IN RE EST OF RICHARD L HAYNES DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of RICHARD L. HAYNES, Deceased.
THOMAS J. HAYNES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
EDDIE R. BELLERS and BARBARA BELLERS,
No. 235232
Jackson Probate Court
LC No. 99-000001-SE
Respondent-Appellants.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents, in this will contest, Barbara Bellers and Eddie R. Bellers appeal as of right
from an order setting aside a will, a power of attorney, and a quit claim deed. We affirm.
The decedent in the instant case was at one time married to respondent Barbara Bellers.
Barbara Bellers divorced the decedent in 1993, but moved back in with him in the spring of
1994. Barbara Bellers resided with decedent at his farm on Curtis Road until his death on
September 17, 1999. In April of 1999, decedent learned that he had terminal cancer. As his
condition worsened, Barbara Bellers managed the farm and became his primary caregiver. On
the morning of August 17, 1999, decedent underwent surgery to remove a stint that had been
placed in his liver. Later that same day, decedent signed a will prepared by Barbara Bellers’ son,
respondent Eddie Bellers. The will left $100 each to the decedent’s three sons and $1 to his
daughter. But the will left the Curtis Road Property to Barbara Bellers and the remainder of
decedent’s estate to Eddie Bellers. The following day, the decedent signed a document granting
Eddie Bellers durable power of attorney. On August 25, 1999, under his authority as the
decedent’s attorney in fact, Eddie Bellers signed a quitclaim deed transferring the Curtis Road
property to Barbara Bellers. Following the decedent’s death, his son, petitioner Thomas Haynes,
filed suit challenging the will. The probate court found that respondents had exercised undue
influence and set aside the will, the power of attorney and the resulting quitclaim deed.
On appeal, respondents first contend that the probate court erred in not granting their
motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.
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We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict de novo. Sniecinski v BCBSM, 469
Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). We examine “the evidence and all legitimate inferences
from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and grant the motion only if the
evidence viewed in this light fails to establish a claim as a matter of law. Id.
In Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529, 537; 251 NW2d 77 (1976), the Michigan Supreme Court
stated the element necessary for a prima facie case of undue influence as follows:
[I]t must be shown that the grantor was subjected to threats, misrepresentation,
undue flattery, fraud, or physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower
volition, destroy free agency and impel the grantor to act against his inclination
and free will.
A presumption that this standard is met arises when the evidence shows the existence of three
factors. Id. These three factors are: (1) existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship
between the grantor and a fiduciary; (2) a transaction benefiting the fiduciary or an interest he
represents; and (3) the fiduciary must have had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision
in the transaction. Id.
The creation of such a presumption of undue influence does not shift the ultimate burden
of proof. Kar, supra at 538. The petitioner must still prove the existence of undue influence
based on the preponderance of the evidence. Id. But the presumption creates a “mandatory
inference” in favor of the petitioner. Id. at 541. The opposing party must present some evidence
tending to rebut the presumption or the petitioner is deemed to have “satisf[ied] the burden of
persuasion.” Id. at 542.
This Court applied the standard from Kar, supra, in In re Conant Estate, 130 Mich App
493; 343 NW2d 593 (1983), and found the existence of a fiduciary relationship because the
decedent granted the respondent, her friend and caregiver, a general power of attorney. Id. at
498. And the respondent benefited in that she was given interests in the decedent’s savings
account and land. Id. Finally, this Court stated that the relationship between the decedent and
the respondent was such that she "had the opportunity to influence decedent's decisions as
regards those interests." Id. These factors combined to create a presumption of undue influence.
Id. at 499.
Respondents in the present case argue that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
of an opportunity to influence the decedent. The trial court found respondents’ opportunity to
influence was evident on the face of general power of attorney granted to Eddie Bellers and the
quitclaim deed with which he transferred the Curtis Road property to Barbara Bellers.
Respondents assert that the fact that Eddie Bellers was granted power of attorney is insufficient
to show an opportunity to influence decedent’s decision to grant that power.
