PEOPLE OF MI V JOHNNY RAY BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242861
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 01-000724-FH
JOHNNY RAY BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm, MCL 750.84, prisoner possessing a weapon, MCL 800.283(4), three counts of
assaulting a prison employee, MCL 750.197c, and malicious destruction of personal property
under $200, MCL 750.377(a)(1)(d). Defendant was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’
imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, five to seven and a
half years’ imprisonment for the prisoner possessing a weapon conviction, four to six years’
imprisonment for each of the three counts of assaulting a prison employee, and ninety-three
days’ imprisonment for the malicious destruction of personal property under $200 conviction.
All sentences were to run concurrently to each other, but consecutive to the life sentence
defendant is presently serving on a separate offense.
On appeal defendant argues that his conviction must be vacated because he was
incompetent to stand trial. Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial due to prejudice
resulting from the presence of leg irons during trial and also ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant finally argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred when it
upwardly departed from the guidelines. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences
because the record does not support defendant’s challenges.
Defendant was an inmate at Huron Valley Correctional Center (HVCC), mental health
division. On February 4, 2001 at approximately 1:40 a.m., defendant and two other inmates,
Palmer and Strader were involved in an altercation with prison personnel. Defendant planned
and then carried out the plan to cause a melee in the HVCC using metal towel bars in an attempt
to be transferred out of the unit. During the incident defendant attacked three forensic security
aids at the HVCC. Defendant admitted to striking one of the forensic security aids, William
Taylor, with the metal towel bar fifteen times.
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Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his requests for a forensic
evaluation on the issue of his competence to stand trial. A criminal defendant is presumed
competent to stand trial absent a showing that, because of his mental condition, he is incapable of
understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a
rational manner. MCL 330.2020(1); People v Mette, 243 Mich App 318, 331; 621 NW2d 713
(2000). Nonetheless, a defendant is entitled to a competency hearing when evidence
demonstrates a bona fide doubt as to his competency. People v Harris, 185 Mich App 100, 102;
460 NW2d 239 (1990). The issue of incompetence can only be raised by evidence of
incompetence. People v Whyte, 165 Mich App 409, 413; 418 NW2d 484 (1988). “Where such
evidence was presented to the trial court, and no such hearing was held, appellate courts may
order a new trial.” Id. However, the decision regarding the existence of a bona fide doubt will
only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 412.
Defense counsel sought both a competency evaluation and a criminal responsibility
evaluation at a hearing conducted prior to trial. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
the psychiatric criminal responsibility evaluation. At the hearing on the motions, defense
counsel stated he could not provide any specific evidence showing that defendant was not
competent to assist in his defense or understand the proceedings. Upon hearing this, the trial
court denied defendant’s request for a competency evaluation. Clearly, defendant cited no
evidence that demonstrated a bona fide doubt regarding his competency. Harris, supra, 185
Mich App 102. Because defendant introduced no evidence of incompetence before the trial
court, the issue of incompetence could not properly have been raised, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the competency evaluation. Whyte, supra, 165 Mich App
412-413. Likewise, contrary to defendant’s related argument on appeal, we do not find
defendant’s trial counsel’s handling of this issue deficient. Indeed, counsel requested both a
competency evaluation and a criminal responsibility evaluation, and cannot now on appeal be
held responsible for the lack of evidence of incompetence. We do not find defendant was denied
the ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was severely prejudiced
when his leg irons were removed from him in the presence of the jury. This Court reviews a trial
court’s decision to allow the restraint of a defendant during trial for an abuse of discretion under
the totality of the circumstances. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 404-405; 552 NW2d 663
(1996). Freedom from shackling is an essential component of a fair trial. People v Williams,
173 Mich App 312, 314; 433 NW2d 356 (1988). Therefore, a defendant should not be shackled
during trial unless extraordinary circumstances demand it. People v Jankowski, 130 Mich App
143, 146; 342 NW2d 911 (1983). Extraordinary circumstances include preventing a defendant’s
escape, protecting courtroom observers from injury, and maintaining order during proceedings.
People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 426; 521 NW2d 255 (1994); Williams, supra, at 314.
Here, the trial court stated prior to trial that defendant’s handcuffs would be removed
during trial, but his leg irons would remain on because the jury would not be able to see them
due to the seating arrangement. Defense counsel did not object to the fact that defendant was
restrained during trial and actually only asked the court to provide a curative instruction to the
jury regarding the restraints. Because defendant did not object to restraints, this issue is not
preserved for our review. People v Solomon (Amended Opinion), 220 Mich App 527, 531-532;
560 NW2d 651 (1996). In any event, the record does not indicate that the jury actually ever saw
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defendant’s leg irons. The record does indicate that defendant’s leg restraints were removed so
defendant could take the stand in his own defense. In accordance with defense counsel’s request,
the trial court provided a curative instruction before the jury began to deliberate. Specifically,
the trial court instructed them that the fact that defendant was in leg restraints was not to be
considered evidence and that it must not affect the verdict in any way. And given the nature of
two of the charges, prisoner possessing a weapon, MCL 800.283(4), and assault of a prison
employee, MCL 750.197c, jurors would normally expect some restraint of a prisoner defendant.
