In a prior appeal, this Court agreed that the identification procedure
was unduly suggestive, but found that there was an independent basis for identification. People
v Skinner, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided September 12, 2000
(Docket No. 219452), slip op at 5.
A witness list contained a handwritten notation of the assistant prosecutor’s name. While
two names were added to the list in blue ink, and some names were crossed out in red ink or in
pencil, the assistant prosecutor’s name was written in black ink outside the area used for listing
witnesses. A later witness list, filed as part of an amended information, did not include the
assistant prosecutor’s name among the endorsed witnesses. Defendant argues that the assistant
prosecutor was added as a witness in the first trial on the prosecutor’s motion.
To be sure, the prosecutor had successfully added the assistant prosecutor’s name as a
potential rebuttal witness in the first trial.1 That did not control the proceedings in the second
trial. Defendant did not move for the assistant prosecutor’s disqualification—although defendant
knew that he had been added as a possible witness in the first trial—and the assistant prosecutor
did not testify at either trial.
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue, our review is limited to plain error
affecting his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
1
The People were represented by a different assistant prosecutor in the first trial.
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(1999). The assistant prosecutor did not testify, and defendant has not shown how he was
prejudiced. We conclude that the defendant’s substantial rights were not affected.
III. Denigration of Defense Counsel
Finally, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the assistant prosecutor
denigrated defense counsel in arguments before the jury. The test of prosecutorial misconduct is
whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case by case
basis, and the reviewing court examines the pertinent portion of the record and evaluates a
prosecutor’s remarks in context, People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123
(1999), and in light of defense arguments and the relationship the remarks bear to the evidence
admitted at trial. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Appellate relief is generally precluded if the defendant fails to timely and specifically
object, unless an objection could not have cured the error or a failure to review the issue would
result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557
(1994). A miscarriage of justice will not be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
comments could have been cured by a timely instruction. Watson, supra at 586; People v
Rivera, 216 Mich App 648, 651-652; 550 NW2d 593 (1996).
Defendant claims that the assistant prosecutor improperly accused defense counsel of
misleading the jury when the assistant prosecutor objected to the manner in which defense
counsel was introducing an exhibit:
Your Honor, I’m gonna object to the procedure he’s [defense counsel]
using. If he’s gonna be bringing sections of the [preliminary examination]
transcript, then he has to, by the Doctrine of Completeness, read the rest of the sec
– that section. Because the next section characterizes the exact terms he’s using.
Defense counsel “objected” to being interrupted. The court ruled that the assistant prosecutor’s
objection was valid under MRE 106.
We find no misconduct in the assistant prosecutor’s apparently valid suggestion that the
testimony was being taken out of context. The court agreed with the assistant prosecutor’s
objection, and defendant does not dispute that ruling. We note that defense counsel made a
similar argument during trial that the assistant prosecutor could use the “doctrine of
completeness” if he “thinks I left anything out.” Considered in the context of a valid objection,
the assistant prosecutor’s remark did not denigrate defense counsel.
The assistant prosecutor also remarked in voicing objections that the defendant’s attorney
had made a “gross mischaracterization” and a “mischaracterization” of the testimonial record.
After defendant objected to the first reference, the assistant prosecutor withdrew his objection,
and the phrase “gross mischaracterization.” Thus, defendant was granted relief with regard to
this first reference, and he has not shown prejudice.
Defense counsel did not object to the second reference to “mischaracterization,” although
the attorneys argued about which version of the testimonial record was correct. The trial court
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expressed agreement with the assistant prosecutor’s recollection of the testimony. Defendant has
not shown plain error in this regard. The trial court agreed that the assistant prosecutor’s
comment was factually correct. In any event, the assistant prosecutor’s comments did not
suggest that defense counsel was intentionally attempting to mislead the jury. Defendant was not
denied a fair trial by the assistant prosecutor’s objections.
Defendant claims that the assistant prosecutor also committed misconduct when he asked
an expert witness whether additional DNA testing could be performed so long after the offense.
In his examination, the assistant prosecutor asked, “So, for example, if [defense counsel] doesn’t
like that you opened the known [sample; from known persons] five days before you opened the
unknown – .” That question was interrupted by a defense request for a side-bar conference. No
specific objection was noted on the record, but, when the questioning resumed, the assistant
prosecutor asked the question a different way.2 We find no error.
The question was responsive to a prior question from defense counsel regarding the
preferable way to test samples. In cross-examination of the DNA expert, defense counsel asked
many pointed questions about testing protocols designed to prevent contamination, including the
preferability of testing the unknown samples from a crime scene before the known samples are
opened or tested. In this context, the question did not denigrate defense counsel, but instead
related back to the preferable manner of testing samples.
During another point in the testimony of the DNA expert, the assistant prosecutor was
questioning the witness about prior incidents of contamination:
Q. . . . When he [defense counsel] was talking about the two instances of
contamination, what’s he talking about?
A. He’s talking about transferring DNA in the form of cells to another sample,
inadvertently, by mistake.
Q. And both those times, was it – was it detected?
A. Ah – In – In the case or scenario that he gave in terms of 450 cells versus a
very concentrated stain, you may not detect the contamination that was
transferred. Ah – If – If the sample is quite le-weak, you may see a
contribution.
Q. No. He [defense counsel] just snuck in at this last – his last question –
2
The assistant prosecutor rephrased the question as follows:
Just so I know – We’re not gonna talk about anything that we’ve just been
talking about. That conversation’s over, okay? Just so I know, [defense counsel]
was asking you, “well, if you opened the unknown versus the known, which is
preferable,” I thought you testified you opened the known how many days apart
from the unknown?
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Please don’t refer to me like that. Please, Mr. [assistant
prosecutor].
THE COURT: Yeah.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I think it [the original defense question] was fair
inquiry and I object to the reference of me.
Again, the assistant prosecutor rephrased the question to avoid referring to defense counsel. The
court agreed with defendant’s objection, and defendant did not request a curative instruction.
Defendant has not shown that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the assistant prosecutor’s
unfortunate choice of words.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Charles L. Levin
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