The opportunity for undue influence is only relevant before Eddie Bellers obtained the
power of attorney. Once Eddie Bellers obtained the power of attorney, he did not have the need
to influence the decedent because he had absolute control over the decedent’s property. The fact
that he quitclaimed the decedent’s farm to Barbara Bellers after obtaining the power of attorney
is probative of the second element necessary for a presumption of undue influence, but not the
third. In order to create a prima facie case of undue influence, there must have been an
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opportunity for Eddie Bellers to exert influence before decedent signed the will or the document
granting power of attorney.
Although, the mere existence of a power of attorney does not automatically mean that the
recipient had the opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision, we find that petitioner in the
present case provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that respondents had such an
opportunity. Like the respondent in Conant, supra, Barbara Bellers was the decedent’s
companion and primary caregiver during his long illness. And the will itself declares Eddie
Bellers to be the “friend and confidant” of the decedent. As in Conant, supra, these relationships
were such that respondents had ample opportunity to exert influence over decedent’s decisions to
create a will and grant Eddie Bellers power of attorney. The trial court mistakenly found the
opportunity to influence inherent in the power of attorney. Regardless, sufficient evidence of an
opportunity for undue influence existed. We will not reverse a trial court’s decision when the
right result was reached for the wrong reason. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 458; 616
NW2d 229 (2000).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, sufficient evidence existed to
create a presumption of undue influence. At the time of the directed verdict motion, respondents
had yet to present any rebuttal evidence. Therefore, petitioner had not only presented a prima
facie case, but was entitled to a mandatory inference of undue influence. See Kar, supra at 541542. Upon a de novo review, the trial court’s decision denying respondent’s motion for a
directed verdict is affirmed.
Respondents next argue that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow a lay
witness to give opinion testimony regarding the decedent’s lucidity on the day of his surgery, the
day he signed the will at issue We disagree. Decisions concerning the admissibility of lay
opinions are “within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion.” Chastain v General Motors Corp (On Remand), 254 Mich App 576,
588; 657 NW2d 804 (2002), citing Bachman v Swan Harbor Assoc, 252 Mich App 400, 438; 653
NW2d 415 (2002). Such abuse exists only where “an unprejudiced person, considering the facts
on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling
made.” Id., (citations omitted).
The witness, Carol Eaton, paid the decedent a visit at the hospital on the afternoon of
August 17, 1999. While at the hospital, Eaton served as a witness for decedent’s will. At trial
Eaton testified that decedent “knew exactly what he was doin’ [sic]” when he asked her to sign
the will. The trial court sustained an objection to this statement on the grounds that the witness
did not have sufficient foundation to give an opinion as to decedent’s competence. Eaton’s next
statement, that decedent “seemed like he was in his right mind,” was, similarly, not allowed by
the trial court. The trial court, then, allowed Eaton to testify that at the time she was in the
hospital room with decedent he “appeared to be aware of what he was doing.”
Under MRE 701, lay witnesses may give opinion testimony “where it is rationally based
on the witness’ perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact at issue.” Richardson v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 213 Mich App 447,
455; 540 NW2d 696 (1995). Such testimony is admissible concerning a person’s testamentary
capacity or lack thereof if the witness first testifies to facts that are consistent or inconsistent with
the testator’s sanity. In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich 150, 175; 134 NW2d 148 (1965).
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Despite this general rule, lay witnesses may not give opinion testimony in all situations.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Moore v Lederle Laboratories, 392 Mich 289, 295; 220 NW2d
400 (1974), (quoting 2 Jones on Evidence (6th ed), § 14:9, p 605) provided:
“While the qualifications of an ordinary or nonexpert witness to give
testimony as to the inferences he has drawn from the facts he has perceived are
tested by the capacity of people generally to draw reliable conclusions from given
facts, if the conclusion to be drawn is beyond such capacity and dependent on
specialized knowledge, education, experience or training, the witness, if he has
such special qualifications, testifies as an expert witness and not as an ordinary
witness.”
In Moore, supra, the question concerned whether a witness could give “an opinion as to
whether a person could have died within twenty four hours of a particular disease if that person
did not receive a particular drug.” Id. The Court held that it was error for the trial court to admit
the witness’ opinion where there was no foundation laid to show that he possessed sufficient
knowledge of the effects of the disease if untreated or the effects of the drug in arresting the
disease. Id. at 295-296.