Since we have no other evidence to the contrary, it appears that the jury was unable to
actually see the restraints. In order to justify reversal based on the presence of restraints during
trial, defendant must show that prejudice resulted. Solomon, supra, 220 Mich App 532; People v
Robinson, 172 Mich App 650, 654; 432 NW2d 390 (1988). Even if the jury did see the
restraints, any prejudice was cured by the trial court’s instruction. Thus we find that defendant
has not shown he was prejudiced by being required to wear leg restraints during trial. Id.
Next, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
This Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575,
579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, generally a
defendant must show that trial counsel’s performance did not meet an objective standard of
reasonableness, that such performance affected the outcome of the trial, and that an outcome so
affected was unfair. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
The right to counsel that the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee, U.S.
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, sec 20, is the right to effective assistance of counsel. United
States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 657 (1984); People v Pubrat 451
Mich 589, 594; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). Effective assistance is presumed, and a defendant bears
a heavy burden to prove to the contrary. LeBlanc, supra, 465 Mich 578.
Defendant states that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because his
counsel did not seek a jury instruction for felonious assault, MCL 750.82. The decision to
request a lesser offense instruction is a matter of trial strategy. People v Sardy, 216 Mich App
111, 116; 549 NW2d 23 (1996). After reviewing the record, we find that defendant has not
overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on the lesser crime
of felonious assault was sound trial strategy. Evidence was presented at trial that defendant
planned to fashion weapons out of towel bars and then executed that plan. Defendant stated that
he would do whatever he had to get out of the psychiatric facility. Defendant admitted at trial
that he struck Taylor fifteen times with the metal bar. There was also testimony that after the
incident defendant told an HVCC employee that he hoped one of the victims would die.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the evidence adduced at trial does support an instruction on
assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.84, and defense counsel did not err when
he did not request an instruction on felonious assault. “Trial counsel is not required to advocate
a meritless position.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not remove a
juror who was previously employed at the HVCC. Counsel’s decision relating to the selection of
jurors is generally a matter of trial strategy. People v Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 259; 631
NW2d 1 (2001). Defendant argues specifically that his counsel should have excused Juror
Robinson because he had worked at HVCC before retiring, was annoyed because this was his
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third time on a jury, and had recently had surgery. During voir dire, the trial court inquired about
any possible bias on Juror Robinson’s part. Juror Robinson stated that his previous employment
would not affect his verdict. And, the trial court stated that arrangements would be made for any
special accommodations necessitated by Juror Robinson’s recent surgery. Last, because a juror
seems “annoyed” is not cause for removal from a jury. Upon the existing record, we can find no
obvious cause for Juror Robinson’s removal. We will not evaluate trial counsel’s decisions here
with the benefit of hindsight. Id. Because defendant has failed to show prejudice and failed to
overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s method of jury selection was sound trial
strategy, we find that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
In any event, taken individually or grouped together, defendant’s assignment of errors has
not established ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel’s
performance did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness, that such performance
affected the outcome of the trial, and that an outcome so affected was unfair. Rodgers, supra,
248 Mich App 714.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court did not
articulate sufficient and compelling reasons to justify an upward departure. Specifically,
defendant states that the trial court’s reasons were not objective and verifiable, were already
taken into account in the guidelines, and were not based on accurate information.
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s determination of the existence of a
sentencing factor. People v Babcock (Babcock III), 469 Mich 247, 273; ___ NW2d ___ (2003),
quoting People v Babcock (Babcock I), 244 Mich App 64, 75-76; 624 NW2d 479 (2000). We
review de novo the determination that the sentencing factor is objective and verifiable. Babcock
III, supra. The phrase “objective and verifiable” has been defined to mean that the facts to be
considered by the court must be actions or occurrences that are external to the minds of the
judge, defendant, the prosecution, and others involved in the case, and must be capable of being
confirmed. People v Hill, 192 Mich App 102, 112; 480 NW2d 913 (1991).
We review for an abuse of discretion the determination that the objective and verifiable
factor constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart from a mandated minimum
sentence. Babcock III, supra, at 274. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
chooses an outcome falling outside the permissible principled range of outcomes.” Id.
The trial court must impose a minimum sentence within the guidelines range unless a
departure from the guidelines is otherwise permitted. MCL 769.34(2); Babcock III, supra, at
272, see also 259 n 13. To constitute a substantial and compelling reason for departing from a
mandated sentence, a reason must be objective and verifiable, and must irresistibly hold the
attention of the court. Babcock III, supra, at 257, quoting People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62, 67;
528 NW2d 176 (1995). A substantial and compelling reason “exists only in exceptional cases.”
Babcock III, supra, at 258, quoting Fields, supra, at 62, 67-68.
The record indicates that defendant’s sentencing guidelines range on the felony
convictions as a second habitual offender include thirty-eight to ninety-five months’
imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, twenty-two to fortyseven months’ imprisonment for the prisoner possessing a weapon conviction, and fourteen to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment for each of the three counts of assaulting a prison employee.
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The trial court adopted the prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum on its Sentencing Information
Report Departure Evaluation form and sentenced defendant exactly as requested by the
prosecutor to 120 to 180 months’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily
harm conviction, sixty to ninety months’ imprisonment for the prisoner possessing a weapon
conviction, and forty-eight to seventy-two months’ imprisonment for each of the three counts of
assaulting a prison employee.
The trial court, at sentencing, read directly from the prosecutor’s sentencing
memorandum to list the reasons for the upward departure. The trial court stated as follows:
This is not the Defendant’s first instance of severely assaulting the
employees of his place of confinement.
The attack in this case was premeditated and perpetrated against unarmed
forensic security aides, the very people from the Defendant is bound to take his
orders. There is no, absolutely no justification for the attack. The most severe
attack was against an aide who Defendant readily admits was a good guy with
whom he had no previous problems but for the fact that the aide had prevented the
Defendant from committing suicide.
The attack was made against the third shift even though it was the
employees of the second shift that the Defendant stated were abusive in denying
him medication. The Defendant was the leader of the offense and although the
People have scored the Defendant at OV14 as the leader, that scoring fails to
accurately account for the efforts of the Defendant, that he went through in order
to perpetrate the offense. When he failed to recruit Mr. Strader he went forth and
recruited Mr. Palmer. When Mr. Palmer was unable to remove his towel bar on
his own, the Defendant removed the towel bar from [sic] Mr. Palmer.
Defendant’s plan had included taking hostages and raping the woman in order to
gain media attention.
The Defendant’s total rescore is well above the top score of 75. The
Defendant’s expressed no genuine remorse for his actions. While the Court
cannot consider the Defendant’s choice not to make a statement for the presentence report or at sentencing, the Court can and should consider the fact that at
the time of this offense the Defendant expressed that it [sic] his hope that the
victim, William Taylor would die. His only arguable expression of remorse came
after the incident [sic] was speaking with the officer in charge at which time
Defendant stated that he had been praying for Mr. Taylor.
The severity of the injury suffered by Mr. Taylor and the Defendant’s
consistent efforts to keep other employees from coming to Mr. Taylor’s assistance
demonstrate his true intentions and lack of remorse.
In this case, the trial court departed upward on each of the five felony convictions, including
convictions for three separate offenses, assault with intent to do great bodily harm, prisoner
possessing a weapon, and assault of a prison employee. Our Supreme Court in Babcock III,
supra, counsels that, “[a] trial court must articulate on the record a substantial and compelling
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reason for its particular departure, and explain why this reason justifies that departure.”
Babcock III, supra, at 272, citing MCL 769.34(3) and People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 9; 609
NW2d 557 (2000). In retrospective application of Babcock III, supra, we note the trial court did
not list particular reasons for each departure on the felony counts and did not explain the
justifications for each guideline departure. This is error, however the trial court’s recitation does
facilitate our review of whether the factors relied upon by the trial court constitute substantial
and compelling reasons to depart from mandated minimum sentences. We are compelled by the
Babcock III Court to examine the sentencing record. In Babcock III, supra, our Supreme Court
declares the following:
[I]f the trial court departs from the guidelines range by twelve months and
articulates reasons A, B, and C to justify this departure, and if the Court of
Appeals determines that reasons A and B are not substantial and compelling
reasons, but that C is, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the trial court
would have departed from the guidelines range by twelve months on the basis of
reason C alone. Babcock III, supra, at 261.
We are satisfied that the majority of the factors articulated by the trial court are objective
and verifiable. Daniel, supra, 462 Mich 6-7; People v Perry, 216 Mich App 277, 282; 549
NW2d 42 (1996). The record supports the facts that defendant has previously assaulted
corrections employees, meticulously planned the attack at the HVCC including recruiting other
inmates to assist him with the plot, had an OV score well above the highest score, and expressed
no genuine remorse for his actions and the injuries that resulted. These factors “keenly” and
“irresistibly” grab our attention and they are of “considerable worth” in deciding the length of
the sentence. Babcock III, supra, at 272. We note that whether the victim in the case was a
“good guy” is a subjective factor and thus is not objective and verifiable, however, here,
defendant admitted he had no previous issues with Taylor. After reviewing the record in this
case and scrutinizing the sentencing transcript, we are certain the trial court would have departed
from the guidelines range by the amount that it departed on each of the sentences on the basis of
the objective and verifiable factors alone.
We affirm.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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