In the present case, the trial court sustained petitioner’s objection to Eaton’s opinion
testimony on grounds similar to those in Moore, supra. Eaton attempted to testify that decedent
“knew exactly what he was doin’[sic]” and that “he seemed like he was in his right mind”.
While such statements might ordinarily be admissible lay opinions, more was required in this
situation. As with the witness in Moore, supra, no foundation was laid showing Eaton had
specialized knowledge concerning the effects of a serious medical condition on a person’s
mental state soon after the person emerges from anesthesia. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by restricting Eaton’s testimony regarding decedent’s testamentary capacity because
there was no showing she had specialized knowledge of the possible effects of the surgery and
anesthesia. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting the scope of
Eaton’s testimony.
Respondents’ final argument is that because they presented evidence rebutting the
presumption of undue influence, petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence for the trial court
to find the existence of undue influence. We disagree.
A suit to set aside a transaction because of undue influence involves an action sounding
in equity. Conant, supra at 493. We review equitable determinations de novo, but review the
supporting findings of fact for clear error. Forest City Enterprises, Inc v Leemon Oil Co, 228
Mich App 57, 67; 577 NW2d 150 (1998). We will not reverse findings of fact made by a
probate court sitting without a jury unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Erickson Estate, 202
Mich App 329, 331; 508 NW2d 181 (1993). Findings are clearly erroneous when the “reviewing
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is
evidence to support the finding.” In re Bennett Estate, 255 Mich App 545, 549; 662 NW2d 772
(2003), citing In re Wojan Estate, 126 Mich App 50, 52; 337 NW2d 308 (1983).
The Michigan Supreme Court in In re Karmey Estate, 468 Mich 68, 75; 658 NW2d 796
(2003) (citing Kar, supra at 537), provided the following standard for finding undue influence:
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To establish undue influence it must be shown that the grantor was subjected to
threats, misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or physical or moral coercion
sufficient to overpower volition, destroy free agency and impel the grantor to act
against his inclination and free will. Motive, opportunity, or even ability to
control, in the absence of affirmative evidence that it was exercised, are not
sufficient.
In deciding whether this standard was met in the present case, the trial court first
examined the presumption of undue influence it had found at the close of the petitioner’s case in
chief and determined that it had been rebutted. But the presentation of rebuttal evidence does not
totally dissipate the evidentiary value of such a presumption. Kar, supra at 541. “Unless the
defendant’s controverting evidence meet[s] the standard for a directed verdict,” the presumption
continues to create a permissible inference of undue influence. Id. Although petitioner was no
longer entitled to a mandatory inference, the presumption continued to provide a valid
evidentiary basis for the trial court’s finding of undue influence.
In addition to the presumption, the trial court had testimony on which to base its findings.
Under MCR 2.613(C) we must defer to the probate court on matters of credibility. Erickson,
supra at 331, citing In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). And we give
“broad deference to findings made by the probate court because of its unique vantage point
regarding witnesses, and other influencing factors.” Id.
In determining whether decedent was unduly influenced to “act against his inclinations
and free will” the trial court considered the testimony of numerous witnesses to determine what
his inclinations were. The court found the testimony of the decedent’s friend, Ronald
Konopacki, to be particularly credible. Konopack, stated that decedent was adamant in wanting
to provide for Barbara Bellers, John Haynes, and John Haynes’ children. The court expressed
concern over the testimony of Karen Riter, the hospital employee who notarized the decedent’s
power of attorney. Riter testified that decedent had stated “his children did not deserve anything
because they never stood behind him.” The court based its doubts on the fact that John Haynes
and perhaps Thomas Haynes stayed at the farm to help care for the decedent. The trial court
found that decedent would have had no reason to exclude John Haynes from his will. Because of
this the court held that the will and the power of attorney were contrary to the decedent’s will
and the products of undue influence.
The testimony, combined with the permissible inference created by the rebutted
presumption, provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to have found undue influence. We
must defer to the trial court's determination concerning Konopacki and Riter’s credibility. See
Erickson, supra at 331. And we give broad deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. See Id.
As such, the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Based on these factual
findings, upon a de novo review, we find that the trial court did not err in finding the existence of
undue influence. See Forest Lity Enterprises, Inc, supra at 67.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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